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Abstract
A Coordination-Based Approach to Subnational Variations in Split-Ticket Voting: The
Case of Ghana 1996-2016

Samuel K. Darkwa

This dissertation seeks to explain the causes of split-ticket voting (skirt and blouse voting)
in emerging democracies like Ghana. The analysis carried out here has been approached at three
levels. This is because voters’ decisions in the voting booth are affected by factors within the larger
political environment which are often beyond the individual voter. Thus, the three approaches
employed here consider individual-level, constituency-level, and elite-level factors that affect the
phenomenon. In each case different datasets were used to examine split-ticket voting. The analysis
reveals that the individual-level factors (demographic characteristics and political information
variables) are weak in explaining ticket splitting. Aside from their statistically weak relationship
with ticket splitting, they are inconsistent in explaining the phenomenon. The most important
factors shaping split-ticket voting, however, operate at the elite-level, and are coordination based.
Using the Afrobarometer survey, constituency level electoral data, and a fieldwork survey, the
analysis finds elite-level factors which are based on coordination successes and failures within and
between parties as the best predictors of ticket splitting. The reason for this is that elite coordination
successes and failures affect the available choice sets at any given election and these largely affect
ticket splitting. I argue that differences in ticket splitting are better explained by variation in the
degree of coordination among elite actors than by variation in characteristics of individual voters
such as political sophistication.
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION
“… the larger point is that the particular mix of mechanisms underlying ticket splitting will evolve
as democracies mature.” (Helmke 2009, 77).
“Taking ticket splitting in a comparative direction will necessarily expand the definition of ticket
splitting commonly used in the American politics literature” (Burden and Helmke 2009, 2)
Split-ticket voting continues to attract research attention in developed as well as emerging
democracies due to its effects on democratic representation and accountability (Burden and
Helmke 2009; Helmke 2009). This is because the underlying mechanisms of the phenomenon
continue to evolve as democracies evolve and this is overwhelmingly prevalent in emerging
democracies like Ghana. Aside from the evolution of the underlying mechanisms of the
phenomenon, there are discrete nuances in factors that underpin split-ticket voting in different
settings though the fundamental cause may be uniform in most settings. As such, the study of ticket
splitting needs to expand beyond how it is viewed from the lenses of American and Western
European scholars though their work can form the basis of the study. One place where ticket
splitting is remarkably pronounced and has fascinated both the electorate and party elites is Ghana.
Political parties usually have strong incentive to encourage straight ticket voting so that
voters support all their candidates on the ballot. In Ghana, split-ticket voting is so common that it
has a special name, “skirt and blouse voting1” denoting a two-piece dress instead of one straight
dress (Daddieh 2011). It is associated with voting for a presidential candidate from one political
party and for a parliamentary candidate from a different political party in a concurrent election.
Not only do we see evidence of split-ticket voting in some constituencies in Ghana, but we also
see some evidence that party supporters and elites strategically encourage split-ticket voting under
certain conditions2. Further, civil society may encourage split-ticket voting to achieve certain
1
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goals. My dissertation will explore the reasons for this phenomenon and contribute to our
understanding of split-ticket voting, elite behavior, and Ghanaian electoral politics.
Given that we see some evidence that party supporters and elites strategically encourage
split-ticket voting under certain conditions, it is important to consider different questions when
split-ticket voting is studied in Ghana alongside the conventional questions such as: “why will
some voters split their tickets, but others will not?” Thus, the following questions become relevant
when we study split-ticket voting in Ghana. Why would party elites, or supporters of a political
party want either the party’s presidential or parliamentary candidate lose the election in a particular
constituency? Why would a presidential and or parliamentary candidate of a political party
advocate either overtly or covertly for split-ticket voting? Again, why would a supporter, a
member, or an official of a political party vote to split the ballot, roll-off the ballot, or abstain?
What are the effects of ticket splitting on democratic representation and accountability; is the
phenomenon promoting or hurting Ghana’s democracy? This dissertation argues that skirt and
blouse voting is helping the country’s young democracy in two important ways. First, it creates
cross-party cohesion especially through strategic moves of party elites from different political
parties to form electoral coalition with diverse arrangements to boost their performance which
inadvertently further induce ticket splitting. It has been argued that successful democracy is largely
the acts of consensually united elites who see politics as bargaining based on the principle of give
to get (Best and Higley 2010; Higley and Burton 1989, 2006; Higley et al. 1991). Thus, the
strategic moves of political elites through bargaining often create ticket splitting and reduce the
incidence of winner-takes-all that often sows the seeds of disaffection among disunited elites
which has a potential to cause political instability (Best and Higley 2010; Higley and Burton 1989,
2006; Higley et al. 1991). Second, ticket splitting has direct effect on democratic representation
2
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and accountability. Here, a voter who is candidate oriented could vote for the most viable
candidates irrespective of their party affiliation and in so doing vote based on competence instead
of on party identification. This also ensures political accountability in the sense that political actors
are challenged to perform or face the wrath of the electorates.
This is not to say that ticket splitting has no adverse consequences on government
policies/performance and political accountability. It has been found that ticket splitting can create
divided government that can dilute clarity of responsibility among a governing coalition and thus
affect government policy formulation and implementation (Burden and Kimball 2009; Powell and
Whitten 1993). In this way, the electorates are unable to adequately hold political actors
responsible for their performance (Powell and Whitten 1993). Be it as it may, ticket splitting has
effects on democratic representation and accountability and it is important to study how elite
interactions and voter level factors contribute to it. It worth pointing out that in Ghana, the general
impression of the masses is that split-ticketing safeguards the public’s interests as politicians
cannot condone and connive to engage in misappropriating the nation’s scarce resources (Dadzie
2008; Lartey-Adjei 2012). In the study of split-ticket voting, not much attention is typically paid
to party elites because the phenomenon is considered voter behavior reflected by individual choice
made in the voting booth (Burden and Kimball 2009; Roscoe 2003). However, because the
individual choice is a function of more than individual forces, it is imperative to include such
factors when evaluating ticket splitting if we want to get to the bottom of the phenomenon. In fact,
voter choice (electoral outcome) is influenced by how electoral systems, elite interactions, and
alliances affect the choice sets that are available to the electorate (Cox 1997, 1999; Roscoe 2003).
Therefore, since voter preference is structured by electoral systems and elite interactions
(coordination), this dissertation includes these factors in evaluating ticket splitting and this is
3
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where the Ghanaian ticket splitting is especially relevant. Studying ticket splitting this way will
provide meaningful insights into split-ticket voting in other jurisdictions especially in emerging
democracies. Thus, this dissertation will analyze split-ticket voting by considering both voter-level
and elite-level factors under a single member first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. It will also explore
multiple datasets (large-N surveys from Afrobarometer, aggregate electoral datasets, and
fieldwork carried out by the author) to analyze split-ticket voting.
The chapter will first define split-ticket voting and show how the Ghanaian concept is
similar and different from the conventional definition. Second, the dissertation will review past
research on split-ticket voting. This is critical because, it will help the present study identify what
has been done in the subfield and thus, justify the present study based on how it intends to extend
our knowledge by building on what others have done thus far. The chapter will distinguish between
split-ticket voting and strategic voting and end by providing a brief overview of the dissertation.
1.2 DEFINITION FOR TICKET SPLITTING
Burden and Helmke (2009) provide a conceptual framework for ticket splitting that
expresses the phenomenon as “a ticket is split if voter i votes for party j in contest r and votes for
party ~j in some other contest” (Burden and Helmke 2009, 2). From this framework, split-ticket
voting refers to an aspect of voting behavior where a member of the electorate votes for a candidate
of one political party in an election for one office while voting for a candidate of another party in
a concurrent election for a different office. For instance, on the same polling day, a voter may vote
for a National Democratic Congress (NDC) presidential candidate and for a New Patriotic Party
(NPP)3 legislative candidate or vice-versa. Thus, ticket splitting occurs when a voter casts at least
one vote for a candidate/list representing one party and at least one other vote for a candidate/list
representing a different party (or independent). These ballots must be cast at the same election4 for
4

Samuel K. Darkwa
candidates contesting seats in the same institution (e.g., a legislature using a mixed-member
electoral system) or different institutions (e.g. concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections).
Ticket splitting can further be classified into two dimensions (direction and timing). With
respect to the direction, the focus is on political institutions (e.g. presidential and parliamentary
elections) or the electoral systems involved (e.g. SMD plurality, proportional representation [PR],
or mixed-member electoral system). Again, when we speak of ticket splitting in directional terms,
we are interested in whether it is vertical (different offices: e.g. presidential and parliamentary) or
horizontal (same office but under different electoral systems: e.g. a legislature using a mixedmember electoral system). Conversely, ticket splitting in respect to timing considers whether the
phenomenon occurred in concurrent or non-concurrent elections (Campbell and Miller 1957;
Burden and Helmke 2009). These classifications are briefly illustrated by Table 1.1 below.
Table 1.1: Ticket Splitting Across Offices and Time.
Concurrent

Non-concurrent

Horizontal

Mixed member systems elections (Karp et al.

Staggered multi-member

2002; Burden 1998; Moser and Scheiner 2005)

elections

Presidential-legislative elections (Brunell and

Midterm and by-elections

Grofman 1998, 2009; Helmke 2009)

(Chandra 2007, 2009)

Vertical

Source: Burden and Helmke (2009, 3)
1.2.1 Working Definition for Ticket Splitting
Since the Ghanaian ticket splitting is a vertical-concurrent type located at the lower left
quadrant of Table 1.1, I will restrict this study to the Burden and Helmke (2009) definition above
and use it as a working definition for this dissertation. In fact, many scholars are of the view that
ticket-splitting can only take place in concurrent elections where electorates vote candidates from
different political parties into different offices. As such Navia and Saldaña (2015) assert that ticketsplitting can only occur when there is a concurrent election where voters choose candidates for
5
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different offices. Voters split their tickets when they select a candidate from one party for one
office and a candidate from a different party for a different office (Navia and Saldaña 2015, 486;
see also Thomson 2007, Watts 2010). It is worth restating that, there are different forms of ticket
splitting and these are summarized in Table 1.1 above.
In Ghana, the phrase “skirt and blouse voting” is used to describe two distinct phenomena.
The phrase is sometimes used to refer to the type of ticket splitting described above. In its more
original usage5, however, the phrase refers to an aggregate-level outcome where the winners in the
presidential and legislative races in a given constituency (electoral district) come from different
political parties (Daddieh 2011; Frempong 2017). In this way, the concept of skirt and blouse
voting is different from the conventional concept of split-ticket voting used in political science
literature.
Skirt and blouse voting also represents voter behavior in the voting booth which is similar
to its conventional usage in mainline political science literature. Scholars have identified two main
reasons why skirt and blouse voting occur. First, skirt and blouse voting occur where a voter in the
same set of elections chooses a presidential and a parliamentary candidate from different political
parties in a concurrent election (Asunka 2016; Ichino and Nathan 2013, 2017; Lindberg 2013;
Weghorst and Lindberg 2013). Second, skirt and blouse voting occur in instances where supporters
of a political party vote for the party’s presidential candidate but vote for a parliamentary candidate
from a different political party or an independent candidate (Boafo-Arthur 2006, 2008; Debrah
and Gyampo 2013). The difference between the two reasons for electorates voting skirt and blouse
is that the first falls within the conventional ticket splitting while the second is an organized act in
“isolated” constituencies often characterized by mobilized voter protest due to in-party
competition/factions or deliberate sabotage (Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2012; Debrah 2004).

6
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Thus, the literature on skirt and blouse voting in Ghana has used the same phrase (“skirt
and blouse voting”) to mean both split district outcome and split-ticket voting; this creates
conceptual ambiguity that requires reclassification to harmonize it with similar concepts used in
political science for consistency and comparability. In view of this, the dissertation reclassifies the
concept into skirt and blouse voting (split-ticket voting) and skirt and blouse outcome (split district
outcome/two office split at the aggregate level). The Ghanaian case triggers questions such as:
why would the supporters of a political party defect from their parliamentary candidate in favor of
a candidate of another party? Why would they not withdraw from both the presidential and the
parliamentary candidates or abstain from the presidential candidate? What is so unique about the
presidential candidate and not about the parliamentary candidates? These are questions not asked
in ticket splitting literature from other settings and they make the Ghanaian case a unique one.
1.3 A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE TICKET SPLITTING LITERATURE
The literature on ticket splitting is voluminous and diverse (Burden and Helmke 2009). For
the purpose of this study, the current dissertation will briefly review the most influential work in
this chapter and consider it in more detail in chapters 3-5 where it is applied alongside other
research. This chapter emphasizes research about demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
of voters, strategic policy balancing, divided government, economic voting, candidate quality, and
(mis)coordination in ticket splitting.
1.3.1 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Voters
Most of the literature under this sub-heading is in the US context because the literature in
that area is well developed and widely cited. Scholars of elections often approach the study of
split-ticket voting by analyzing the demographic and socioeconomic features of voters to find out
7
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how ticket-splitters differ from other voters (Bybee et al. 1981; Campbell and Miller 1975; Roscoe
2003). Demographically, ticket-splitters are said to be younger, more educated, and often relatively
middle-class and white-collar in socioeconomic terms. They tend to live in more suburban areas
than the typical middle-class voter (DeVries and Tarrance 1972). Based on such observable
indicators of ticket splitters, DeVries and Tarrance (1972) recommend political actors to target
such voters with specific campaign messages. In contrast to this work, Campbell and Miller (1957)
found no link between ticket splitting and socio-economic characteristics of voters. Other scholars
found that the relationship between age and ticket splitting was spurious and there is no statistically
significant relationship between education and ticket splitting (Bybee et al. 1981; Roscoe 2003).
Thus, there are conflicting findings about the relationship between the demographic features of
voters and ticket splitting.
Aside from demographic and socioeconomic features of ticket-splitters, scholars have also
considered attitudinal factors of ticket-splitters such as voter perception and political attitudes
toward the political parties. It has been found that partisanship intensity and higher interest in
politics are inversely related to ticket splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell
and Miller 1957). In contrast, Maddox and Nimmo (1981) found that while partisans split their
ballots, strong partisans tend to split less frequently. This tells us that, under certain circumstances,
even strong partisans may split their tickets, and this is one of the puzzles that this dissertation
explores. It has also been found that voters who make late voting decisions are more likely to split
their tickets (Maddox and Nimmo 1981; Bybee et al. 1981) including those who change their vote
intentions based on unfolding issues and those who update their voting intentions over the course
of the campaign (Bybee et al. 1981).

8
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Furthermore, exposure to political information (voter sophistication) especially through
print media usage has been found to influence voters to make decisions which positively correlate
with ticket splitting (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Bybee et al. 1981; Gomes and Wilson 2006).
However, counter evidence has shown that persons who are partisan may be selective in their
media choice and as such may not necessarily split their votes. Also, strong partisans who are
likely to vote a straight ticket are generally more sophisticated, suggesting that voter sophistication
is not a good proxy for ticket splitting (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003). This
dissertation controls for these voter-level factors. It must be pointed out however, that there are
conflicting views on the relationship between exposure to political information and ticket splitting.
For instance, while some scholars found association between reliance on the print media and ticket
splitting (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Bybee et al. 1981), others found no positive relationship
between television and ticket splitting (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Beck et al. 1992; Bybee et al.
1981; DeVries and Tarrance 1972).
1.3.2 Strategic Policy Balancing
Aside from analyzing how ticket splitters are different from other voters by evaluating the
demographic and socioeconomic features of voters, scholars have also examined the phenomenon
by considering voter intentions. A classic theory about voter intention is Fiorina’s (1988) concept
of strategic policy balancing. This concept is derived from a simple proximity spatial model in
which voters prefer policies nearest to their ideal points (Downs 1957). It assumes that voters are
generally concerned with the overall orientation of the policy implemented by a government and
that these voters favor nonextreme policies. It further assumes that political parties hold different
positions on the ideological continuum. Due to their preference for nonextreme policies, voters
who are positioned at the median segment will be more likely to split their votes to achieve non9
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extreme policies where the parties’ policies overlap. Furthermore, the model assumes that voters
are rational and are likely to maximize their utilities to obtain optimal policies from casting a splitticket (Fiorina 1988, 1996; Kedar 2005). Thus, voters through their voting decisions are signaling
political parties to be less polarized and move towards the ideological center with moderate
policies.
Other studies, however, have shown that voters prefer high party polarization because that
gives them (voters) distinct choices while ideological or perceived party similarities blur voter
choice and so cause ticket splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Petrocik 1991; Petrocik and Doherty 1996;
Roscoe 2003). This theory indicates that we should expect the likelihood of ticket splitting to be
higher where voters do not see much difference between the parties. We are to expect more splitticket voting where the parties are perceived to be similar because voters do not have distinct
choice at the polls.
1.3.3 Divided Government
Related to the strategic policy balancing theory is the divided government model. This
theory is rooted in Fiorina’s (1988, 1992) policy balancing model which asserts that a voter's
decision to split the ticket is an intentional and conscious choice for divided government. Divided
government theory posits that where individual preference overlaps with those of the political
parties, that individual will split to achieve moderate policy outcome. Scholars such as Jacobson
(1990) and Petrocik (1991) who also view divided government as intentional result of ticket
splitting have argued that splitting is a deliberate act of voters to match political parties to
institutions the parties have expertise in (institutional matching) or issues they have skills to
address (issue ownership). For instance, in the US, it was held that Republicans and Democrats

10
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had different strengths. Democrats were suitable for Congress because they supported social
intervention policies while Republicans were best for the presidency because they were best in
managing the economy. Thus, ticket splitting is a purposeful act of voters to place parties in offices
they handle best. However, these claims were challenged when in the 1990s Democrats won the
presidency to manage the budget deficit while Republicans achieved a Congressional majority
(Saad 1995; Roscoe 2003). Other scholars have disputed the assertion that positive attitudes toward
divided government are responsible for ticket splitting. These scholars argue that individuals who
hold moderate issue positions are no more likely to split than others. They found that divided
governments are often accidental than deliberate voter intentions (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009;
Campbell 1960; Erikson 2016; Sigelman et al. 1997; Roscoe 2003).
Scholars studying other countries have different view on ticket splitting and divided
government. Ames et al. (2009) observed that Brazilians do not cast their votes with eventual
government formation in mind. These scholars argued that Brazil’s divided government is
inadvertent because voters make separate decisions when voting in presidential and deputy
elections. Their main argument is that presidential and deputy elections are “unlinked.” Ames et
al (2009) are of the view that the sequencing of the elections, such as the mid-term elections in
United States, is responsible for divided government (Ames et al 2009; see also Shugart 1995;
Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). Other scholars whose research is based in new democracies found
ticket splitting in these settings to be akin to voters’ intention of protecting themselves by matching
experienced politicians and challengers rather than creating a divided government. They argued
that voters in new democracies will like to vote for new parties and candidates but would like to
avoid making the mistake of having only ‘novice’ politicians into office. Thus, ticket splitting in
these settings is largely electoral insurance rather than divided government (Ames et al 2009;
11
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Helmke 2009). Hence, studying ticket splitting in new democracies offers profound prospects for
expanding our knowledge in split-ticket voting.
1.3.4 Economic Voting
Downs’ (1957) expected utility theory of voting constitutes the fundamental argument of
economic voting theory which posits that a voter would favor a presidential candidate that renders
the highest expected utility. Downs’s expected utility theory of voting was revised by Fiorina
(1981) who argued that voters will vote for an incumbent president whose administration improved
citizens’ economic conditions and punish an incumbent under whose leadership the economy
deteriorated. Further, the revised model asserts that where an incumbent’s challenger shows
prospects of better performance based on excellent track record, voters are likely to vote for the
challenger. Fiorina’s (1981) revision, therefore, introduces retrospective and prospective voting
into the decision calculus of voters.
In essence, the economic voting model asserts that voters will evaluate the performance of
the incumbent and that of the challenger when making their voting decisions. Where a challenger
does not have the benefit of office experience, voters are to base their assessment on the prospects
of the challenger (Benton 2005; Fiorina 1981; Helmke 2009). Splitting occurs where candidates
with higher performance ratings are not from the same party (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck and
Paldam 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). Some scholars argue that the economic voting is not
effective because governments were not consistently punished for bad economic times or rewarded
for good performance (Anderson 2007). Finally, it has been argued that retrospective voting based
on performance is blind especially in situations where voters will like to punish politicians on acts
beyond their control such as natural disasters (Achen and Bartels 2004). Furthermore, it has been
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argued that clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993), a country’s electoral system
(Benton 2005) and availability of alternatives (Anderson 2007) may inhibit voters’ ability to
employ economic voting.
1.3.5 Candidate Quality
Scholarship on ticket splitting has also identified candidate-level factors to be responsible
for the phenomenon. Three main candidate-level factors identified are: incumbency, campaign
spending, and issue positioning (Born 1994; Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Burden and Kimball 2009).
It has been observed that incumbency is often associated with candidate quality because
incumbents have the advantage of office experience (Born 1994; Burden and Kimball 2009).
Consequently, voters whose preferred Congressional candidate does not have the benefit of office
experience for instance, will vote for their presidential candidate and either roll-off or vote for a
more experienced candidate who is often the incumbent (Born 1994; Burden and Kimball 2009).
On the contrary, it has also been found that incumbency may not always be advantage and that it
can also be a liability (Burden 2009; Roscoe 2003; Scheiner 2005). Campaign spending has also
been found to influence ticket splitting in some settings such that a candidate who is able to spend
beyond certain threshold has a greater chance of getting the attention of the electorate and therefore
can cause ticket splitting (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003). Though campaign
spending can cause splitting, those who spend more sometimes lose the election to their lowerspending counterparts (Frempong 2017; Roscoe 2003).
Finally, a candidate’s issue positioning has been found to be responsible for ticket splitting.
Advocates of issue positions argue that candidates who move closer to their opponent’s issue
position or move away from their party’s position can create ticket splitting (Frymer 1994; Key
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1966; Petrocik and Doherty 1996). It has been argued that high party polarization decreases
splitting while less polarization increases splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Petrocik 1991; Petrocik and
Doherty 1996; Roscoe 2003). Thus, when there is a clear difference between the parties or
candidates contesting the elections, voters can make distinct choices but where the contestants look
alike on ideological grounds and issue positions, voters do not have unique choice, therefore, they
will split their votes (Key, 1966). In fact, scholars have found a strong statistical association
between candidates’ issue positions and ticket splitting (Burden and Kimball 2009). Hence, all
things being equal, where candidates position on issues are not very diverse, we expect higher
likelihood of splitting. The logic of candidate quality and ticket splitting is that, where the most
visible candidates in the different races belong to different parties, the greater the likelihood of
ticket splitting.
1.3.6 (Mis)coordination Ticket Splitting
Cox (1997, 1999) provides a model to understand how party elites make their entry
decisions. This model is related to the concept that he referred to as the M+1 rule (strategic entry
rule required of party elites), where M refers to the district magnitude. This model suggests that
where a voting district (constituency) elects one candidate, the viable number of candidates in that
constituency is two (that is the district magnitude plus one). Where elites field more than two
candidates in that constituency, voters who care only about the present election and want their
votes to count, will withdraw support from less viable candidates. For instance, a voter whose
preferred candidate is the third-ranked candidate will rather prefer to vote for one of the top two
candidates than for the third-ranked candidate. Consequently, the contest in SMD plurality is often
reduced to a competition between the most viable candidates. In this way, SMDs with plurality
rule favor two party systems. However, proportional representation (PR) systems are less
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punishing to small parties because the district magnitude is greater than “1” and tend to produce
less strategic defection (Duverger 1954). Thus, a voter whose preferred choice is the third-ranked
candidate (or party) will still vote for that candidate and still be able to influence the system. As a
result, PR systems tend to produce multiparty competition.
Consequently, some scholars are of the view that mixed-member electoral systems that
combine SMD plurality and PR will have a mixture of the two systems. This is because
competition at the SMD tier will reduce to a two-party affair while the PR tier will produce
multiparty competition (Milazzo, Moser, and Scheiner 2018; Moser and Scheiner 2005, 2012; Rich
2014). However, proponents of contamination effects argue that the use of different electoral rules
in the same voting district would yield a vote bonus at the PR tier for parties who contest elections
at the SMD tier (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Guinjoan 2016; Herron and Nishikawa
2001). Therefore, the overlap of electoral arenas in mixed electoral systems will encourage
multiparty competition at the SMD tier contrary to what takes place in a pure SMD system.
The major takeaway from (mis)coordination ticket splitting is that in pure SMDs, when
party elites fail to coordinate their entry given by the first M+1 rule, voters will activate the second
M+1 rule by concentrating their votes on the most viable candidates. It means that where a political
party fields more than one candidate either due to nomination problems or factions, voters are
likely to withdraw (split away) from that party. This is because the support base of that party may
divide and voters who do not want to waste their votes will support their next preferred candidate
who is likely to win. In the same vein, where an ideological bloc, for instance, leftist parties, field
more than one candidate in a pure SMD, that bloc may be (mis)coordinating their entry. If their
opponent commands similar support, voters are likely to defect from at least one of the candidates
from the leftist bloc. It is worth stressing that voter coordination ultimately occurs at the polls
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where voters defect from nonviable contestants. In the case of Ghana, where elections are
conducted in concurrent presidential-legislative races in SMDs, voter coordination can lead to
ticket splitting if the candidates a voter elects in the two races are not from the same political party
(Beck et al. 1992; Burden and Kimball 2009). Thus, if a party wants to avoid influencing voters to
split their tickets, it must coordinate on competitive candidates in both presidential and
parliamentary races and ensure that there is harmony between the presidential and parliamentary
candidates’ campaigning/marketing.
1.4 DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPLIT-TICKET VOTING AND STRATEGIC VOTING
Conceptually, strategic voting deals with voters’ strategic response or reaction to electoral
rules with the view of making their votes count (Batto et al. 2016; Bawn 1999; Cox 1997; Roberts
1988). In mixed systems for instance, supporters of dominant parties normally tend to vote
sincerely for their most preferred candidates/parties in both the SMD and PR tiers because their
preferred candidates/parties are often viable, therefore, they do not necessarily need to vote
strategically. In contrast, supporters of minor parties tend to act strategically especially in district
races by voting for the viable candidates of major parties closer to their ideologies but vote
sincerely at the PR tier for their preferred candidates/minor parties. Aside the electoral rules
determining the strategic acts of the electorates, the strategic moves of party elites to coordinate
candidate nomination in district races with other parties often influence the strategic acts of the
electorates. These strategic moves of elites often determine the electoral context. By electoral
context, I mean the parties and candidates contesting in a particular district as well as the
competitiveness of the election. Proponents of contamination effects argue that party elites can
lessen the strategic acts of voters by fielding candidates in SMDs in order to boost party votes in
the PR tier (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Ferrara and Herron 2005; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa
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2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). Thus, voters may have their preferred candidates or party
identification, the electoral rule and the electoral context may influence their voting decision. In
sum, strategic voting occurs where voters react to the electoral rules and context and regulate their
vote choices to ensure that their votes count (do not waste their votes) especially where their most
preferred candidates/parties are not viable.
Split-ticket voting occurs where voters cross party lines when choosing their
representatives (Gschwend et al. 2003; Johnston and Pattie 2003; Karp et al. 2002). It is voting for
different political parties into different political institutions such as presidency and legislature –
vertical splitting or for different parties into the same office but under different electoral systems
e.g. a legislature using a mixed-member electoral system – horizontal splitting (Burden and
Helmke 2009; Campbell and Miller 1957). Conceptually, two main viewpoints have been
advanced to explain the patterns of split-ticket voting and these are whether voters are acting
sincerely or strategically (Plescia 2016, 5). It has been argued that voters deliberately split to
achieve divided government (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Fiorina 1992) or as an insurance for
having both experienced politicians and new parties/candidates in office (Ames et al 2009; Helmke
2009). However, scholars such as Alvarez and Schousen (1993), Beck et al. (1992) and Mattei and
Howes (2000) do not find support for strategic incentives for ticket splitting. Proponents of sincere
ticket splitting argue that voters split their votes where the viable candidates in the different races
are not from the same political party and voters want to sincerely vote for the viable
candidates/parties (Burden and Kimball 2009; Roscoe 2003).
It worth pointing out, however, that strategic voting and split-ticket voting are two different
concepts though they may overlap. As explained above, strategic voting occurs where voters want
their votes to count by adjusting their voting preference in response to electoral rules and elite
17

Samuel K. Darkwa
strategic moves. These strategic acts of voters may result in split ticket or straight ticket when the
party affiliation of candidates selected in the different races are considered. In the case of ticket
splitting, the candidates selected by a voter in the different races are not from the same party while
in the case of straight ticket, the candidates selected in both races are from the same party. In
mixed-member electoral systems, split-ticket voting tends to be strategic especially if a voter’s
preferred party/candidate has no chance of winning (Bawn 1999; Karp et al. 2002; Plescia 2016).
Normally, it is the supporters of minor parties who often engage in this strategic behavior by
casting a sincere vote at the PR tier and voting strategically at the SMD tier by defecting from
unviable candidates which at times leads to ticket splitting. Supporters of major parties on the other
hand, are more likely to cast straight tickets because they often field viable candidates. Thus, the
convention is that voters vote sincerely at the PR tier and often strategically at the SMD tier and
that there is no ticket splitting at the PR tier. However, it has been found that though at the PR tier
there is no ticket splitting, supporters of major parties may at times split strategically to help their
junior coalition partners cross the electoral threshold (Abramson et al. 2010; Gschwend 2007;
Hobolt and Karp 2010). Finally, though straight ticket voting is often viewed as a sign of sincere
voting, it could be strategic in instances where a supporter of a minor party decides to cast a
strategic straight ticket ballot for a major party where the voter’s party has no chance of winning
a seat (Plescia 2016). In sum, strategic voting and ticket splitting are two different concepts
however, strategic voting can create ticket splitting where a voter’s strategic acts result in the
selection of candidates from different political parties at the different races or tiers. Also, a
supporter of a minor party may adopt strategic straight ticket voting for a major party where his or
her preferred party has no chance of winning a seat.
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1.5 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation is interested in ticket splitting and explores the subject largely from how
coordination especially on the part of party elites influences the phenomenon. The conventional
literature on the subject has largely approached the subject from voter perspective (Bybee et al.
1981; Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell and Miller 1957). The current dissertation would like to
incorporate elite level factors which are coordination centered to analyze split-ticket voting where
Ghana presents appropriate context. The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses the theory of strategic coordination which is based on Cox’s (1997,
1999) strategic coordination theory introduced in the preceding section 1.3.6 above. The strategic
coordination theory is the primary framework adopted by this dissertation to evaluate the concept
of ticket splitting. The chapter breaks the theory into intraparty and interparty coordination
successes and failures, discusses the features of each of these, as well as the strengths and
weaknesses of the theory. It shows why the theory is appropriate for the Ghanaian case.
The analysis which begins in Chapter 3 examines individual-level factors and elite-level
factors (intraparty and interparty variables) of ticket splitting. Using Afrobarometer Round 6
datasets, the chapter focuses its analysis on variables that have significant connection with ticket
splitting. The analysis helps to examine both individual level factors and elites level factors in a
single model to identify which have utility when it comes to explaining ticket splitting.
Chapter 4 employs an aggregate-level electoral dataset (1996-2016) from Electoral
Passport6 to analyze the district-level aspect of the skirt and blouse outcome. Chapter 5 focuses on
data from fieldwork carried out in Ghana that samples 303 party elites. This allows the dissertation
to test coordination theory in more detail. It controls for important variables that are likely to
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impact splitting by considering alternative explanations such as voter demographic variables,
political attitude and political information. By utilizing multiple datasets, the dissertation provides
more reliable evidence for conclusions arrived at in this study.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the findings from the research and highlights the
dissertations’ contribution to the split-ticket voting literature. The chapter also discusses the
limitations of the research and provides recommendations for future research in the subfield.
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1.7 NOTES:
1. Constituencies with skirt and blouse outcome in 2012
http://citifmonline.com/2016/11/14/constituencies-that-voted-skirt-and-blouse-in-2012infographic/
2. ‘Skirt and blouse’ voting in Ghana. The trend, winners and losers
https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/skirt-and-blouse-voting-in-ghana-the-trend-winnersand-losers.html
3. NPP and NDC are the two dominant parties in Ghana. Together, their vote share is over 97%
(Boafo-Arthur 2006; Frempong 2017)
4. There are other types of ticket splitting in non-concurrent elections (e.g. midterm election in the
US) where the electorates may vote to moderate the effects of their choice in the presidential
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election by voting another party in the midterm legislative elections (Burden and Helmke 2009, 2;
see also Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Fiorina, 1996).
5. The phrase “skirt and blouse voting” was first coined in Ghana where in a party’s strongholds
the party’s national executives decided to impose parliamentary candidates as the “consensus
candidates” instead of electing the candidates in the party’s primaries and aggrieved nomination
seekers massed up support to vote against the so called “consensus candidates”. The campaign
message of the aggrieved nomination seekers was to elect the party’s presidential candidate but
vote to cause the defeat of the “consensus candidates”. Thus, the original idea was not about the
individual act of ticket splitting but to produce an electoral outcome where the party’s presidential
candidate is elected and the “consensus candidates” lose the election in those constituencies
(Frempong 2017). Since then both constituency split result and the individual act of ticket splitting
is referred to in Ghana as skirt and blouse voting. No attempt has been made to reclassify the two
usages of the concept per the literature I have sighted so far from Ghana though I follow the
publication of leading Ghanaian electoral scholars.
6. Electoral Passport http://www.electionpassport.com/
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CHAPTER 2. DEVELOPING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation explores split-ticket voting. Instead of examining the subject exclusively
from voter-level factors responsible for split-ticket voting, it evaluates the puzzle from both elitelevel and voter-level factors. This is because the individual choice made in the voting booth is a
function of more than individual forces (Cox 1997, 1999; Roscoe 2003). As a result, the chapter
develops a conceptual framework that can suitably address both voter-level and elite-level factors
in a more cohesive and reliable way. Furthermore, the selected framework must aptly handle the
subject using multiple levels of analysis.1 Since it is often valuable to utilize multiple levels of
analysis in studying a phenomenon (Kollman 2018), a theoretical framework capable of handling
multiple datasets such as survey data, aggregate electoral data, and fieldwork offers an added
advantage of complementary and richer analysis when the same problem is viewed from various
levels. Given these objectives, the dissertation finds Cox’s (1997, 1999) strategic coordination
theory represented by the two M+1 rules to be a suitable framework capable of handling voterand elite-level factors.
In what follows, the chapter discusses strategic coordination theory which is the main
theoretical framework adopted by this dissertation to explore the phenomenon of split-ticket voting
in Ghana. It shows how the theory is suitable for handling both voter-level and elite-level factors
of ticket splitting. Next, the chapter puzzles out the two dimensions of the elite level factors of the
theory: intraparty and interparty coordination successes and failures. The penultimate section
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the theory and shows where it is applicable to explain
the phenomenon of ticket splitting and where it breaks down and therefore, fails to explain split-
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ticket voting. The final section shows why Ghana presents the appropriate kind of context to
explore the coordination theory to investigate ticket splitting in new democracies.
2.2 STRATEGIC COORDINATION THEORY
While the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 above identifies several factors that correlate
with split-ticket voting, there has been no comprehensive conceptual framework that captures how
both voter and elite level factors interconnect to explain the phenomenon. Cox’s (1997, 1999)
strategic coordination theory which is based on Duverger’s observation of how electoral systems
affect the structure of electoral competition seem to give us an idea of how both voter and elite
level factors interconnect to explain strategic voting which has a potential of helping our
understanding of ticket splitting emerging from the strategic acts of voters and political elites.
Duverger observed that electoral systems have specific logical effects on the structures of electoral
competition on voters and competitors. Electoral systems that adopt plurality rule tend to lead to a
two‐party system while systems with majority runoff tend to lead to multiparty competition
(Duverger 1954, 1959). According to Duverger, the mechanical and psychological effects of the
electoral rules influence the structure of electoral competition. The mechanical effect has to do
with the process of how vote distribution is transformed into seat allocation. The term ‘mechanical
effect’ emerges from how the strict application of electoral laws affects seat share. The
psychological effect is how voters and political actors structure their behavior in anticipation of
the mechanical effect. Thus, the term ‘psychological effect’ is the influence the mechanical effects
have on voters and political elites.
According to Cox (1997, 1999) the mechanical and psychological effects structure the
electoral competition differently in different systems. For instance, in single member first-past-
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the-post (FPTP) system (SMDs) where a single candidate is elected under a plurality rule, voters
tend to concentrate their votes on the top two contenders. As a result, competitions in SMD systems
with plurality rules tend to favor two-party systems. However, in PR systems where more than one
candidate is elected, the system is less punishing and therefore, favors multiparty competition.
With this, Cox provided a formula (logical expression) to capture how the mechanical and
psychological effects structure the electoral competition differently in different electoral systems.
In his view, because the mechanical effect relates to the process by which a distribution of votes
is transformed into a distribution of seats within a district, it is important to consider the number
of seats in that district (district magnitude) in arriving at that logical expression. The expression
should also hold for political actors and voters who are influenced by the mechanical effects of the
electoral rule to adjust their behavior to make votes count (Cox 1997). This logical expression is
given by M+1 where M refers to the district magnitude. This expression has come to be known as
the M+1 rule. According to Cox (1997, 1999), there are two M+1 rules; the first relates to the
entry strategy required of party elites while the second M+1 rule applies to the strategic acts
required of voters. Cox (1997) contends that if political elites (parties and candidates) are to make
votes count (reap the benefits in investing in parties and candidates), they are to adopt strategic
entry while voters need to adopt strategic voting behavior. In this way, party elites are to coordinate
their entry strategy on two candidates in SMDs where just one seat is allocated. If parties failed to
coordinate on two candidates in SMDs, voters will have to concentrate their votes on the top two
contenders for their votes to count. As a result, with time, electoral competition in SMDs will be
reduced to a two-party affair while competition in PR systems will lead to multiparty system. It
must be pointed out however, that empirical evidence shows that the M+1 rule does not necessarily
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lead to two-party competition in all countries as demonstrated by countries such as Canada, India,
and the United Kingdom (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001).
Though voters are influenced to act strategically to make their votes count, they could do
so based on how much the electoral system/electoral rules and elite interaction will allow them.
These two can influence the strategic behavior of the voter. That is, they can cause the voter to
either cast strategic or sincere vote. They can also help us to find out the type of ballot the voter
casts, whether straight ticket or split ticket. Strategic voting explains how voters adjust their
choices for their votes to count. In pure PR systems, voters do not have to vote strategically for
their votes to count because the district magnitude is greater than one however, in SMDs, because
the district magnitude is one, they have to act strategically. In mixed systems, voters can still vote
sincerely at the PR tier and strategically at the SMD tier. The parties selected at the different tiers
will show whether the voter voted straight ticket or split ticket. The type of party a voter supports,
or elite interactions can influence the strategic acts of the voter. For instance, supporters of
dominant parties tend to vote sincerely for their most preferred parties in both the SMD and PR
tiers because their preferred parties are often viable. As such they do not necessarily need to vote
strategically. This creates straight ticket voting. In contrast, supporters of minor parties tend to act
strategically especially in district races by voting for the viable candidates of major parties closer
to their ideologies but vote sincerely at the PR tier for their preferred minor parties leading to ticket
splitting. These acts can cause ticket splitting or straight ticketing.
Again, in mixed systems, due to the overlap of the electoral system, elites are incentivized
to field candidates in SMD tier to create vote bonus in the PR tier which can cause voters to vote
for the same party at both tiers thereby reducing strategic voting. This act of parties reduces ticket
splitting in the sense that voters are motivated to cast straight ticket. This is what is referred to as
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contamination effect (Ferrara and Herron 2005; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and
Nishikawa 2001). It has also been found that though at the PR tier there is no ticket splitting, major
parties who enter into alliance can cause their supporters to at times split strategically to help their
junior coalition partners cross the electoral threshold (Abramson et al. 2010; Gschwend 2007;
Hobolt and Karp 2010). Again, where parties do not field candidates in all districts or do not
contest in all races, their supporters are forced to split their ticket in order to make their votes count
(Benoit et al. 2006; Thrasher et al. 2014). Again, in concurrent legislative and presidential
elections, parties can field candidates in legislative or presidential constituencies that they are not
comparatively strong to boost their votes in constituencies that they are comparatively strong. This
can create ticket splitting or split outcomes. It must be pointed out however, that not all voters may
vote strategically because voters may select non-viable candidates for all sorts of reasons. Again,
strategic voting and ticket splitting are two different concepts, strategic voting can create ticket
splitting where a voter’s strategic acts causes the selection of candidates from different political
parties at the different races or tiers. Again, though voters may act strategically, their acts are
constrained by the electoral context which is structured by elite moves and electoral rules.
Therefore, the decision to split tickets may depend on the available legislative and presidential
choice set, coordination among parties (such as deals, joint nominations, etc.), as well as signaling
among party elites.
2.2.1 Intraparty Coordination Successes and Failures
As stated above, the first M+1 rule, the strategic entry decision of party elites, is applicable
to party elites in the same party, those in the same ideological bloc, and from different ideological
blocs. When coordination involves elites from the same political party, it is referred to as intraparty
coordination. Here, party elites are to limit nomination to ensure that a single candidate emerges
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as the representative of the party to contest the election under the party brand (Benoit 2001; Cox
1997, 1999, 2006; Golder 2006). The way of limiting nomination requires that elites harmonize
their actions and use democratic and transparent means that are acceptable to most people (Benoit
2001; Cox 1999; Golder 2006). When this happens, party members and their supporters will have
no incentive to coordinate their votes leading to possible ticket splitting in the main election. In
this way, intraparty coordination success is more likely to reduce ticket splitting. That is, party
supporters are less likely to split where there is intraparty coordination success.
However, where the nomination process is not democratic and transparent, and therefore,
not acceptable to especially the aggrieved candidate(s), some party elites may have an incentive to
contest the election as independent, or advocate for ticket splitting overtly or covertly. This is
where intraparty coordination failure is said to have occurred. Thus, where a party fails to nominate
a single candidate, there is intraparty coordination failure (Benoit 2001; Cox 1999; Golder 2006)
and this is likely to increase the likelihood of splitting. Intraparty coordination failures often create
opportunity for party elites to engage in ticket splitting. This is because, if the aggrieved
nomination seeker and his/her supporters are not happy with say the verdict of the party’s
parliamentary primaries, in a concurrent election, they will likely vote for the presidential
candidate of the party and vote for another candidate or cast a blank ballot. It is worth pointing out
however, that a party may have acrimonious primaries where disappointed nomination seekers
disagree with the outcome but when party elites succeed in dissuading such nomination seekers
from contesting the election as independents, this can be referred to as intraparty coordination
success. Table 2.1 below summarizes the observable indicators of intraparty coordination
successes and failures and their possible resultant impact on ticket splitting.
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Table 2.1: Observable Indicators of Intraparty Coordination and Possible Impact on Splitting
Intraparty Coordination Success
Possible impact on ticket splitting/split outcome
Limiting nomination
Likely to reduce splitting
Running fewer candidates
Likely to reduce splitting
Ability to prevent independents
Likely to reduce splitting
Creation of a joint platform
Likely to reduce splitting
Intraparty Coordination Failure
Possible impact on ticket splitting/split outcome
Over nomination
Likely to increase splitting
Contentious primaries (independent contestants) Likely to increase splitting
Existence of splinter groups
Likely to increase splitting
No policy linkage between candidates
Likely to increase splitting
Sources: Authors’ own compilation from Benoit (2001), Cox (1999), and Golder (2006)
2.2.2 Interparty Coordination Successes and Failures
As indicated above, the first M+1 rule, strategic entry decision of party elites, relates to
party elites in the same ideological bloc and from different ideological blocs who for strategic
reasons would like to contest the election together in a coalition or devise some sort of electoral
deal for their mutual benefit (Benoit 2001; Cox 1999; Golder 2006). Often, it is easier for political
parties from the same ideological bloc to form a coalition due to policy similarities (Benoit 2001;
Cox 1999; Golder 2006). However, at times it becomes necessary for political parties from
different ideological bloc to team up to defeat an “undesirable” political party in an election (Cox
1999; Downs 1957; Golder 2006). To succeed in interparty coordination, parties in an alliance are
to engage in strategic withdrawal, endorse a common candidate, harmonize their policies, adopt a
joint campaign, and secure the backing of party supporters to vote for that candidate. Where this
happens, supporters of those parties are likely to vote for all their candidates in concurrent
presidential and parliamentary races in a given constituency. In this case, successful interparty
coordination will reduce ticket splitting, all things being equal. However, if party elites fail to
negotiate strategic withdrawal because some of the parties had already elected their candidates and
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had made substantial investment in their campaigns, engaging in strategic withdrawal will become
difficult. In such instances, members of the alliance are likely to campaign against each other (at
least one of these legislative candidates will be running under a party label other than the label of
the presidential candidate) and will therefore, be advocating for ticket splitting. Instances where
coalition parties run legislative candidates under a party label other than the label of the
presidential candidate of the coalition, I expect high likelihood of splitting especially from their
core supporters. This is because their core supporters will be voting at the presidential and the
legislative races for candidates with different party labels. Again, I expect higher likelihood of
splitting from short term instrumentally rational voters (that is voters who care only about who
wins the present election), in instances where coalition parties run legislative and presidential
candidates under single party label but the viable candidates in the different races are from the
coalition party in one race and another party in the other race.
Interparty coordination success can lead to ticket splitting if the parties involved in an
alliance enter deals. Typically, Ghanaian political elites in alliance prefer deals where instead of
conducting the election under a common party brand, one party supports the other in the
parliamentary race in return for a similar gesture in the presidential race (Agyeman-Duah 2005;
Boafo-Arthur 2006; Darkwa 2019) in a concurrent presidential-legislative race. When such a deal
becomes successful, supporters of the parties are likely to vote for one party in say, the presidential
race and for another party in the parliamentary race in the same constituency. This increases the
chances of ticket splitting leading to a possible split outcome (Agyeman-Duah 2005; Boafo-Arthur
2006; Darkwa 2019; Frempong 2017).
Party elites are often left out when estimating split-ticket voting because the phenomenon
is often viewed as the result of voter-level factors. However, as a voter's decision in the voting
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booth is a function beyond the individual (Cox 1997, 1999; Roscoe 2003), elite coordination which
affects the available choice set needs to be considered when explaining ticket splitting (Cox 1997,
1999; Roscoe 2003). From the above discussions, it seems that elite interactions (strategic
coordination) to greater extent determine the available options for the electorate in an election. In
fact, Cox (1997, 1999) places elite coordination ahead of voter coordination. Roscoe (2003) argues
that voters are like diners in a restaurant who are limited by the available menu. These diners could
only make their orders based on the menu. In fact, voter coordination is necessitated by elite
coordination and that is why elite coordination is vital in estimating ticket splitting. Table 2.2
below outlines the observable indicators of interparty coordination successes and failures and their
possible effects on splitting.
Table 2.2: Observable Indicators of Interparty Coordination and Possible Impact on Splitting
Interparty Coordination Success
Possible impact on ticket splitting/split outcome
Joint nomination/campaigns
Likely to reduce splitting
Strategic withdrawal
Likely to reduce splitting
Effective negotiations
Likely to reduce splitting
Ability to secure members’ support
Likely to reduce splitting
Interparty Coordination Failure
Possible impact on ticket splitting/split outcome
Fight for supremacy
Likely to increase splitting
Over nomination
Likely to increase splitting
Conflict over policy/ideology
Likely to increase splitting
Inability to secure members’ support
Likely to increase splitting
Sources: Authors’ own compilation from Benoit (2001), Cox (1997, 1999), and Golder (2006)
In sum, elite intraparty coordination success is likely to reduce ticket splitting while
intraparty coordination failure is likely to increase ticket splitting all things being equal. Similarly,
interparty coordination success is likely to reduce ticket splitting while failure is likely to increase
splitting. However, that will depend on the kind of alliance formed by coalition parties and how
they are able to secure the support of their members and those of the electorates. More importantly,
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it will depend on the viability of the coalition candidates vis-à-vis the candidates of other
contesting parties. In some instances, there could be elite coordination failure but if there are no
viable alternatives, that will not increase splitting. Ultimately, voter coordination will depend on
the viability of candidates of all the contesting political parties in for instance, concurrent
presidential-parliamentary contests. However, because in situations where both MPs and
presidents are directly elected in general elections the presidential office is more valued (Birch
2003; Kadima 2006; Reif and Schmitt 1980; Tavits 2008), I expect elites to coordinate more on
the presidential race. Again, because each party is expected to present only one presidential
candidate nationally, parties are able to attract presidential candidates of comparable quality. The
parliamentary contest on the other hand, is saddled with enormous coordination challenges ranging
from subpar candidates to internal conflict within a constituency, the parliamentary contests are
more likely to experience increased voter defection leading to more ticket splitting than the
presidential race. Again, because each constituency is unique, the constituency parliamentary
coordination problems will differ from constituency to constituency. In this case, some
constituencies are expected to experience more ticket splitting than others. Ultimately, the
fundamental logic of voter coordination and ticket splitting is that, voters will defect from unviable
candidates in the different races. A voter’s electoral decision may be described as ticket splitting
if candidates the voter selects in the different races belong to different parties.
2.3 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE THEORY
The strategic coordination theory represented by the two M+1 rules is capable of
explaining elite- and voter-level coordination as discussed in the preceding sections. This explains
why competition in SMD-plurality systems tend to exercise a reductive impact on the number of
candidates (Cox 1997, 1999; Duverger 1954). The theory also supports elite and voter coordination
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in PR systems. This is because in PR systems the district magnitude is more than one, viable
candidates in these systems tend to be greater than two which means that competition in PR
systems favor multipartism. Elites in PR systems can coordinate on more than two candidates and
still could achieve their objective of investing in candidates. Voters can also vote for their preferred
candidates in PR systems and still influence the electoral outcome (Cox 1997, 1999; Bawn 1999;
Rich 2014; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). The theory can explain ticket splitting in pure SMDs
because if the two candidates a voter elects in a concurrent election involving two offices are not
from the same party, we have ticket splitting. In pure PR systems, because voters can vote for their
preferred candidates in concurrent presidential-legislative contest and still influence the outcome,
theory breaks down when it is applied to explain ticket splitting in pure PR systems.
Again, the theory breaks down when it is used in a mixed-member electoral system that
combines SMD-plurality and PR. In the first place, scholarship suggests that the M+1 rules do not
apply in the SMD tier of the mixed electoral system as it is the case under a pure SMD-plurality
system (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Guinjoan 2016; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). The
reason is that, the overlap of the electoral systems creates vote bonus in the PR tier for parties that
field candidates in the SMD tier. As a result, parties are motivated to contest in the SMD tier
regardless of their chances of winning a seat. Thus, party competition at the SMD tier encourages
multiparty system due to contamination effects that the overlap of the two systems create (Ferrara,
Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Herron, Nemoto, and Nishikawa
2018). Proponents of contamination effects argue that the overlap of the two systems in mixed
electoral systems creates symbiotic interactions that boosts a party’s votes at the PR tier (vote
bonus) when that party contests in SMD tier.
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2.4 WHY GHANA
Ghana presents the appropriate kind of environment to explore coordination theory to
investigate ticket splitting in new democracies. In the first place, like many Anglophone African
countries, Ghana uses a pure SMD-plurality system (Wahman 2014) where the M+1 rules are
applicable. Therefore, it provides a suitable environment to investigate how elite coordination
(intraparty and interparty) interacts with voter coordination to explain the phenomenon of ticket
splitting in new democracies. Second, elections in Ghana are competitive between the two major
political parties (NDC and NPP) whose vote share is typically more than 90 percent combined,
and results have shifted since 1992 (Frempong 2017; Graham et al. 2017 Kumah-Abiwu 2017;
Lindberg 2007, 2013; Weghorst & Lindberg 2013). Between 2000 and 2016, the nation has
experienced three alternations in power which occurred in 2000, 2008, and 2016 with the ruling
party handing over power to the main opposition party. One thing that has characterized these
elections and alternations in power is skirt and blouse voting/skirt and blouse outcomes ostensibly
due to elite (mis)coordination (Frempong 2017; Lindberg 2007, 2013; Lindberg and Morrison
2008; Weghorst & Lindberg 2013). Party elites either due to interparty coordination or intraparty
coordination problems have openly and covertly advocated for ticket splitting. In fact, elite
(mis)coordination has helped in the smooth transition of political power often in peaceful manner
because, elites through their (mis)coordination could predict the outcome of the elections with
certain level of certainty (Frempong 2017; Graham et al. 2017; Yobo and Gyampo 2015). These
reasons make Ghana an ideal laboratory to investigate how elite and voter coordination interact to
produce ticket splitting and facilitates political transitions or alternations of power in new
democracies. Although what prevails in Ghana may not be fully generalizable in all emerging
democracies, it still presents a suitable place to engage in such an exercise.
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It worth pointing out that this study is applicable to most of the developing democracies in
Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America whose political trajectory is similar to that of Ghana.
Like many other emerging democracies, Ghana has a history of political instability stemming from
military interventions especially where political elites are disunited. Thus, the coordination theory
adopted by this dissertation to analyze ticket splitting made the selection of Ghana ideal laboratory
to test whether it closely fits the theory. In his book, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political
Theory, Stability, and Change, Eckstein (1992) made a case for the use of what he referred to as a
‘crucial case’ to test a theory’s validity. He argues that, if one is to have confidence in a theory’s
validity, then it should be applicable to a crucial case in the sense that, that case must closely fit
the theory. In the future, I can look at how elite coordination affects ticket splitting, representation,
and democratic stability.
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CHAPTER 3. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
Electoral coordination occurs…where competitors coordinate entry and citizens coordinate
votes (Cox 1999, 145).
3.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
Ticket splitting or, split-ticket voting is fairly a common phenomenon in Ghanaian electoral
politics, to the extent that the concept has been given a local term “skirt and blouse voting.” Though
the concept is familiar to most Ghanaian voters, the phenomenon has not received much scholarly
attention. Consequently, the literature on split-ticket voting has produced two versions of “skirt
and blouse voting” with distinct, but related, meanings. In its first usage, skirt and blouse relates
to the overall electoral outcome at the constituency level where different political parties or a blend
of party candidates and independent candidates are elected at the constituency level for the
presidency and the legislature (Daddieh 2011; Frempong 2017). This is equivalent to split district
outcome (Cummings 1966; Burnham 1965; Feigert 1979) and therefore different from the
traditional split-ticket voting in mainline political science literature. Its second usage refers to
situations where voters at the voting booth choose candidates from different political parties or
strategically withdraw from a candidate (Burden and Helmke 2009; Campbell and Miller 1957;
Chandra 2009). In this way, the Ghanaian phenomenon (skirt and blouse voting) is similar to splitticket voting as used in conventional political science literature. Two reasons have been given as
the motivation for the individual act of skirt and blouse voting in Ghana by some scholars and
political actors. First, voters are said to be voting based on their evaluative assessment of the
contesting candidates. Thus, if candidates that voter evaluative assessment favor are not from the
same party, the result is ticket splitting (Asunka 2016; Lindberg 2013; Ichino and Nathan 2013,
2017; Weghorst and Lindberg 2013). The second explanation advanced as the motivation for skirt
and blouse voting is where supporters of a political party vote for the party’s presidential candidate
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but vote for a parliamentary candidate (PC) from a different political party or an independent
candidate (Boafo-Arthur 2006, 2008; Debrah and Gyampo 2013).
Thus, the Ghanaian literature has used the same concept (skirt and blouse voting) to mean
a split district outcome and split-ticket voting. Therefore, for clarity and comparability, this
dissertation would like to distinguish between skirt and blouse outcome which is in tandem with
its first usage and skirt and blouse voting which is in sync with its second usage. This distinction
is necessary to harmonize the phenomenon with split-ticket voting and split district outcome
(Brunell and Grofman 2009; Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009) to enable us compare and contrast
the Ghanaian ticket splitter with similar voters elsewhere. The distinction is also necessary given
that the concept has been used interchangeably to signify split district outcome and split-ticket
voting. This creates conceptual ambiguity that needs some sort of reclassification to harmonize it
with similar concepts used in political science for consistency and comparability.
One may ask, why would the supporters of a political party defect from their PC in favor
of a candidate of another party? Why would they not withdraw from both the presidential and the
PCs or abstain from the presidential candidate? What is so unique about the presidential candidate
and not about the PCs? Again, why will some voters split their tickets and others will not? What
distinguishes the ticket splitter from a straight ticket voter? These are some of the questions that
this chapter addresses. The basic argument of this chapter is that voters respond to the options
available to them in each election by coordinating their votes to achieve expected outcome given
the institutional framework that governs how votes are translated into seats. That is, their choices
are determined by how party elites have coordinated their entry given the electoral system in
operation. This is aptly captured by the quote from Cox (1999) at the beginning of this chapter
which asserts that electoral coordination takes place where elites coordinate entry and citizens
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coordinate votes. For instance, in single-member first-past-the-post (FPTP) districts, voters are
likely to coordinate (concentrate) their votes around the two viable candidates for their votes to
count (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954). This will create ticket splitting if the candidates elected in the
two races are not from the same party. Also, in contexts where parties from the same political
ideology enter the electoral contest by presenting more than one candidate, voters are likely to
coordinate their votes for their votes to count. If candidates voted for in the different races by an
electorate are not from the same party, the voter would be described as engaged in ticket splitting.
This chapter uses individual-level survey data to empirically assess the theoretical
argument made at the outset of this dissertation which is based on coordination problems faced by
parties, candidates and voters (Cox 1997, 1999). In his groundbreaking work, Making Votes Count:
Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems, Cox (1997) argued that voter
coordination is due to party elites’ failure to strategically coordinate their entry as well as their
efforts and resources. In view of this, the chapter seeks to find out how the individual level of
analysis elucidates the coordination problems faced by parties, candidates and voters in Ghana and
how it accounts for skirt and blouse voting in that country. In other words, the chapter seeks to
find out how voters coordinate their votes after parties and candidates have entered the election.
The chapter addresses the following questions: why would a voter withdraw support from his or
her party’s PC in favor of a PC from another party but would vote for his or her party’s presidential
candidate and vice-versa? Are the Ghanaian skirt and blouse voters (ticket splitters) different from
their counterparts in the rest of the world?
The rest of the chapter is made up of four parts. In the next part, I review several existing
theories of voter behavior and relate them to the question of split-ticket voting. These theories
establish the hypotheses that evaluate my main argument about coordination and several alternate
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explanations. Section 3.3 addresses the data and the various variables used to evaluate the
hypotheses and their measurements. Thus, the main dependent variable, split-ticket voting or skirt
and blouse voting, as well as the explanatory and control variables are also discussed in this
section. Section 3.4 discusses the model of the split-ticket voting which is coordination based. The
model is based on how elite coordination problems impact ticket splitting. It then presents the
empirical analysis of a fitted binary logistic regression which is followed by the discussions of the
results. The chapter ends with section 3.5. The section makes a case that no single factor can
adequately explain ticket splitting and given the Ghanaian experience, coordination problems
faced by party elites collectively become a strong candidate for one explanation of the conundrum
of ticket splitting, a recurrent trend in electoral studies. It also affirms the primacy of the voter in
the determination of the people’s representation in the national assembly, addressing who occupies
the presidency and that political accountability resides in the electorate.
3.2 THEORIES ON TICKET SPLITTING AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
When skirt and blouse voting is mentioned in Ghana, the meaning it conveys to the
audience is that the winners at the legislative and presidential races in a given constituency are not
from the same political party. A curious listener’s first impulse or instinct will be to ascertain the
political identities of the winners of the presidential and parliamentary slots of the constituency
who happen to come from different political parties. Thus, a reference to skirt and blouse voting
in the first place denotes a split outcome. The second meaning, which is often lost out in the details
is the individual voter behavior that produces the split outcome. Consequently, this chapter on the
individual level explanation of skirt and blouse voting investigates the micro-foundations of skirt
and blouse outcomes which must be established to put us in a better position to understand why
skirt and blouse outcomes emerge.
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Establishing the individual level determinants of skirt and blouse voting will also enhance
our understanding of the contexts in which split outcomes are most likely to occur. Furthermore,
conducting the individual-level analysis of skirt and blouse voting will better position us to find
out if Ghanaian voters are distinctively and intrinsically different from ticket splitters in other parts
of the world. We will also be better disposed to understand why some voters will split their ballots
and others will not and account for why supporters of political parties will like to strategically
abstain or withdraw support for their parties. It will also help us understand how variations in
coordination problems among parties cause some political parties to attract more ticket splitting
than others. To fulfill these tasks, it is important to link this study to the literature on split-ticket
voting in light of what occurs in Ghana.
3.2.1 Strategic/Policy-Balancing
Critical early work on split-ticket voting outlines a policy balancing theory which is derived
from a proximity spatial model in which voters prefer policies nearest to their ideal points (Downs,
1957). Fiorina’s policy-balancing model was developed along Downs’s idea and operates on the
assumption that voters are generally concerned with the overall orientation of the policy
implemented by a government that wins an election. It asserts that political parties hold different
positions on the ideological continuum; moderate voters who are positioned at the median segment
will be more likely to split their votes to achieve non-extreme policies. This model further assumes
that voters are rational and are likely to maximize their utilities to obtain optimal policies from
casting a split-ticket (Fiorina, 1988, 1996; Kedar, 2005). In short, the theory asserts that most
voters are generally assumed to favor nonextreme ideologies and would therefore, split their
ballots to achieve that objective.
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Contrary to the Fiorina model, other studies have shown that high party polarization gives
voters distinct choices while ideological or perceived party similarity blurs voter choice and
contributes to ticket splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Key 1966; Petrocik 1991; Petrocik and Doherty
1996; Roscoe 2003). This theory indicates that we should expect the likelihood of splitting where
voters do not see much difference between the parties. That is, where the extreme right and extreme
left parties move close to the center, there is high likelihood of splitting all things being equal.
Thus, to Fiorina, voters split to achieve policy moderation or split to make the parties look alike.
Other scholars like Key (1966), Petrocik (1991), Beck et al. (1992), and Petrocik and Doherty
(1996) argue that voters split because parties are similar. This dissertation leans more towards the
position of the other scholars than that of Fiorina because voters are likely to split when they see
no difference between the parties. Thus, the first hypothesis of this chapter is:
H1: the more similar the parties become in voter perception, the greater the likelihood of
ticket splitting and hence split district outcome.
This means that where party positions become less differentiated either because parties and
candidates strategically deviate from their ideological and or issue positions, they are more likely
to influence voters to split their votes (Burden and Kimball 2009; Key 1966; Page 1978). Research
has shown that where there are clear differences between the political parties, voters are more
likely to rely on ideological and party positions when casting their votes and therefore, more likely
to cast straight-ticket ballots. On the contrary, when parties blur policy and ideological differences,
voters are more likely to rely on other considerations when voting and therefore, more likely to
split their tickets (Key, 1966; Roscoe 2003). Key (1966) aptly captures this when he argues that
clarity from the political parties produces clarity from the electorates while confusion from
political parties causes confusion in voters leading to ticket splitting.
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It has been argued that for voters to be able to split their votes based on their assessment
of party differentiation and policy positions, they must be sophisticated (Abramson 1983;
Converse 1964; Kinder 1983). Other scholars such as Chandra (2007, 2009) and Mclaughlin
(2008) are of the view that voters do not need to be sophisticated in order to be strategic in their
choices but rather update their information by observing the preferences of other voters, often
through information gleaned in opinion polls. Thus, voters can coordinate their choices to achieve
their intended electoral and policy outcomes. What this means is that at the individual level, as
candidates and parties converge ideologically, voters who are located at the middle segment of the
ideological continuum are likely to split their votes based on their cognitive abilities and signals
received from the environment. Parties and candidates who are located at the extreme segments of
the ideological scale are likely to induce voters to cast straight ballots. Thus, where elite
coordination leads to ideological polarization, voter coordination will result in straight-ticket
voting and where elite coordination creates ideological similarity, voter coordination will yield
ticket splitting. Where the total number of split-tickets and those who roll off their ballots as well
as spoil ballots are more than straight ticket votes, there is likely to be split district outcome.
3.2.2 Strategic Voting
Related to strategic/policy balancing discussed above is the concept of strategic voting.
The classic literature on strategic voting emerges from the Duvergerian model that asserts that
voters will abandon unviable parties and candidates in place of viable ones in FPTP systems
(Duverger 1954). Many scholars have built on Duverger’s model to mean that in proportional
representation (PR) systems where seats are allocated based on the proportion of votes received,
voters are likely to vote sincerely while in pure single member districts (SMDs) with plurality
rules, supporters of minor parties often face incentives to vote strategically to avoid wasting their
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votes (Cox 1997; Karp 2009). An exception to this rule is that, in an SMD race with a majority
runoff rule, voters are not likely to vote strategically, especially in the first round (Cox 1997;
Duverger 1954). In mixed-member electoral systems which combine two different electoral rules
to allocate seats to the same legislative house, voters are often faced with the conundrum of making
the most of their votes. In such cases, it is expected that voters in SMD-plurality tiers would defect
from nonviable district competitors toward the ideologically closest viable candidate (Duverger
1954; Rich 2014). On the contrary, voters under the PR tier will vote for their preferred candidates
as the electoral outcome is based on the proportion of votes garnered, hence voters under PR have
little reason to defect from their first choice (Bawn 1999; Rich 2014; Shugart and Wattenberg
2001).
However, scholars whose research is based on contamination effects argue that contrary to
these expectations, the use of different electoral rules in the same voting district creates conditions
that may undermine the Duvergerian model. These scholars found that, unlike the pure SMDplurality systems that have reductive effect on the number of parties, parties who contest in the
SMD tier of mixed-member systems receive vote bonus at the PR tier (Ferrara, Herron, and
Nishikawa 2005; Guinjoan 2016; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). This vote bonus motivates parties
to contest in the SMD tier regardless of their chances of winning a seat. Consequently, party
competition at the SMD tier produces a multiparty system in the SMD component similar to the
PR component (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). Thus,
strategic voting in a mixed-member electoral system is complex such that a voter who votes
sincerely in the PR tier may still vote sincerely for a third-ranked candidate in the SMD component
and this could amount to straight ticket voting. Another voter who votes sincerely at the PR tier
may vote strategically in the SMD tier if the preferred candidate is the third-ranked contender
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(Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Herron, Nemoto, and
Nishikawa 2018). Ultimately, strategic voting and therefore, party competition in mixed electoral
system is a complex one and defies the Duvergerian model (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005;
Guinjoan 2016; Herron, Nemoto, and Nishikawa 2018).
It has also been found that in contexts where parties must cross a certain threshold (for
instance, as it is the case in Germany and New Zealand where parties are required to poll five
percent to qualify for seat share), voters are likely to vote for their next alternative if their first
preference is not likely to meet the five percent threshold (Blais et al., 2004; Cox, 1997; Karp
2009). Thus, voters are more likely to split their tickets to either support their second preferred
candidate or defeat their least preferred alternative. This means that voters cast strategic votes to
achieve a desired outcome. This is what Cox (1999) meant when he stated:
“strategic” refers to actions that are primarily instrumental as opposed to consummatory –
that is, actions taken because of their perceived impact on the final outcome of the election,
rather than because of any intrinsic value they may have (Cox 1999, 149).
It has also been argued that often, supporters of smaller parties may withdraw support from
their preferred parties and or candidates if such choices would result in wasting of their votes
(Bawn 1999; Benoit et al. 2006; Burden and Kimball 2009; Gschwend et al. 2003). Thus, assessing
the options available to them, voters of smaller parties are more likely to split their tickets if their
parties do not stand the chance of making any meaningful electoral impact. Similarly, instances
where smaller parties are not able to run candidates in both legislative and presidential races, their
core supporters are likely to split their votes by voting for their parties in races they run and other
parties in races their parties do not run. Therefore, I expect supporters of a smaller party to split
their votes if the party runs a legislative candidate but not a presidential candidate, sincere
supporters of that party are likely to split their tickets. The reason is that they will vote for their
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party’s candidate in the legislative race and for a different party’s candidate in the presidential
race.”
All things being equal, the strategic voting of the supporters of smaller parties are likely to
go this way: First, they are likely to vote sincerely for their parties in areas and in races that these
parties are likely to make electoral impact. For instance, generally, in PR systems smaller party
supporters are likely to vote sincerely for their parties. While in SMD systems, in areas and in
races that the smaller parties are not likely to make electoral impact, their supporters are more
likely to withdraw their support to vote for parties whose policies and ideologies are similar to
theirs and for the most viable candidates. Furthermore, in areas that the smaller parties do not
contest both races, we expect their supporters to vote strategically because where they elect their
parties in one race, they will need to vote to prevent the victory of their least preferred alternative
in the other race. In this way, they will vote for their next alternative or vote to defeat the least
preferred of the major contenders in that area or race.
As stated above, strategic voting will translate into ticket splitting where the parties that an
electorate votes for in the different races are not from the same party. Similarly, if the parties that
supporters of smaller parties vote for in the different races are not from the same party, we have
ticket splitting. Benoit et al. (2006) refers to the kind of ticket splitting from supporters of smaller
parties as restricted choice menu, largely because often they are compelled to split because their
parties are unable to contest in all races in all constituencies. It has often been argued that the
challenges faced by smaller parties are largely due to their inability to offer enough choices to their
supporters (Benoit et al. 2006). Thrasher et al. (2014) think that smaller parties often create ticket
splitting due to misallocation of scarce resources and that if they master the allocation of their
resources, they can overcome this kind of splitting.
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3.2.3 (Mis)coordination Ticket-Splitting (MCTS)
Connected to strategic voting is the concept of “(mis)coordinated ticket-splitting” (MCTS).
There are two strands of MCTS: where there is over nomination from ideologically similar parties
and where there are intraparty conflicts (within the same party) either due to personality differences
or nomination problems (Benoit 2001; Cox 1999; Golder 2006; Navia and Saldaña 2015). The first
strand of MCTS is said to occur where ideologically similar parties do not harmonize their entry
to produce a joint list or single candidate but they all contest in the same constituency seeking the
votes of the same voters (Cox 1999; Navia and Saldaña 2015). MCTS is likely to produce ticket
splitting especially if the supporters of such parties do not want to waste their votes. Both Cox
(1999) and Navia and Saldaña (2015) found that the Concertación Alliance (Concertación Party)
of Chile fell victim to MCTS because they did not coordinate their entry. In this way, they all “fall
together” (lose the election) because of their failure to coordinate their efforts. MCTS is not unique
to Chilean politicians1; it has also been applied to Japanese parties who often over-nominate
candidates leading to voters withdrawing from such parties in order not to waste their votes (Cox
1999). Cox (1999) observed that Japanese parties’ elites who failed to coordinate their entry often
jointly lost the elections and therefore, came to be associated with a preexisting nonpolitical word,
tomodaore “falling down together” (Cox 1999, 152). Thus, the term tomodaore is used to describe
the defeat associated with elite miscoordination.
The second category of MCTS occurs where within the same political party, nomination
problems cause some members to defect and contest the election as independent candidates or
where there is no proper cohesion between the presidential and PC’s campaign (Birch 2003; Cox
1997, 1999; Debrah 2004; Tavits 2008). In this way, there is high likelihood of ticket splitting
because, the probability of the same electorates voting for the presidential and PCs from the same
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party is very slim. When party elites from the same party are divided, it encourages ticket splitting
(Cox 1999; Benoit 2001). Thus, I expect MCTS in instances where party elites from the same
ideological bloc fail to coordinate on a single candidate by dissuading nonviable candidates from
contesting the election. Similarly, I expect MCTS where within the same party, party elites fail to
dissuade unsuccessful primary seekers from contesting the election as independent candidates and,
or instances where there is no proper interaction between the presidential candidate and the PCs.
Instances where the second category of MCTS occurs, all things being equal, I expect
voters to withdraw from the trailing candidate who could either be the presidential candidate or
the PC (Cox 1997, 1999; Benoit 2001). In the case of Ghana, because it practices concurrent
Presidential-Legislative elections, if there is no proper coordination between the presidential and
parliamentary candidate of a party in a given constituency, party supporters are more likely to split
their tickets. However, where the presidential office is treasured more than the parliamentary
office, I expect party supporters to defect from the PC and vote for the presidential candidate of
their party (Birch 2003; Kadima 2006; Reif and Schmitt 1980; Tavits 2008). Again, where the PCs
are subpar in certain constituencies or where there are intraparty conflicts concentrated at local
level which basically affects the parliamentary nomination/candidate, I expect supporters to defect
from the PC (Benoit 2001; Birch 2003; Cox 1997, 1999; Burden and Kimball 2009; Kadima 2006).
So, I expect coordination problems at local level to cause party supporters and floating voters to
split away from the PC in favor of the presidential candidate leading to ticket splitting and
consequently, split outcome. Thus:
H2: the greater the miscoordination at the constituency level, the higher the likelihood of
splitting from the parliamentary candidate.
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This means that, elite coordination success is likely to induce party supporters and other electorates
to vote for all the party’s candidates. In this case, elite coordination success and ticket splitting are
inversely related, meaning as elites succeed in coordination there will be less ticket splitting and
as elites fail in coordination there will be more ticket splitting. However, in cases where
ideologically similar parties present more than one candidate, voters who support that ideological
tradition may be indifferent towards the candidates and that is likely to cause ticket splitting.
Again, where nomination problems and factions divide a political party or there is no policy
linkage between the presidential and the PC, there will be MCTS until such a time that the
coordination problems are resolved. As in all other cases, MCTS will produce skirt and blouse
outcome only if the net skirt and blouse voting and roll offs or abstentions are able to tilt the total
number of straight ticket votes in a concurrent election.
3.2.4 Economic Voting
The fundamental argument of the economic voting hypothesis could be traced to Downs’
(1957) expected utility theory of voting which claims that a voter would favor a candidate who
renders the highest expected utility. Fiorina (1981) further developed the Downs’s utility argument
based on voter rationality by stating that voters will vote for an incumbent president who presided
over a prosperous economy and punish incumbent presidents who presided over a deteriorating
economy. Furthermore, where an incumbent’s competitor promises or shows prospects of better
performance or the track record of a challenger trumps that of the incumbent president, voters are
more likely to vote for the challenger.
This distinction introduces retrospective and prospective voting into the decision calculus
of voters. Helmke (2009) observed that Mexican voters consider the incumbent’s economic

54

Samuel K. Darkwa
performance in making their decision, but also, they would have to weigh that decision based on
the available alternatives. That is, voters may want to vote based on performance, yet if challengers
are not viable, they will need to balance inexperienced hands with underperforming incumbents.
Similarly, Benton (2005) also argued that Latin American voters would like to punish not only the
incumbent but also non-incumbent political actors who have contributed adversely to their present
economic circumstance. However, a country’s electoral system and available alternatives may
inhibit voters’ ability to employ economic voting. Thus, economic and electoral concerns interact
to affect voting behavior, political accountability, and public opinion in a nation. Finally, Powell
and Whitten (1993) argued that a key determinant of economic voting is contingent on clarity of
responsibility. In this vein, voter assessment of political actors’ performance is limited by the
extent to which voters can assign responsibility to political actors.
I expect economic voting variable, sociotropic evaluation, to be positively related to ticket
splitting. Since voters who rate the incumbent’s performance as poor are more likely to split their
votes from the president or the president’s party, worse economic performance is likely to be
associated with ticket splitting, all things being equal. To make it more precise, if voters who give
poor ratings to the president also rate the legislative candidate from the president’s party higher,
there will be ticket splitting. Thus, the third hypothesis:
H3: voters who rate the president low on past economic performance and rate the
legislators from the president’s party high on approval ratings are more likely to split their tickets.
This will only translate into skirt and blouse outcome if the total number of those who split their
tickets and those who roll off their ballots exceed those who vote straight ticket. Thus, the fact that
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we do not observe a skirt and blouse outcome does not mean there was no skirt and blouse voting
(Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009).
3.2.5 Ethnicity
The scholarship on ticket splitting has also identified ethnicity as variable responsible for
the phenomenon in divided societies. The conventional account on ethnicity and voter choice is
that voting in ethnic societies is a mere headcount of membership (Horowitz 1985). That is, voters
in ethnic communities vote sincerely for their ethnic parties irrespective of the effect of such votes
on the final electoral outcome. Thus, there is no strategic voting among ethnic voters (Horowitz
1985). It has also been argued that clientelism (voting for private benefits) is the sole driving force
that incentivizes voting in ethnic societies (Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Hyden and Leys 1972;
Lemarchand 1972). In contrast to the classic view on ethnic voting, Chandra (2009) posits that
voters among Scheduled Caste communities in the northern India do not vote sincerely for their
ethnic parties but rather vote strategically to ensure that their decisions make impact on the
electoral outcome. This position is in consonance with McLaughlin (2008) who observed that in
South Africa, ethnicity is not the motivation when electorates are voting at the national and
provincial levels. Voters often select their “true” preferences at the national level but vote for a
different party at the provincial level based on their anticipation of what other voters are doing.
In Ghana, scholars are of the view that how ethnicity is viewed needs to be reconsidered in
the sense that the electorates vote for their ethnic contestants only where they believe in their
ability to perform (Debrah 2016; Frempong 2012, 2017; Osei 2012). The assertion that Ghanaian
voters will vote for their coethnic contestants only where they believe in their ability to perform is
similar to those of Banducci, Donovan, and Karp (2004) who found the Maori electorate of New
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Zealand to be more critical of their Maori MPs. In Ghana, it is also argued that ethnically-based
skirt and blouse voting is a tool used by voters to navigate otherwise difficult voting decision that
they must make at the voting booth. After making such a decision, even if it amounts to voting
against coethnics, the individuals are able to satisfy party and candidate choice without
compromising their conscience (Interview with Mr. Kwesi Jonah in March 2017). The voter settles
with the party and candidate that is viable in either race. The solution tool that ethnicity provides
the voter is aptly captured by Campbell and Miller (1957) in relation to the conundrum that faces
an ambivalent voter in making decision:
This voter is also politically involved but his political motives are in conflict. He may prefer
the candidate or policies of one party but feels a personal allegiance to the other, with the
result that he cannot fully satisfy his political motives by voting a straight ticket. His splitticket is a compromise solution to his conflict (Campbell and Miller 1957, 312)
Thus, we expect ethnicity to be employed as a tool used by voters to resolve difficult voting
decisions especially when it is not obvious to vote straight ticket given the parties and candidates
involved in the contest. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis:
H4: voters who share ethnicity with the presidential candidate of one party and parliamentary
candidate of another party are more likely to split their tickets if their coethnics are the viable
alternatives and they are concerned about most viable options.
Thus, ethnicity is expected to be significant and positive if coethnics are expected to perform
better. The cumulative effect of ethnic skirt and blouse voting on skirt and blouse outcomes will
depend on the overall impact of the voting choices made by all the voters in a given constituency
(Brunell and Grofman 2009).
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3.2.6 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Voters
Often scholars view ticket splitting from the angle of demographic and socioeconomic
features of voters to find out how ticket-splitters differ from other voters (Bybee et al. 1981;
Campbell and Miller 1975; DeVries and Tarrance 1972). They have also addressed the topic from
the attitudinal point of ticket splitters (Beck et al. 1992; Bybee et al. 1981; DeVries and Tarrance
1972; Gomes and Wilson 2006), while others have touched on political information inventory of
these voters (Downs 1957, Gomes and Wilson 2006, Zaller 1992).
Demographically, ticket-splitters are said to be younger (Campbell and Miller 1957; De
Vries and Tarrance 1972). Thus, younger voters are more likely to split their tickets than their
older counterparts in simultaneous elections. Recent works on age and ticket splitting however,
have found contradictory evidence and concluded that the relationship between age and ticket
splitting is spurious (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003).
It has also been argued that ticket splitters are more educated and more likely to have whitecollar jobs (Beck et al., 1992; Dalton, 2013; DeVries and Tarrance 1972). Though there is
convergence on education and ticket splitting, some scholars think that education level rather than
education in general is significant. For instance, whereas Campbell and Miller (1957) think that
lower level of education is associated with ticket splitting, others are of the view that higher level
of education has higher probability of ticket splitting (Dalton, 2013; De Vries & Tarrance, 1972).
The role of income in ticket splitting is found to be mixed. Whereas DeVries and Tarrance
(1972) found an association between income and ticket splitting, Roscoe (2003) found income to
be related to ticket splitting only in scattered instances and that its impact is insignificant and
inconsistent. Men are found by Campbell and Miller (1957) to be more disposed to split their ticket
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than women. However, others found no significant relationship between gender and ticket splitting
(Beck et al., 1992; Rallings and Thrasher, 2003).
In addition to demographic and socioeconomic features of ticket-splitters, electoral
scholars have also considered attitudinal factors of ticket-splitters such as voter perception and
political attitudes toward the political parties. However, the findings are often contradictory. Some
scholars have found that the intensity of partisanship and higher interest in politics are inversely
related to ticket splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell and Miller 1957). In
contrast, Maddox and Nimmo (1981) found that largely, all partisans split their ballots but that is
context determinant. It is argued that partisans who work for their parties or candidates have strong
partisanship and therefore less likely to split their tickets (Burden and Kimball 2009). An
individual’s interest in the campaign is found to be positively related with ticket splitting (Maddox
and Nimmo 1981). In contrast, Beck et al. (1992) found no association between interest in
campaign and ticket splitting. Other scholars have found that interest in campaign alone is not
likely to affect ticket splitting but those interested in the result of the election are more likely to
split their tickets (Mclaughlin 2008; Roscoe 2003). Therefore, I expect to see interest in the
campaign to be significant when those interested in it expect a certain electoral outcome. This
means that depending on voters’ expectations, interest in the campaign may produce ticket splitting
or straight ticket voting, and the direction can either be positive or negative. Consequently, I expect
the following hypotheses as political attitude hypotheses:
H5A: Voters who attend meetings with candidate(s) or campaign staff are less likely to split.
H5B: Voters who work for candidates or political parties are less likely to split their votes.
I expect negative association between the variables: “working for a candidate” and “campaign
meeting” and ticket splitting.
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3.2.7 Political Information
It has been argued that voters who are politically informed are more likely to engage in
rational decisions and often rely on information shortcuts referred to as heuristics when deciding
on which candidate or party to vote for (Downs 1957; Popkin 1991). Also, a voter's ability to
correctly locate issues and candidates on a 7-point ideological scale as well as gather information
from the media has been associated with voter sophistication (Neuman 1986; Zaller 1992). Thus,
the politically informed are sophisticated voters who make rational decisions on political issues
including voting in general and ticket splitting in particular. This is not to make a sweeping
generalization that the politically informed and sophisticated persons split their votes because there
is conflicting view on political sophistication and ticket splitting. For instance, while Converse
(1964) found a negative relationship between political sophistication (political information) and
ticket splitting, other scholars found counter evidence (Dalton, 2013; Lachat, 2007). This may
mean that politically sophisticated persons are more likely to be strong partisans who are less likely
to engage in splitting or they may rely on one-sided information that suit their political inclination.
This caveat notwithstanding, the scholarship on ticket splitting has considered political
information as one of the variables that induce splitting (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Maddox and
Nimmo 1981). However, there is conflicting evidence on reliance on the media for political
information and ticket splitting. For instance, while reliance on the print media is found to be
associated with splitting (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Bybee et al. 1981), there is no positive
relationship between television and ticket splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Bybee et al. 1981; DeVries
and Tarrance 1972). With these in mind, the dissertation will control for media (radio, television,
and newspaper). It will be interesting to find the relationship and the direction that each media type
has on ticket splitting in Ghana as compared with those indicated above.
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In sum, based on the literature related to split-ticket voting, I expect perceived party
similarity to increase ticket splitting all things being equal. Thus, to confirm H1, I expect voter
perception of party similarity to be positively related to splitting. Next, I expect elite
miscoordination to positively relate to splitting to confirm H2. I also expect voters who rate an
incumbent president bad on the economy to defect from the president or the president’s party to
confirm H3. Again, I expect voters who share ethnicity with a presidential candidate of one party
and a parliamentary candidate of another party to split their tickets if their coethnics are the viable
alternatives to confirm H4. Furthermore, I expect persons who attend political campaigns with
candidates and those who work for political parties/candidates to be negatively related to splitting
to confirm H5A and H5B. In addition, I expect political information variables such as newspaper,
television and radio exposure to be positively related to splitting. Finally, income and education
are expected to be positively related to splitting meaning the higher the level of education and the
wealthier one becomes, the higher the likelihood of making informed and independent choices
including voting.
3.3 DATA AND MEASUREMENT
This chapter uses data from the Afrobarometer dataset to assess individual-level attitudes
about parties and candidates in Ghana to evaluate the hypotheses listed above. The Afrobarometer
is a Pan-African research organization that carries out public attitude surveys on series of topics
including democracy, governance, and economic conditions in over 35 countries in Africa2
(Network Afrobarometer 2014; Bratton 2004; Fry, 2013). The first round of surveys took place in
July 1999 and by March 2018, the research network had published seven rounds of its surveys
which have been used extensively by scholars across the globe. This chapter focuses on round six
of the survey published in June 2015, because it is the closest to the 2016 Ghanaian election. The
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surveys are based on personal interviews of persons within the voting age while the sample drawn
from 2,400 respondents is nationally representative of the population with regard to demographic,
partisanship, occupation and socioeconomic circumstances of the larger Ghanaian society. Also,
the surveys were carried out by experts who asked respondents questions in their local languages
and this makes responses more likely to be reflective of the true intentions of respondents.
Although the dataset is appropriate and reliable, a substantial number of respondents did
not identify with a party when asked in the interview. Although this set of persons could represent
the pool of floating voters who often swing the elections (Asunka 2016; Debrah and Gyampo 2013;
Weghorst and Lindberg 2013), their failure to properly identify their partisanship poses some
challenge to the use of the dataset since one is not sure whether their responses amount to
misreporting or not. This aside, the Afrobarometer data poses other problems. First, the survey did
not directly ask questions about skirt and blouse voting. Consequently, I resort to proxies to derive
possible skirt and blouse voters (that is respondents who do not feel the same level of closeness to
the parliamentary and presidential candidates of the same party). Second, the Afrobarometer
survey was not carried out right before or after elections therefore, my assessments of likely
behavior may understate or overstate skirt and blouse likelihood. Despite these shortcomings, the
dataset is capable of testing my research hypotheses in a systematic way.
3.3.1 Dependent variable
The main dependent variable of this dissertation is skirt and blouse voting. It is a dichotomous
variable – a respondent splits or does not split the ballot. Ideally, I would like to work with a survey
that asks respondents the political affiliation of candidates they will vote for in the legislative and
presidential elections in order to identify likely ticket splitters. Unfortunately, that is not possible
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because the Afrobarometer questions do not directly assess behavior, therefore, I have to use as
close of a proxy as I can get.
For instance, respondents were asked to indicate their closeness to political parties. They
were also asked to identify which presidential candidate they will vote for if elections were held
tomorrow. However, there was no corresponding question asking which legislative candidate they
will vote for in the same election. Therefore, responses for these two questions were used to deduce
likely skirt and blouse voters. Those who are likely to split their ballots (respondents who do not
feel the same level of closeness to the parliamentary and presidential candidates of the same party)
were coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”. Thus, respondents who, for instance, indicated they
would vote for NDC presidential candidate but stated that they were closest to the PNC were coded
as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”.
It is important to state that the proxies I used are likely to understate possible ticket splitters
given that about 46 percent (45.58%) respondents as per Table 3.1 did not indicate their closeness
to legislative candidates and as such treated as missing. It could be possible that non-partisan
identifiers are more likely to split and since I do not know their candidate preference, I dropped
them because it is better to understate likely splitters than to overstate them. Thus, the choice of
less likely splitters as my dependent variable is to adopt a relatively conservative approach in order
not to overstate my dependent variable. It is also significant to note that more respondents feel
closely attracted to the NPP (opposition) presidential candidate (858 respondents, i.e. 35.75%)
than the NDC (incumbent) presidential candidate (557 respondents, i.e. 23.21%) as per Table 3.2.
This is fair because normally, voters are more likely to identify with an incumbent’s challenger
when the economy is not doing well. This is confirmed by the actual electoral results in Table 3.3
where the NPP presidential candidate won 31 more constituencies (153-122) than the NDC
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presidential candidate. A closer look at Tables 3.1 and 3.2 shows that relatively stable respondents,
23.75 percent and 23.21 percent respectively said they feel closely attracted to the NDC
presidential and legislative candidates. Compared to Table 3.3 where the NDC presidential
candidate won 16 more constituencies (122-106) than the party’s legislative candidates and the
NPP legislative candidates won 16 more constituencies (169-153) than the party’s presidential
candidate shows that largely, splitters withdrew from the NDC legislative candidates in the 2016
general election.

Table 3.1: Respondents' Closeness to the Legislative Candidates
Name of Political Party
Number
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
570
New Patriotic Party (NPP)
658
Others
78
Missing
1094
Total
2400
Source: Author’s Compilation from Afrobarometer Round 6 Dataset

Percentage
23.75
27.42
3.25
45.58
100.00

Table 3.2: Respondents' Closeness to the Presidential Candidates
Name of Political Party
Number
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
557
New Patriotic Party (NPP)
858
Others
130
Missing
855
Total
2400
Source: Author’s Compilation from Afrobarometer Round 6 Dataset

Percentage
23.21
35.75
5.42
35.63
100.00

Table 3.3: Actual Performance of Presidential & Legislative Candidates in 2016 Elections
Constituencies Percentage Seats Won Percentage
Name of Political Party
Won (Pres.)
(Legislative)
National Democratic Congress
122
44.36
106
38.55
New Patriotic Party
153
55.64
169
61.45
Total
275
100
275
100.00
Source: Author’s compilation from 2016 Electoral Results from Ghana’s Electoral Commission
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3.3.2 Independent Variables
The main empirical interest in this paper is to test which voter level variables are
responsible for skirt and blouse voting in Ghana and to determine whether Ghanaian voters behave
in a manner consistent with ticket splitters in other parts of the globe or they do not. The following
paragraphs outline how the independent variables are coded. The coding details for all the variables
and the questions used are provided at Appendix 3.1.
Perceived party similarities: I have made the claim that perceived party distinctiveness
gives voters distinct choice while perceived party similarity blurs voter choice. This means that
voters who see significant difference between the parties are likely to vote straight ticket while
voters who do not see significant difference between the parties are likely to engage in ticket
splitting. To measure perceived party similarities, I use question 62 of the Afrobarometer Round
6 which asked respondents: “Which of the following do you see as the most important difference
between the ruling party and opposition parties in Ghana?” The variable perceived party
similarities is measured as binary with respondents who see no significant difference between the
parties coded as “1” otherwise coded as “0”. The variable, perceived party similarities, is expected
to be positively related to splitting, thus as perceived party similarities increases, splitting increases
and as perceived party similarities decreases splitting decreases.
Parliamentary Split: I measure parliamentary split using questions 52A & 52F that asked
respondents their trust in the ruling party and the president. Given that the president is from the
ruling party, respondents who do not feel the same level of trust in the ruling party and president
are likely to defect from (withdraw from) the PC of the ruling party and vice-versa. The two
questions are: Q52A. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough
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about them to say: The President? Q52F. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t
you heard enough about them to say: The Ruling Party? From these questions, I deduced likely
parliamentary split (proxy): those who do not feel the same level of trust in the ruling party and
president were coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”.
Economic Voting: The analysis incorporates a key variable to assess sociotropic
evaluation3. Question 4A of the survey asked, “In general, how would you describe the present
condition of this country?” sociotropic voting is measured using a five-point scale from 1-5 for
“very bad” to “very good”. It is expected that those who are not satisfied with the incumbent’s
economic performance are likely to split their ticket by voting for alternatives and maintain some
of the incumbent party’s legislators as a hedge/insurance against voting for challengers and
incumbents.
Ethnic minority: In Ghana, the two dominant political parties, NDC and NPP have their
core support from the Ewe and Akan ethnic groups. These two ethnic groups often vote straight
tickets and therefore coded as “0” while the remaining ethnic group members coded as “1” because
they are more likely to split their tickets4. This variable was computed using responses to the
question, “What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?” Ethnic minority is expected
to be positively related to ticket splitting especially in situations where electorates from minority
ethnic groups coordinate their votes to impact the electoral results.
Campaign Meetings: I generate the variable campaign meeting using question 23B,
“Thinking about the last national election in 2012, did you: Attend a meeting with a candidate or
campaign staff?” Campaign meeting is a dichotomous variable with “Yes” and “No”. All things
being equal, respondents who do attend political party’s campaign with candidates are said to have
strong partisanship and therefore less likely to split their tickets while those who do not attend are
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weak partisans. Thus, respondents who answered “Yes” are coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”.
I expect voters who attend campaign meetings with candidates to be negatively related to splitting.
Work for Party/Candidate: Just like those who attend political parties’ campaign, those
who work for political parties are expected to have strong partisanship and therefore less likely to
split their ballots while those who do not are weak and therefore more likely to split. The variable,
Work for a candidate, was generated using question 23D, “Thinking about the last national
election in 2012, did you: Work for a candidate or party?” Respondents who answered “Yes” are
coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”. This variable is expected to be negatively related to splitting
meaning persons who work for a candidate are less likely to engage in ticket splitting.
3.3.3 Control Variables
Education: The variable education was generated using the education level of respondents.
This variable is coded on a ten-point scale (0-9) representing respondents who do not have “formal
schooling” to those with “post-graduate education”. Seven of the respondents did not select their
education level while three selected the “I do not know” option. These two categories of
respondents were considered as missing. Education is expected to be positively related to splitting.
Male: The variable male was generated using respondents’ sexes. Female respondents were
coded as “0” and male coded as “1”.
Residence: Under residency, the survey sampled respondents from the urban and rural areas
of the country. About 46 percent of the respondents were sampled from the rural areas and the
remaining 54 percent from urban areas. I coded residents from urban areas as “1” because they are
expected to be more sophisticated and therefore more likely to split their votes. Rural residents
were coded as “0” because they are expected to vote straight ticket, all things being equal.
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Age: The variable age was generated using respondents age which range between 18 and
105 and was coded as continuous. I expect age to be negatively related to splitting.
Income: Income is on a five-point scale ranging from those who “never go without cash
income” to those who “always go without cash income” coded “0” – “4” respectively for the Model
1. Generally, respondents who have regular source of income are considered to be independent
and therefore likely to split their tickets. This variable was generated using responses to question
8E, “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without cash
income?”
Political Information/Sophistication: Political information/sophistication variables;
television radio, and newspaper exposure were generated using question 12A-C, “How often do
you get news from the following sources: Radio, TV, and Newspaper? Respondents who listen to
radio daily are thought to be politically informed and therefore sophisticated in their decisions.
These voters are more likely to split their tickets and are therefore coded as “1” otherwise coded
as “0”. The expected direction of radio exposure is positive meaning as radio exposure increases,
ticket splitting is expected to increase, all things being equal. Respondents with television and/or
newspaper exposure are expected to be well informed like their radio exposure counterparts.
Therefore, respondents who watch television and/or those who read newspaper(s) on daily basis
are coded as “1” otherwise, coded as “0”.
3.4 Estimation Strategy for Voter Choice under Coordination Theory
The intuition behind voter choice under the coordination theory operates on the assumption
that voters will like their votes to count in the sense that they will like their votes to impact the
electoral outcome by voting for their most preferred candidates or parties (Cox 1997, 1999; Karp
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2009; Karp et al 2002). Voters are also constrained by the choices available to them and by the
laws governing how votes are translated into seats (Cox 1997, 1999; Duverger 1954; Roscoe
2003). Consequently, they will end up either voting for their preferred candidates/parties or vote
in such a way as to help defeat their least preferred choice. In this way, rational voters will
coordinate their votes on the most competitive candidates. If the candidates selected in the different
races are not from the same political party, we are likely to have split-ticket voting. This
dissertation is interested in ticket splitting, that is the core interest of the dissertation is to identify
instances where a voter votes for different political parties in a concurrent presidential-legislative
election. Consequently, my dependent variable is binary (an electorate votes split-ticket or not),
hence, I employed logit regression which is suitable for the dependent variable. I estimated a total
of six models to analyze ticket splitting using Afrobarometer Round 6 datasets. In the first model,
I regressed the dependent variable on only the control variables. Second, I regressed the dependent
variable on only the independent variables. In the third, I regressed the dependent variable on all
the other variables both independent and control variables. These were done to determine how the
different models/variables affect splitting. There was quite significant amount of missing values
in the dataset. Therefore, to ensure that the results are not influenced by missing data, multiple
imputation technique was employed to deal with missing data5 (StataCorp 2017). In terms of
labeling the models, where only the control variables were run, it was labeled Model 1A. Model
2A denotes the regression model with only independent variables while Model 3A denotes the
regression model that contains all variables (control and independent variables). In each of these
cases, missing values were not replaced. Similarly, where only the control variables were run with
missing values replaced, it was labeled Model 1B. Model 2B signifies the model with only
independent variables run with missing values replaced. Finally, in Model 3B, all the variables
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were used to run logistic regression with missing values replaced. Thus, six models were employed
to test the hypotheses put forward in this chapter using binary logit regression.
3.4.1 Results
When only the control variables were employed in logistic regression, radio exposure and
newspaper exposure were the only significant variables as shown by Model 1A in Table 3.4. When
missing values were replaced through multiple imputation techniques, it was only radio exposure
which was significant. Interestingly, none of the demographic variables (education, male, urban,
age, and income) was significant as demonstrated by Model 1A in Table 3.4 and Model 1B in
Table 3.5 below. I then used only the independent variables to ran logistic regression using the
same dataset. At this time, most of the independent variables appeared to be significant and in the
expected direction as per Model 2A in Table 3.4 below. Again, where missing values were replaced
through multiple imputation techniques as per Model 2B in Table 3.5, the variables maintained
their direction in Model 2B as they were originally in Model 2A. Interestingly, when missing
values were replaced, sociotropic voting variable which was significant in Model 2A, became
insignificant in Model 2B. Also, attendance to campaign meeting which was initially not
significant in Model 2A became significant in Model 2B.
Finally, I combined all the variables (control variables and independent variables) to run
logistic regression using the same dataset. The results are illustrated in Model 3A in Table 3.4
below. At this time, all the independent variables largely behaved the same way they behaved in
Model 2A when only the independent variables were used (compare Model 2A and Model 3A).
Interestingly, income which was not significant in Model 1A became the only significant
demographic variable in Model 3A. Again, television exposure which was not significant in Model
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1A became significant in Model 3A. Also, newspaper exposure which was significant in Model
1A became insignificant in Model 3A.
Table 3.4: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Voting with missing data
6Model

Variables

1A
Model 2A
Model 3A
with Missing Values with Missing Values with Missing Values

Perceived Party Similarities (H1)

0.2719*
(0.1502)
0.2674*
(0.1379)
0.1246**
(0.0527)
0.4021***
(0.1326)
-0.1604
(0.1797)
-0.9528***
(0.2255)
-0.0101
(0.0314)
-0.0071
(0.1193)
-0.0450
(0.1272)
0.0007
(0.0005)
0.0617
(0.0429)
-0.5132***
(0.1319)
0.1965
(0.1379)
0.4498**
(0.2266)
-0.7228***
(0.1608)
1,510

-1.1482***
(0.1229)
1,343

0.2640*
(0.1554)
0.2806**
(0.1424)
0.1242**
(0.0550)
0.3040**
(0.1416)
-0.2435
(0.1851)
-1.0017***
(0.2323)
0.0247
(0.0347)
0.0923
(0.1334)
-0.0203
(0.1395)
0.0008
(0.0005)
0.1205**
(0.0477)
-0.5115***
(0.1448)
0.2582*
(0.1499)
0.4050
(0.2475)
-1.2533***
(0.2202)
1,311

Log Likelihood

-903.46

-786.82

-751.72

McFadden’s R2

0.012

0.043

0.058

Parliamentary Split (H2)
Sociotropic Voting (H3)
Ethnic Minorities (H4)
Campaign Meeting (H5A)
Working for a Candidate (H5B)
Education
Male
Urban
Age
Income
Radio Exposure
Television Exposure
Newspaper Exposure
Constant
Observations

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Voting with missing data (All Variables)
Variables

Model 1B
with Imputation

Model 2B
with Imputation

Model 3B
with Imputation

0.6408***
(0.1085)
0.2567***
(0.0963)
0.0412
(0.0387)
0.2416***
(0.0928)
-0.3227**
(0.1293)
-0.9257***
(0.1574)

0.6632***
(0.1094)
0.2553**
(0.0971)
0.0420
(0.0393)
0.2822***
(0.0969)
-0.3251**
(0.1312)
-0.9491***
(0.1592)
0.0318
(0.0241)
0.0318
(0.0903)
-0.0583
(0.0947)
0.0001
(0.0004)
0.0247
(0.0333)
-0.2471**
(0.1012)
0.2173**
(0.1024)
0.1894
(0.1827)
-0.1682
(0.1541)
2,400

Perceived Party Similarities (H1)
Parliamentary Split (H2)
Sociotropic Voting (H3)
Ethnic Minorities (H4)
Campaign Meeting (H5A)
Working for a Candidate (H5B)
Education
Male
Urban
Age
Income
Radio Exposure
Television Exposure
Newspaper Exposure
Constant
Observations

0.0030
(0.0226)
-0.1182
(0.0855)
-0.0946
(0.0910)
0.0002
(0.0004)
-0.0054
(0.0315)
-0.3097***
(0.0975)
0.1506
(0.0984)
0.2000
(0.1747)
0.3109**
(0.1192)
2,400

McFadden’s R2

0.0053
(0.1229)
2,400

Note 7

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Additionally, I replaced missing values through multiple imputation techniques and used
all the variables to run the final regression. At this point, sociotropic variable which lost its
significance when missing data was replaced in Model 2B still lost its significance as shown in
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Model 3B in Table 3.5 above. Also, campaign meeting attendance which gained significance when
missing values were replaced in Model 2B maintained its significance when missing values were
replaced and all variables were used in the Model 3B. Again, interestingly, income which became
significant when all variables were used without replacing missing values lost its significance
when missing values were replaced as illustrated by Model 3B in Table 3.5. It must be pointed out
however, that the standard measure of fit calculated using McFadden’s R2 shows that the model
does not do a good job in explaining the relationship between ticket splitting and the variables
used. This is because, the values of the McFadden’s R2 do not lie within the conservative 0.2 and
0.4 range of McFadden’s R2 (McFadden 1974, 1977). However, we can state that Model 3A with
McFadden’s R2 of 0.058 fits better than Model 2A with McFadden’s R2 of 0.043 and still better
than Model 1A with McFadden’s R2 of 0.012. Standard measure of fit cannot be calculated for
multiple imputation technique model. Per Stata Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual Release
15, standard measure of fit does not work with models estimated using multiple-imputation
technique.
To estimate how changes in probabilities are likely to affect changes in the likelihood of
ticket splitting for each variable, first, I held all other variables at their medians. Second, I
generated the change in probability of a given variable, for instance education, by changing
education from its minimum to its maximum values. The results are illustrated in Table 3.6 below.
As indicated by the changes in probabilities in Table 3.6 below, the probability of ticket splitting
increases by (.045) among electorates who perceive the political parties to be different when the
voter perception variable is changed from its minimum to its maximum. Also, when the
parliamentary split variable, was changed from its minimum to its maximum, the probability of
splitting increased by (.048) among voters who do not feel the same level of trust in the ruling
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party and president. Again, when the variable, working for a candidate is changed from its
minimum to its maximum, the probability of split is reduced among voters who work for political
parties/candidates by (.114). Similarly, when the variable, attend campaign meeting was changed
from its minimum to its maximum, the probability of splitting decreases by (.036) among voters
who attend campaign meeting with candidates. Finally, the probability of split-ticket voting
increases by (.052) among ethnic minorities when the variable ethnic minorities is changed from
its minimum to its maximum value.
Table 3.6: Effect of Changing Variables from Their Minimum to Maximum Values on
Probability of Ticket Splitting
Variable
Change in
Probability
of Splitting
Perceived Party Similarities (H1)
0.045
Parliamentary Split (H2)
0.048
Sociotropic Voting (H3)
0.090
Ethnic Minorities (H4)
0.052
Campaign Meeting (H5A)
-0.036
Working for a Candidate (H5B)
-0.114
Education
0.035
Male
0.015
Urban
-0.003
Age
0.010
Income
0.082
Radio Exposure
-0.093
Television Exposure
0.044
Newspaper Exposure
0.071
Note: Estimates are derived from Model 3A holding all other variables constant at their medians.

3.4.2 Discussion
From the above results, it is evident that most of the variables are significant and are in the
expected direction consistent with findings from similar studies on voter behavior in Ghana, on
the African continent, and in other parts of the world. A couple of them, however, were surprisingly
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different from expectations. First, the perceived party similarities variable was significant in all
the models with signs in the expected direction. This confirms H1 that the more voters perceive
the contesting political parties to be similar, the more the likelihood of ticket splitting. Per Table
3.6 the probability of ticket splitting among persons who see no significant difference between the
parties increases by (.045) when perceived party similarities variable changes from its minimum
to maximum. In fact, candidates who are able to increase voter perception of party similarities by
either moving closer to their opponents’ issue position or move away from their party’s issue
position are more likely to induce ticket splitting than their counterparts who stress core party
uniqueness in the political space. Thus, when parties or candidates become more similar they
increase ticket splitting and in contrast, they reduce ticket splitting when they emphasize core party
distinctiveness.
In my fieldwork (appendix 3.2), respondents 2 and 98 indicated that politicians often move
their policies closer to their opponent’s policy position or away from their party’s policy position
and thereby encourage ticket splitting. For instance, when the previous government abolished
teacher and nursing trainee allowances, some legislators from the president’s party created
scholarship schemes for their constituents. In this way, such legislators moved away from their
party’s position and thereby created ticket splitting. Again, when the then opposition NPP
promised free senior high school, the incumbent president also promised the same and said that
his government is pursuing progressive free senior high school, and therefore his government
needs a renewed mandate. Thus, often when political elites adopt policies of their opponents, they
are able to induce skirt and blouse voting. In other words, elite coordination (intentional act of
moving away from party’s position or closer to opponents’ position) in the form of issue
positioning can influence ticket splitting. As a result of these, in the 2016 elections there were 29
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split constituencies (constituencies with split outcome) out of 275 constituencies, the highest ever
since 1996.
Second, the significance of the parliamentary split variable (H2) in all the models supports
the coordination driven approach of the dissertation showing that where there is no proper cohesion
between the presidential and parliamentary candidates of a political party, supporters will
withdraw from the PC. Per Table 3.6, the probability of ticket splitting among persons who do not
feel the same level of trust in the ruling party and president and are likely to withdraw from the
PC of the ruling party increases by (.048) when that variable increases from its minimum to its
maximum. This happens where the presidential race is most valued than the parliamentary race
and also where there are intraparty conflicts that are concentrated in local areas. This finding
corresponds with other studies and explains why some voters will withdraw from their PCs but
vote for their presidential candidates and a PC from a different party (Boafo-Arthur 2006; Debrah
and Gyampo 2013). In Ghana, like in Chile, as observed by Navia and Saldaña (2015), winning
the presidency is more important to elites than winning the legislature. Therefore, party elites and
party supporters attach more weight to the presidential race and so would prefer voting for their
presidential candidates because the presidency is considered to be of higher level than the
parliamentary race. This is in line with second-order national elections theory (Reif and Schmitt
1980) which posits that voters attach less importance to elections at the lower levels of government
and therefore will prefer voting at the higher levels of government to the lower levels.
Beside the evidence from the empirical work in this chapter and the literature in support of
parliamentary split (H2), the fieldwork (qualitative research) I carried out in Ghana just after the
2016 election discussed in Chapter 5 supports why some party supporters will withdraw from their
PCs and vote for the presidential candidate. First, there is so much competition at the local level
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for the parliamentary race of the party and this creates internal problems. Some of my respondents
revealed that most politicians prefer to be parliamentarians than holding offices that are
appointment based. This is because, the political appointees, such as ministers, board chairs, as
well as municipal, metropolitan and district chief executives (equivalence of mayors), do not have
guaranteed tenure backed by the Constitution. The president can hire and fire any of these at any
time, but the parliamentarian has a guaranteed tenure. This aside, unlike the presidency that has a
two-term limit, the parliamentarian can be in office as long as the people are willing to renew his
or her mandate. This makes the competition for the parliamentary nomination very competitive
and acrimonious even within the same political party. Additionally, due to their work, the
parliamentarians are “distanced” from their constituencies most of the time. Their in-party
competitors who are political appointees of the president such as the municipal, metropolitan and
district chief executives are stationed among the people and carry out development projects and
therefore easy to win the hearts of the electorates. Some of these, at times sabotage the
parliamentarians just to take over their positions. Second, respondent 6 revealed that some of the
parliamentarians, before or after they get to office, involve themselves in local conflicts such as
chieftaincy and ethnic conflicts9. These conflicts are locally centered and therefore, the local
politicians suffer for them. These and other factors account for why some party elites and
supporters of a party may withdraw from their PCs and even at times may openly and secretly
campaign against the PCs. It is also important to note that, though supporters often withdraw from
the PC in support of the presidential candidate, in my fieldwork it came to light that at times, the
reverse can be true. Respondents 2 and 9 alluded to the fact that government policy that abolished
teacher and nursing trainee allowances caused some PCs from the president’s party who
established scholarship schemes to receive more votes while the president lost in some of these
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constituencies8. Thus, supporters may withdraw from the president and support the PC due to
differences in policies.
Third, the study confirms hypothesis H4 represented by the ethnic minority variable which
was statistically significant in all four models it appeared and in the expected direction. The
probability of ethnic minorities splitting increases by (.052) among ethnic minorities when that
variable is changed from its minimum to its maximum. This finding is supported by discoveries
from similar studies on Ghana. For instance, scholars such as Adu-Amankwaah (2008), Debrah
(2016), and Frempong (2001) found that ethnicity is not used for clientelistic purposes in Ghana
especially among minority ethnic groups. Contrary to Horowitz (1985), voting among Ghanaian
ethnic communities is not a mere headcount of membership. In fact, most voters only vote for their
coethnics when they had performed well or expected to do better than non-coethnics (AduAmankwaah 2008; Debrah 2016; Frempong 2001). It was for this reason that former President Dr.
Hilla Limann lost the 1992 election in his own home district and Vice-President Prof. Atta Mills
lost the 2000 and the 2004 elections (also in his home turf) to their competitors who were
considered more viable candidates (Adu-Amankwaah 2008; Frempong 2001).
Respondent 2 indicated in an interview that the reason why ethnicity is not too much an
issue in Ghana is that, the two major parties, NPP and NDC, do their best to nominate candidates
from the predominant ethnic groups in each constituency and get the minor ethnic groups to
support them11. Thus, elite coordination is at work here. Therefore, splitting is often based on
candidate quality and whether or not there are intraparty conflicts in the various parties. One of
my respondents said that, “…in Akan land all the candidates are Akan and in Ewe land all the
candidates are Ewes. Moreover, the presidential candidates of the two major political parties are
often very experienced who have been in politics for decades and are known beyond and within
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Ghana. Therefore, competence rather than ethnicity is responsible for splitting”9. These views
notwithstanding, ethnicity cannot be discounted in Ghana when it comes to voter choice. For
instance, the current National Chairman of the NDC (the major national opposition party), during
my interview with him, said, “Some communities such as the Kokombas will always want to vote
for a Kokomba irrespective of the party the person belongs to”11. These contrasting views on
ethnicity notwithstanding, ethnicity is a mobilizing force and a mechanism that communicates to
the electorates the viable candidates in that locality. If the viable candidates are from the same
party, there will likely be less ticket splitting. However, where the viable candidates are from
different parties, then, the likelihood of splitting increases. Thus, ethnicity is a voter coordination
tool that creates splitting or otherwise depending on the direction the coordination takes especially
among ethnic minorities.
Fourth, the variable, working for a candidate was significant in all the models and the signs
were in the expected direction. From Table 3.6, the probability for persons who work for
candidates to split reduces by (.114) when the variable, work for candidate, is changed from its
minimum to its maximum. This shows that persons who work for candidates are less likely to
engage in ticket splitting. These people are often influenced by candidates they work with and
therefore less likely to split their ticket. This finding is consistent with what other scholars such as
Burden and Kimball (1998, 2009) and Roscoe (2003) who studied American ticket splitters found.
These scholars found persons who work for candidates to less engage in ticket splitting.
Fifth, though the economic voting variable, sociotropic voting (H3) was not significant in
all the models especially when missing values were replaced, its significance in Models 2A and
3A is consistent with previous work on Ghana. Some of these studies found that a president’s
economic performance impacts his reelection or his party’s chances in the next elections (Debrah
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2016; Lindberg 2013). Boafo-Arthur (2006) and Ninsin (2006a, 2006b) also found that Ghanaian
electorates have sayings such as “Hwɛ w’asitena mu na to aba pa”, which simply means that
“examine your life and vote appropriately”. Thus, like their counterparts elsewhere, Ghanaian
electorates are capable of using evaluative variables such as government’s economic performance
to split their tickets. They will vote for a president who pursues policies that create economic
prosperity and if the PC from the president’s party is not responsive to the electorates, they will
vote against that PC and this will create ticket splitting. Thus, through economic voting, voter
coordination can lead to splitting when an incumbent president’s economic performance is at stake.
Finally, the demographic and socioeconomic variables were not that significant as in other
studies. Only income was partially significant in just one (Model 3A) out the four models that
demographic variables were used in the regression analyses. The political information variables;
radio, television and newspaper exposure present interesting findings. First, radio exposure has
been significant in all the models but was not in the expected direction as per Tables 3.4 and 3.5
above. Per Table 3.6, the probability of splitting is reduced by (0.93) among persons who listen to
radio daily when radio exposure variable was changed from its minimum to its maximum value.
This suggests that ticket splitters might be listening to radio stations that match their political biases
or relay messages against ticket splitting. Newspaper exposure was only significant in Model 1A
while Television exposure was significant in Models 3A and 3B when all the variables were
combined in the models. Based on the performance of the political information variables (radio
exposure’s signs were not in the expected direction; newspaper exposure and television exposure
were significant in few models), it could be said that their effects are largely inconsistent as shown
by many other scholars (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Beck et al. 1992; Bybee et al. 1981). Due to
their inconsistent relationship with ticket splitting, it stands to reason that they could be tools used

80

Samuel K. Darkwa
by elites to disseminate public opinion in vogue at the time of an election to influence voter choice
in certain direction (Chandra 2007, 2009; Mclaughlin 2008). It will be fascinating to investigate
the instrumental role of political information, especially, radio exposure on ticket splitting. It is
likely that the direction of political information variables may largely depend on the objectives of
those who employ them.
In fact, it would have been great to investigate voter coordination in more nuanced ways
where it may lead to less ticket splitting rather than more ticket splitting. For instance, in a given
constituency, parties A and B presented candidates for the presidential race and a voter prefers
party A’s candidate in that contest. Now, assuming in the legislative race parties A, B, and C
presented candidates and the same voter prefers C to A to B (C >A > B), if that voter does not
think C is viable and therefore, votes for A instead of C, in that case, voter coordination would
lead to less ticket splitting. This scenario could have been possible if the Afrobarometer dataset
had data on expected candidate preference prior to the elections and actual voting decision after
the elections. Again, my data does not allow me to identify which parties fail to coordinate. Q90B
would have been a good example from the data to address an instance where the Nkrumahist
parties: Convention People’s Party (CPP), People’s National Convention (PNC), Progressive
People’s Party (PPP), Democratic People’s Party (DPP), and Great Consolidated Popular Party
(GCPP) failed to coordinate by presenting five candidates. However, because I used that question
to deduce my likely ticket splitters (my dependent variable), I could not use the same question to
generate an independent variable. In the light of this limitation, the next two chapters employed
different datasets (constituency electoral dataset for chapter four and fieldwork survey data for
chapter five) to complement findings from this chapter.
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3.5 CONCLUSION
In sum, ticket splitting at the individual level is necessary to evaluate why some voters do
split their ticket and others do not. In this way, we can also predict possible ticket splitters, all
things being equal. Some scholars have, however, cast doubt on the individual-level variables on
the basis that it is possible for two people to be identical in many of the individual-level variables,
yet one splits, and the other does not (Burden and Kimball 2009; Roscoe 2003). Indeed, this points
to other variables beyond the individual level but that does not stop us from explaining why for
instance, weak partisans would split, and strong partisans would not. We are also better disposed
to understand why elite miscoordination can lead even strong partisans to split in certain contexts.
We are also better disposed to understand why some politicians will like to induce ticket splitting
through issue positioning by moving closer to their opponents’ issue position or away from their
party issue position. Again, we are able to understand why some politicians in an MP’s party will
care less in advocating skirt and blouse because such politicians may prefer the MP’s office for
which tenure is guaranteed by the constitution.
This section has given us a bigger picture to consider in analyzing individual level variables
that impact ticket splitting and this is in line with Burden and Helmke (2009) who argue that the
focus of ticket splitting will expand beyond its consideration in an American setting when we study
the phenomenon on comparative basis. We can understand why, for instance, the presidential race
is very important to the Ghanaian electorates and their political actors to the extent that some
supporters of a political party would like to vote for their presidential candidate and for a PC from
another party. This same point can be understood when viewed from an American perspective by
employing Burden and Kimball (2009). From Burden and Kimball (2009), we understand that at
least the two dominant parties in America are able to attract high profile individuals for the
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presidential race but the same thing cannot be said about legislative candidates in many cases.
Consequently, many will vote for their presidential candidate and for other party’s candidate in the
legislative race, as the candidate from one’s own party may be weak.
If America, the oldest democracy, is faced with such a challenge (subpar candidates) at the
constituency level (electoral district) that causes voters to split their ticket (Burden and Kimball
2009), then Ghana is not likely to be an exception. Ghana is also faced with a similar challenge,
especially given that the coordination problem at the constituency level is bigger; ticket splitting
may be endemic at that level. Finally, if we need to study ticket splitting beyond the American
setting, then we can understand why ethnicity becomes a tool for communicating viable candidates
in a voting district rather than engaging in clientelistic voting. It can be said that ethnicity in Ghana
is not for clientelistic purposes because a number of big politicians have lost the elections in their
home turf to their opponents. For instance, former President Dr. Hilla Limann lost the 1992
elections to Mr. Jerry Rawlings in his own region (Adu-Amankwaah 2008; Frempong 2001).
Again, Vice-President Prof. Atta Mills lost the 2000 elections to candidate Kufuor and also in 2004
to President Kufuor both in Prof. Mills’ home town (Adu-Amankwaah 2008; Frempong 2001).
It has been argued that factors that induce ticket splitting are very diverse and no single
study can unearth all of them (Burden and Helmke 2009). This chapter has therefore focused on
how elite (mis)coordination encourages voter coordination that often induces ticket splitting
because voters would like their votes to count (Cox 1997, 1999) and therefore, would like to
withdraw support from less viable candidates. In the same way that demographic, socioeconomic,
attitudinal variables, and political information variables are important in explaining ticket splitting
at the individual level, voter coordination in its nuance and complexity is required to understand
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the phenomenon at the individual level. Ticket splitting at the individual level can be viewed from
multiple angles so long as its focus is on the individual action at the voting booth.
In effect, the chapter has made three important points. First, it has reclassified skirt and
blouse voting into skirt and blouse voting (split-ticket voting) and skirt and blouse outcome (split
district outcome). Previously, the concept was plagued with conceptual ambiguity where the same
concept had two usages. The chapter has reclassified skirt and blouse voting to enable the Ghanaian
concept to be comparable to similar concepts in political science. Second, ticket splitting at the
individual level can be studied from voter coordination perspective. That is looking at how voters
make sense of the options available to them in an election to make the most electoral decision
bearing in mind that voters want their votes to count (Chandra 2007, 2009; Cox 1997, 1999).
Finally, though ticket splitting was certainly not one of the objectives of the Afrobarometer in its
data collection, collecting data on it will help advance the comparative study of African politics
because other barometers do that. That is, the chapter recommends that the administrators of
Afrobarometer dataset should try to incorporate questions that assess voter intentions such as ticket
splitting in their data collection. Again, the dataset could not allow the examination of how voter
coordination could lead to less ticket splitting. Furthermore, the dataset does not allow me to
distinguish which parties fail to coordinate.
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3.7 NOTES
1. As we shall soon see, MCTS is what has come to bedevil the Ghanaian political actors since the
inception of the Fourth Republican Constitution in 1992 and especially the Nkrumahist Tradition
which has many splinter groups contesting each of the seven elections since 1992.
2. The Afrobarometer project is a joint enterprise of “the Center for Democratic Development
(CDD) in Ghana, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa, the Institute for
Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi in Kenya, and the Institute for Empirical
Research in Political Economy (IREEP) in Benin. Michigan State University (MSU) and the
University of Cape Town (UCT) provide technical support to the network” (Network
Afrobarometer 2014, 2).
3. Sociotropic evaluation addresses the question of how economics influences politics. That is,
voters consider the general economic condition of a country to make their voting decisions Kinder
and Kiewiet (1979; 1981). Thus, when economic conditions are good, voters are likely to vote for
the incumbent president for presiding over a prosperous economy and punish incumbents when
general economic conditions are bad. Sociotropic evaluation which focuses on the economic
condition of the nation is contrasted with egocentric evaluation (pocketbook voting) which asserts
that voters make their voting decisions by looking at their personal financial situation at the time
of the election.
4. The Ghanaian Constitution prohibits the formation of political parties on ethnic lines or on
regional bases and requires all political parties to have functional offices in all the constituencies.
However, research findings reveal that the two major parties, the NPP and the NDC have their
main support from Akan and Ewe ethnic groups respectively (Ayee 2002; Debrah 2016; Frempong
2017; Fridy 2006) and therefore, are more likely to vote straight ticket. Other ethnic groups on the
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other hand, are more likely to split their votes (Adu-Amankwaah 2008; Debrah 2016; Frempong
2001; Fridy 2006). In short, I expect more ticket splitting from other ethnic groups than Akan and
Ewe but elite coordination is likely to influence voting choice of ethnic members.
5. I am grateful to Professor Mason Moseley and Professor Erik Herron who suggested the multiple
imputation technique to me to handle missing data in this dissertation.
6. The dataset I used had a lot of missing values. To ensure that missing data do not affect my
results, multiple imputation techniques were adopted to replace missing values. After this, I rerun
the binary logit regression to compare the regression results from the dataset with missing values
with those from replaced missing values
7. Standard measure of fit cannot be calculated for multiple imputation technique model. Per Stata
Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual Release 15, standard measure of fit does not work with
models estimated using multiple-Imputation technique.
8. Interview with Deputy Director of Operations, National Commission for Civic Education
(NCCE) Ghana on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 and with the Director of Research to the main
opposition NDC on Wednesday, March 15, 2017 by author.
9. Interview with National Civic Society leader on Monday, March 13, 2017 by author.
10. Interview with Deputy Director of Operations, National Commission for Civic Education
(NCCE) Ghana on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 by author.
11. Interview with the Director of Elections (currently the National Chairperson) to the main
opposition NDC on Wednesday, March 15, 2017 and with the Achimota Zonal Chairperson of the
ruling NPP on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 by author.

Appendix 3.1: Description of the variables
Indicator
Split-ticket
voting

Perceived
Party
Similarities
(Similarity
between
Parties)

Description of the Variable (questions in
the 2015 Afrobarometer Survey)
Q90. Do you feel close to any particular
political party?
Q99. If presidential elections were held
tomorrow, which party’s candidate would
you vote for?
Q62. Which of the following do you see as
the most important difference between the
ruling party and opposition parties in Ghana?
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Model 1 Coding Rule
Binary: 1= those who do not feel the same
level of closeness to the political party and
presidential candidates of that party
0 = otherwise
Binary: 1=There is no difference; 0=otherwise
(the honesty or integrity of party leader; the
religion of party leaders or member; their
economic and development policies; the
experience of party leaders; the ethnicity of
party leaders or members; the personalities of
party leaders; the regional identity of party
leaders; None of these)
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Parliamentary
split:

Sociotropic
(Economic
Voting)
Ethnic
minorities
Campaign
meetings
Work for
candidate
Education

Q52A. How much do you trust each of the
following, or haven’t you heard enough
about them to say: The President? Q52F.
How much do you trust each of the
following, or haven’t you heard enough
about them to say: The Ruling Party?
Q4A. In general, how would you describe:
The present condition of this country?

Binary: 1= Those who do not feel the same
level of trust in the ruling party and president;
0=otherwise

Q87. What is your ethnic community,
cultural group or tribe?
Q23B. Thinking about the last national
election in 2012, did you: Attend a meeting
with a candidate or campaign staff?
Q23D. Thinking about the last national
election in 2012, did you: Work for a
candidate or party?
Q97. What is your highest level of
education?

Binary: 1=others; 0=Akan and Ewe/Anglo

Male
Urban
Age

Q101. What is your gender?
Urban or rural primary sampling unit
Q1. How old are you?

Income

Q8E. Over the past year, how often, if ever,
have you or anyone in your family: Gone
without a cash income?
Q12B. How often do you get news from the
following sources: Television?
Q12A. How often do you get news from the
following sources: Radio?
Q12C. How often do you get news from the
following sources: Newspapers?

TV Exposure
Radio
Exposure
Newspaper
Exposure

Scale: 1=Very bad; 2=Fairly bad; 3=either
good nor bad; 4=Fairly Good; 5=Very good

Binary: 1=Yes; 0=No
Weak partisans will split
Binary: 1=Yes; 0=No
Weak partisans will split
Scale: 0= No formal schooling; 1= Informal
schooling only; 2= Some primary schooling;
3= Primary school completed; 4= Some
secondary school; 5= Secondary school
completed; 6= Post-secondary qualifications;
7= Some university; 8=University completed;
9= Post-graduate
Binary: 1= male 0= female
Binary: 0= rural; 1= urban
Continuous variable: age of respondents was
taken as given
Scale: 0= Never; 1= Just once or twice;
2=Several times; 3= Many times; 4=Always
Binary: 1= Everyday
0= otherwise
Binary: 1= Everyday
0= otherwise
Binary: 1= Everyday
0= otherwise

Appendix 3.2: Fieldwork
The fieldwork took place in Ghana in March 2017, covering seven out of the 275 constituencies
with 303 respondents. Most respondents were contacted between Sunday, March 5, 2017 and
Friday, March 17, 2017. One person elected to have his interview via Skype on Friday, March 24,
2017. The 303 participants were essentially party elites with just a handful of them representing
civil society, the media, and members of academia.
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Prior to administering the questionnaires, pilot samples were run with colleagues that have the
same level of involvement in the subject area in the United States. Their constructive feedback and
critiques enriched the final questionnaire. Again, the pilot survey was carried out in Ghana among
a subset of the selected sample whose response led to rewording of some of the questions to reflect
the level of comprehension of the project’s research subjects. Thus, efforts were made to ensure
that the questions and the design work as intended were not ambiguous and that respondents were
asked the right questions to measure key variables. It worth pointing out that prior to administering
the questionnaires, all the committee members made inputs to the questionnaires. Professor Mason
Moseley for instance, tremendously helped in finetuning the survey before in Ghana finishing
touches were made to reflect the language and comprehension levels of the average Ghanaian
research respondents. What the fieldwork entails could be summed up under four main headings
below.

A. Time and location of the interviews
As indicated above, the fieldwork took place in Ghana between Sunday, March 5, 2017 and Friday,
March 17, 2017 involving seven electoral districts (constituencies). The seven constituencies
selected were Ablekuma South, Bantama, Ellembelle, Evalue Ajomoro Gwira, Ketu South,
Klottey Korle, and Wulensi. The selection criterion for the constituencies was to help sample those
that have experienced skirt and blouse outcome(s) and those that have not as well as constituencies
where interparty alliance had taken place and those where interparty alliance had never taken place
before. The sample was also to include cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan constituencies, swing
constituencies and party strongholds, huge population size1 (with 60,000 or more voters) and those
with less than 60,000 voters. Finally, consideration was given to constituencies where a former
party affiliated candidate who protested by going independent won and where no former party
affiliated candidate who protested by going independent won. The number of constituencies
involved, and the selection criteria is summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Cases (constituencies) and their Fitness to the Selection Criteria
Skirt &
blouse
outcome
Yes

Experienced
Interparty
alliance
No

Constituency
Ablekuma
South
Bantama
No
No
Ellembelle
Yes
Yes
Evalue A.
Yes
Yes
Gwira
Ketu South
No
No
Klottey
Yes
No
Korle
Wulensi
Yes
No
Others
Total Number of Participants

Cosmopolitan

Swing
constituency

Party
stronghold
No

Huge population
size +60,000
votes
Yes

Won by
Independent
Protester
No

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
No

No
No
No

51
39
39

No
Yes

No
Yes

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

No
No

46
38

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

46
7
303

1

Sample
size

Constituency with more than 60,000 registered voters is considered large because it exceeds the national average of
about 56,000 registered voters and about 39,000 valid votes cast as per the 2016 electoral statistics.

93

37

Samuel K. Darkwa
B. Questions for Participants (a full questionnaire can be found under this section)
Participants of the survey were mainly party elites2 (designated as members/officials of political
parties). They were asked a total of 27 questions (a blend of open-ended and multiple-choice).
Response from the open-ended questions were compared to those from the multiple-choice to
identify the consistency of responses given by participants. Furthermore, responses from the openended questions helped to collect information from participants about their assessments on why
skirt and blouse voting takes place, as well as their opinion about elite coordination successes and
failures (both interparty and intraparty). The survey questionnaire is categorized into questions
that collect information on the personal and district demographic profiles of participants as well as
those that collect information about their party ID, their views on intraparty and interparty
coordination of their political parties. A full complement of questions asked respondents are given
below.
Questionnaire to Party Elites (Members/Officials)
Personal and District Demography

Where do you vote (constituency name)? _________

1. Which of the following best describes your educational status?
A) Some primary schooling
B) Primary school completed
C) Some secondary school/high school
D) Secondary school/high school completed
E) Post-secondary qualifications, other than university
F) Some university
G) University completed and beyond
H) I don’t know
2. Are you a member/official of any political party? Yes/No
3. If you answered Yes, on Question 2, which political party is that? _______________________
4. What is your position in the party? _______________________________________________
Party ID and Intraparty Coordination
5. Please select the statement that most closely matches your view. In general, the recent
parliamentary primaries of your political party were successful.
A) Strongly Disagree
Initially, the questionnaires were titled, “Questionnaire to Party Officials”. This was reworded, “Questionnaire to
Party Elites (Members/Officials)” based on advice from participants on the field. I was told that the usage of party
officials in Ghana is often limited to the few party-elected executives responsible for the day-to-day running of the
parties. Thus, the adoption of the term “party officials” would have acted as limitation for people I had to interview.
However, as I needed to interview all those involved in party affairs (MPs, nomination seekers, grassroots, cadres,
etc.), I needed to change the word “official(s)” to “member(s)” in order to attract wide audience. I sought clearance
from Professor Herron on the field to go ahead with the alteration.
2
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B)
C)
D)
E)

Moderately Disagree
Neutral (neither agree nor disagree)
Moderately Agree
Strongly Agree

6. Did any defeated candidate of your party threaten to leave the political party?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
If you answered Yes, on Question 6, answer questions 7 and 8, otherwise skip to question 9.
7. The party leadership was able to resolve issues of defection and has since then coordinated
well.
A) Strongly Disagree
B) Moderately Disagree
C) Neutral (neither agree nor disagree)
D) Moderately Agree
E) Strongly Agree
8. How did they do it? ___________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
9. Did some losing parliamentary contestants threaten to go independent?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
10. Did some losing parliamentary contestants go independent?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
11. If Yes, was the party’s leadership able to convince the disgruntled member(s) to rescind their
decision?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
12. Did any of your party executives endorse the candidature (be it presidential or parliamentary)
of another party?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
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13. Please looking at the results of the 2016 general elections do you think some
members/supporters of your party voted “skirt and blouse”?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
14. If you answered Yes, on Question 13, why do you think they voted skirt and blouse? ______
______________________________________________________________________________
15. Did your presidential/parliamentary candidate plead with supporters/members or the
electorates not to vote “Skirt and Blouse”?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
16. If Yes, why do you think the request was made? If No, why not? ______________________
______________________________________________________________________________
17. Leading to the elections did your party maintain a common pool of resources for both
presidential and parliamentary campaigns. Yes/No
Interparty Coordination
18. Would you recommend your party to enter into an electoral alliance in order to defeat an
‘undesirable’ political party”
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
19. Has your party ever entered into formal or informal electoral alliance with another party
either during the main elections or presidential run-off?
D) Yes
E) No
F) Don’t know
20. Why or why not? ____________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
21. Did your party endorse another candidate for either the presidential or parliamentary slot?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
22. Why or why not? ____________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________________________
23. Did your party decide to leave out any constituency or withdraw a candidate from a
particular constituency to help another party win that seat?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
24. Did your party contest in both presidential and parliamentary seats in all constituencies?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
25. If No, why? ________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
26. Have you ever voted skirt and blouse (that is to vote for presidential and parliamentary
candidates in the same election from different political parties) before?
A) Yes
B) No
C) Don’t know
27. Why? _____________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

C. Participants in the study and how they were recruited
As stated above, there were 303 participants in the study who were essentially party elites with
just a few of them representing civil society, the media, and members of academia. To ensure that
the research samples all the relevant political parties fairly, political parties whose parliamentary
candidates pulled at least ten percent in any of the 275 constituencies in the 2016 general elections
were included in the sample. In this way, five political parties were selected. They were the
Convention People’s Party (CPP), National Democratic Congress (NDC), New Patriotic Party
(NPP), People’s National Convention (PNC), and Progressive People’s Party (PPP) (parties are in
alphabetical order). As the political parties have unequal strengths in terms of resources and
membership, it was decided to fix minimum and maximum number of samples to collect from
each party as 35 and 90. Given the specific nature of respondents required for this research and the
parties involved, randomized selection was not very feasible, therefore, an attempt was made to
undo any biases in the data collection. Consequently, respondents from the seven constituencies
were grouped into clusters of polling stations using the Electoral Commission of Ghana’s code
book.
Thus, in terms of cluster, in Ablekuma South where we collected 37 samples, we surveyed eight
each from Chorkor and Korle Bu but seven each from Korle Gonno, Mamprobi, and New
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Mamprobi. In Bantama, we collected 51 samples, eleven samples were taken from AbrepoMpatasie while ten each were taken from Ahenbronum, Bohyen, Kokoso-Asubonteng, and North
Suntreso. In Ellembele we sampled eight respondents each from Aiyinase South, Awiebo Nyiake,
Ayawora, and Kwasikrom while seven were taken from Nyame Bekyere making a total of 39.
From Ketu South where we sampled 46 respondents, we administered ten surveys in
Avedzi/Teshie, while surveying nine each in Flagatigorme, Gbugbla, Huime-Agordome, and
Kpodzi-Agbogbome. In Korle Klottey which is part of Accra, the national capital where Ablekuma
South is located and are adjoining constituencies, we collected 38 samples. Eight samples each
were from Asylum Down, North Adabraka, and Odaw-Naa/Sahara while seven samples each were
taken from Osu Doku and Ringway Estates. Like Korle Klottey and Ablekuma South, Evalue
Ajomoro Gwira and Ellembele are contiguous constituencies as such we collected 39 samples from
each of them. From Ellembele, we collected eight samples each from Aiyinase South, Awiebo
Nyiake, Ayawora, and Kwasikrom while seven samples were collected from Nyame Bekyere. In
Evalue Ajomoro Gwira, we collected eight each from Apataim, Brawire, Gwira Banso, and
Kokoado but seven from Sikaneasem. Finally, in Wulensi where we sampled 46 respondents, we
surveyed eight respondents from Chando, Gbungbaliga, Kajeso, and Lungni but seven each from
Tinagyeilia and Wulensi South.
Information to participants prior to conducting the interview
Participants were briefed on the objective of the research project which was to collect data on how
inter/intraparty coordination successes and/or failures affect “Skirt and Blouse” voting in Ghana.
They were told that the main purpose of the research is to advance current understanding of the
phenomenon of split-ticket voting in political science in general and in electoral studies in
particular. They were further told that their participation in the project will involve responding to
an approximately 20 to 30 minutes interview conducted by me or member(s) of my team. Their
participation in the project was entirely voluntary. If a participant was unwilling or unable to
participate in the project for any reason, that person could refer me or the enumerator to any other
person who may be of assistance to the research efforts. They were told that if they have further
questions about the study, they could contact me via skdarkwa@mix.wvu.edu, or my faculty
advisor, Prof. Erik Herron via +1.304.293.9805 or by Erik.Herron@mail.wvu.edu.
Additionally, they were told that if they are willing to participate, their involvement in the project
will be kept confidential, and no reports disclosing personal identifying information will be used.
The questionnaires will be treated as confidential information, stored in a secured location for the
duration of the project, accessed only by myself. After analyzing the data, information obtained
will be securely stored as a password protected document on an external hard drive. Participants
must be 18 years of age or older to participate. They were allowed to skip any question(s) that they
did not wish to answer and were told they may discontinue the interview at any time they felt like
doing so. Finally, they were told that West Virginia University’s Institutional Review Board’s
acknowledgement of the project is on file. They were also presented with the cover letter for their
participation. Most of the persons contacted were very willing to participate in the research project.
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Descriptive Statistics on Demographic Profile of Participants
Table 2: Disposition of Respondents
Description

Frequency

Percent

Member

25

8.26

Chair

24

7.92

Secretary

23

7.59

Youth leadership

25

8.25

Campaign Coordinator

21

6.93

Treasurer

12

3.96

8

2.64

Women Organizer

24

7.92

Grassroots/Cadres

30

9.9

8

2.64

Research

12

3.96

Results Analyst

15

4.95

Polling Agent

28

9.24

Communication team member

30

9.9

Civil Society

5

1.65

National Commission for Civic Education

1

0.33

Academia

3

0.99

Media

9

2.97

303

100

Director of Elections

Member of Parliament

Total
Table 3: Participants’ Educational Status
Description

Frequency

Percent

Some primary schooling

12

4.0

Primary school completed

21

6.8

Some secondary school/high school

32

10.6

Secondary school/high school completed

45

14.9

Post-secondary qualifications, other than university

51

16.8

Some university

50

16.5

University completed and beyond

90

29.7

2

0.7

303

100

I don't know
Total
99

Samuel K. Darkwa
Table 4: Participants’ Party Affiliation
Description

Frequency

Percent

CPP

41

13.54

PNC

38

12.54

NDC

87

28.71

NPP

86

28.38

PPP

44

14.52

7

2.31

303

100

Frequency

Percent

Ablekuma South

37

12.22

Bantama

51

16.83

Ellembele

39

12.87

Evalue Ajomoro Gwira

39

12.87

Ketu South

46

15.18

Klottey Korle

38

12.54

Wulensi

46

15.18

Other

7

2.31

Total

303

100

Not a member of any party
Total
Table 5: Participants’ Constituency
Description

D. Membership of the research team and instructions they were given
Membership of my research team was made up 13 persons in all. I briefed them on the goals of
the research and the sampling frame. I also briefed them on the research ethics and what they were
to do. They were not to influence respondents in their questions. If the respondents are not willing,
they should not be forced, and the respondents were allowed to end the interview anytime during
the survey. The 13-member team is made up of four field officials of the National Commission for
Civic Education (NCCE) at the regions, a research person from the Ghanaian Legislative House,
seven research persons from civil society and academia and me.
To ensure that the field workers do their work, I visited some of the constituencies they were
working in (Ellembelle, Evalue Ajomoro Gwira, Ketu South, and Wulensi) to touch base with
them. This aside, I collected the telephone numbers of some of the people they administered
questionnaires to and interviewed them on the phone. These telephone interviews offered me the
opportunity to obtain critical information that I would have missed. These are all discussed under
telephone interviews below. These telephone interviews are different from the face-to-face
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interviews. They were meant to crosscheck what the field personnel were doing and to corroborate
their reports. Though the face-to-face interview enriched the fieldwork, because most of the
material collected were detailed narratives of intraparty and interparty coordination successes and
failures, they were separated from the survey and were rather used to support the survey which is
more quantitative in nature. Thus, the quantitative analysis in this chapter were based on the 227administered survey from the field whereas the face-to-face interviews were used to buttress the
quantitative analysis.
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CHAPTER 4. AGGREGATE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
4.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter evaluated the micro-level foundations of split electoral outcomes,
identifying features associated with individual-level decisions to split tickets in Ghana. This
chapter uses constituency-level electoral data (aggregate level data) to explore how strategic
coordination affects skirt and blouse outcomes (split electoral outcomes). Often, the use of an
aggregate level dataset to examine ticket splitting–which is an individual level factor–is
susceptible to the ecological inference fallacy1 (Burden and Kimball 2009; King 2013; King et al
2004; Roscoe 2003). However, in this case, because I employ an aggregate dataset to explain skirt
and blouse outcomes, which is equally an aggregate level phenomenon, the issue of ecological
inference is not a problem here. In fact, the utilization of the aggregate dataset offers a more
nuanced way of examining how coordination influences splitting.
The chapter employs voter and elite coordination factors/mechanisms such as electoral
volatility (Wahman 2014), effective number of parties (Cox 1997; Laakso & Taagepera, 1979),
SF-ratio (Cox 1997), deals/alliance configurations (Birch 2003), and disputed primaries in
parliamentary elections (Cox 1997) to investigate the relationship between elite coordination and
split outcome. Chapter 3 dealt with ticket splitting while this chapter focuses on split outcomes
using aggregate data. The chapter contends that elite coordination failures and successes influence
split outcomes (skirt and blouse outcomes).
The concept of split-ticket voting has been extensively researched in many political settings
due to its effects on democratic representation and accountability. Some scholars have found voters
who engage in this phenomenon to be sophisticated (Abramson 1983; Converse 1964; Kinder
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1983; Neuman 1986; Zaller 1992). Others have argued that centrist voters interested in moderate
policies abhor extreme policies and will, therefore, vote simultaneously for two different parties
so that the overall public policies formulated and implemented by the political establishments will
be moderated (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989, 1995; Fiorina 1992, 1996). Finally, many of these
scholars also assert that parties have different areas of expertise and that voters match parties to
their respective office of competence. At the same time such voters create divided government for
each arm of government to play a watchdog role over the other (Jacobson 1990; Petrocik 1991).
The bottom line of these arguments is that individual voter behavior of ticket splitting at the
microlevel produces certain electoral outcome at the macro or the aggregate level such as divided
government. Research has found an empirical connection between split-ticket voting and split
district outcomes (Burden and Kimball 2009; Campbell and Miller 1957; Rusk 1970). Again,
extant literature on ticket splitting has found a statistically strong relationship between the two
concepts; ticket splitting and split district outcome, both in terms of magnitude and direction
(Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Gschwend, Johnston, and Pattie 2003; Roscoe 2003).
Since the inception of Ghana’s Fourth Republican Constitution in 1992, the country has
made several strides and has passed the “two-turnover-test” of democratic consolidation
(Huntington 1991) and has had its third peaceful transfer of power (Graham et al. 2017 KumahAbiwu 2017). A prominent feature of Ghanaian voting behavior, which doubtlessly has
contributed to this feat, is the prevalence of ticket splitting discussed in Chapter 3. Skirt and blouse
voting is so popular that it has been given a local name (skirt and blouse voting for split ticketvoting and skirt and blouse outcome for split district outcome). The remarkable thing about this
phenomenon is its display of nuance and complexity.
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Over the years, skirt and blouse voting in Ghana has varied substantially from election to
election and from constituency to constituency and this raises several empirical questions. First,
why would some constituencies produce skirt and blouse outcomes and others would not?
Furthermore, why do skirt and blouse outcomes appear to be more common in some constituencies
in each election and over time? What really accounts for the subnational variations in skirt and
blouse voting and outcomes? Second, are skirt and blouse outcomes intended to create divided
government or for crafting appropriate representation by a constituent? My dissertation argues that
differences in elite coordination (successes and failures) at the constituency level are largely
responsible for the subnational variations in skirt and blouse outcomes. That is, variations in elite
coordination across districts and from election to election primarily account for the variations in
skirt and blouse outcomes. This argument is based on Cox’s (1997, 1999, 2005, 2006) coordination
theory which looks at coordination at two levels: First, at the district level (interparty and
intraparty) coordination and second, across districts (linkage) among legislative and presidential
candidates. The chapter addresses the questions raised above using constituency-level aggregate
electoral dataset which is apt as the phenomenon of interest is a split outcome which is realized at
the constituency level.
Elections are interactions between voters, parties, and candidates mediated by institutional
and social contexts. Elite electoral interactions (coordination) are motivated by a vital incentive of
electoral success while voter coordination is to avoid wasting votes (Birch 2003; Cox 1999, 2006).
These interactions and mediating factors2 such as institutional and social contexts affect the way
voters cast their ballots and may in turn affect the electoral results, which may produce a split
outcome (Burden and Kimball 2009; Campbell and Miller 1957; Rusk 1970). Institutional scholars
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have identified factors such as ballot type, methods of translating votes into seats, and political
systems as the mechanisms responsible for split outcomes.
Some scholars have argued that ballot type affects ticket splitting and consequently split
outcomes (Beck 1997; Beck et al. 1992; Campbell and Miller 1957; Rusk 1970). Per Campbell et
al. (1960) the physical characteristics of an election ballot has a great influence on whether a voter
will cast a straight or split vote. In their analysis, it came to light that states without a straight party
option have higher probability of ticket splitting and therefore, split district outcomes. Aside from
these scholars, Brace (1993) also noted that ballot type may influence voters to cast split or straight
vote in an election. Other scholars such as Ames et al. (2009) and Burden and Helmke (2009) have
emphasized the type of political system in place as responsible for whether voters will vote
sincerely or strategically; split their ballot or vote a straight ticket. Thus, the different
configurations of political and electoral systems in place in a nation affects coordination and
electoral outcomes.
Generally, it has been found by scholars that pure PR systems produce multiparty
competition at the district level while SMD-plurality systems tend to exercise a reductive impact
on the number of candidates (Cox 1997; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005). This is because in
SMDs, the district magnitude is “1”. Given this ceiling, voters, parties and candidates who want
to maximize their satisfaction become strategic in their dealings. That is, voters want to influence
the election while parties and candidates want to get the best return from their investment. In this
way, a voter whose preferred choice is the third-ranked candidate will rather prefer to vote for one
of the top two candidates than for the third-ranked candidate. Consequently, the contest in SMD
is often reduced to a competition between the most viable candidates. In this way, SMDs favor
two party systems. However, in PR systems because the district magnitude is greater than “1”, the
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system is less punishing to small parties. Thus, a voter whose preferred choice is the third-ranked
candidate will still vote for that candidate and be able to influence the system. As a result, PR
systems tend to produce multiparty competition.
This situation is different in mixed-member electoral systems which employ both SMD
and PR in a single election. Instead of the SMD tier exercising a reductive effect on the number of
parties in the system, the interaction of the two systems often leads to multiparty competition at
the SMD tier just as it is the case with the PR tier. It has been argued that the placement of
candidates at the SMD tier boosts a party’s votes at the PR component and this symbiotic
interaction between the two tiers creates what is referred to as ‘contamination effect’ (Ferrara,
Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Guinjoan 2016; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). Proponents of
contamination effect posit that the placement of a candidate in the SMD tier accrues vote bonus
for a party at the PR component and encourages multiparty competition in the SMD tier contrary
to what takes place in pure SMD systems. This is because parties improve their performance at the
PR tier when they contest at the SMD tier. Due to this, parties are incentivized to contest at the
SMD tier irrespective of their chances of winning seats at that tier (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa
2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Herron, Nemoto, and Nishikawa 2018). Thus, where more than
one set of electoral rules are employed within a voting district in the same set of election, the
Duvergerian rule is defeated because, multiparty competition which is a feature of the PR
tier/systems spills over to the SMD tier.
Guinjoan (2016) asserts that proponents of a contamination effect hold that the overlap of
electoral arenas is the main reason why parties may contest in areas they are not viable leading to
non-Duvergerian equilibria. He is of the view that the overlap of electoral arenas alone is not
enough to explain why parties may compete in areas they do not expect to win. To him, a party’s
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decision to run or not is made by considering all the different arenas that a party contests in. These
arenas are interconnected and that the decision to compete transcends each individual arena. This
is because parties are not equally viable (‘asymmetrically viable’) in all arenas. Thus, where parties
are ‘asymmetrically viable,’ they may run even in arenas in which they are not viable and therefore,
know they will not win. He identified two factors that create asymmetric viability: incongruent
electoral system and territorial or subnational variations in a party’s support. Where two electoral
arenas adopt the same set of rules for the elections, a party is likely to be equally viable in these
arenas. However, parties become asymmetrically viable in arenas where different sets of rules are
used. Furthermore, though a national party may not be equally viable in all the territories, it may
take advantage of its viability in other regions to compete in areas where it is not viable. Though
Guinjoan (2016) built on the contamination project, he limited his analysis to parties forgetting
that elite decision to contest are influenced by what voters are doing or what they expect voters to
do. In fact, voter behavior influences parties’ decisions to contest and therefore, voter level factors
cannot be ignored when deciding to contest. It must be stressed here that because Ghana uses the
pure SMD system in a plurality first-past-the-post (FPTP), we expect Duvergerian outcomes to
hold there however, elite interactions may provide some important nuances in different districts.
With respect to the political system in place, splitting in federal systems is likely to be
different from those in unitary systems (Ames et al. 2009; Burden and Helmke 2009). Similarly,
bicameral and unicameral legislative systems are more likely to produce different split outcomes
due to the different incentives faced by elites and voters (Ames et al. 2009; Burden and Helmke
2009). Thus, the differences in politics and electoral systems present different incentives to
political actors in respect to electoral coordination (Ames et al. 2009; Tavits 2008). Finally, how
votes are translated into seats also affects how the electorates cast their votes and thus, influences
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the type of party system in place (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954; Riker 1962). These conditions affect
how voters cast their votes and subsequently affect the composition of the electoral outcome. Thus,
casting blank votes, ballot roll-off and ticket splitting are affected by the institutional and electoral
system in place and these also impact the electoral outcome.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the extant theories of
ticket splitting and split outcomes such as divided government, party system volatility, effective
number of parties, S-F ratio and (mis)coordination among party elites. Each of these will introduce
the hypotheses that will be tested in the chapter. Section 4.3 discusses the data and measurement
of the independent variables. It also addresses the dependent variable which is split constituency
outcome also referred to as two-office split-result, as well as the independent and control variables.
Section 4.4 then presents the model of split outcomes based on coordination problems faced by
voters, candidates, and party elites. The success or failure of how these stakeholders handle the
coordination problems affects ticket splitting and split outcomes. This section also presents the
empirical analysis based on binary logistic regressions, which is then followed with a discussion
of the implications. The chapter ends with section 4.5 which is the concluding part that provides a
succinct discussion of how the coordination problem is the main determinant of ticket splitting and
split outcomes.
The chapter makes a case that throughout Ghana’s Fourth Republic, split outcomes have
been a consistent phenomenon in its elections and this could not be attributable to the desire of
Ghanaians for divided government, but rather elites’ desire for certain electoral outcomes for
purposes other than divided government. The justification of this position is based on two
premises. First, the aggregate results show that between 1992 and 2016, seven elections have been
conducted, and in all such elections, the party that won the presidency also won the majority of
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seats in parliament. Second, there were two instances in which the presidential election required
runoffs, and in both instances, the rest of the contesting parties supported the candidate from the
party which had won a majority of seats in parliament in the same election irrespective of whether
that party was leading the presidential race (Ayee 2002; Frempong 2017; Yobo and Gyampo
2015). In both instances, the position of political elites was to protect/insulate the country’s young
democracy from the challenges of divided government which could potentially lead to military
takeover (Ayee 2002; Darkwa3 2019; Frempong 2017)
4.2 THEORIES OF TICKET SPLITTING AND SPLIT CONSTITUENCY OUTCOME
This section reviews the relevant theories of ticket splitting and split outcomes. These
include divided government which suggests that voters prefer moderate policies and therefore,
would split their votes between extreme polarized parties to ensure that policies produced receive
necessary concessions satisfactory to the median voter. There are many nuances to the theory of
divided government and they are discussed in section 4.2.1. Party system volatility is another
theory that explains why voters split and why there are split outcomes. There are three strands of
the concept. The first strand, which is largely Eurocentric, assumes that party entry and exit in the
party system is stable and that most forms of turbulence in the party system are due to voter
behavior. The second strand concerns new democracies and argues that high party volatility is
largely based on elite conduct such as electoral alliances, party entry, and withdrawals from the
party system. The third form attributes volatility to a blend of elite- and voter-level factors. These
are explained in section 4.2.2.
The next concept that the chapter addresses is district magnitude, explained in section 4.2.3.
This section argues that electoral systems and the methods of converting votes into seats are likely
to create conditions favoring the effective number of electoral competitors that can contest
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elections in a given constituency. Elites are to strategically coordinate their entry to field
candidates not exceeding the district magnitude plus one.
The SF-ratio (second to first loser ratio, that is, the vote share of the third-place candidate
divided by the vote share of the second candidate) is discussed in section 4.2.4. The theory of
strategic coordination argues that where elites field candidates more than the district magnitude
plus “1” in SMD, voters will withdraw from supporting less competitive candidates and will
concentrate their votes on the top two contenders. The SF-ratio is a reliable index that measures
voter coordination. Another theory used to explain ticket splitting and hence, split outcome is the
concept of (mis)coordination on the part of elites. This concept, discussed in section 4.2.6,
considers two forms of elite coordination; largely coordination successes and failures that produce
ticket splitting and therefore split outcome.
4.2.1 Divided Government4
The concept of divided government will largely be discussed from the US perspective
because the literature on divided government in the US is well-developed and widely cited. Hence,
it is appropriate to talk about the US when the concept of divided government is discussed. How
the concept works in other states such as Brazil and Mexico will also be briefly discussed. In the
American system, proponents of divided government argue that voters willfully divide their votes
to achieve specific policy outcomes or representational arrangement moderation (Alesina and
Rosenthal 1989, 1995; Fiorina 1992, 1996). In respect to policy position, the model asserts that
parties hold different positions on the ideological continuum. Moderate voters who are positioned
at the median segment (assuming a single dimension of salient cleavages) will be more likely to
split their votes to achieve non-extreme policies. However, other scholars have shown that high
party polarization gives voters distinct choices while ideological congruence blurs voter choice
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and causes ticket splitting (Petrocik and Doherty 1996; Roscoe 2003). Regarding representational
arrangements, scholars who research on divided government, largely those whose work is based
on the US, assert that the different political parties have their strengths and areas of competence
and for that matter voters would place candidates/contestants in offices they can best handle. This
is referred to as institutional matching or issue ownership or selecting ‘horses for courses’
(Jacobson 1990; Petrocik 1991). It has also been argued that voters intentionally vote to divide or
to balance party control of the government so that the parties play a watchdog role, to prevent
abuse of the public mandate (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Fiorina 1992, 1996; Jacobson 1990;
Mebane 2000; Petrocik 1991). However, the institutional matching theorists’ position that
Democrats are suitable for Congress because they support social intervention policies while
Republicans are best for the presidency because they manage the economy better has proven to be
without merit. Thus, these claims were disproved when in the 1990s Democrats were assigned the
presidency to manage the budget deficit while Republicans enjoyed a Congressional majority
(Saad 1995; Roscoe 2003). There are also those who are of the view that divided government is
an unintentional act, incidental, for instance, to the structural features of the American system such
as separation of powers, checks and balances, as well as the practice of presidential system
(Campbell 1960; Jacobson 1990).
Ames et al (2009) also argue that Brazilians for instance do not cast their votes with
eventual government formation in mind. To them, the country’s divided government is accidental
because voters make separate decisions for presidential and deputy elections. As a result, they
argued that the elections are “unlinked.” It has further been argued that the sequencing of the
elections, such as the mid-term elections in the United States, is responsible for divided
government (Ames et al 2009; Shugart, 1995).
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Contrary to the above positions, Helmke (2009) argues that voters in new democracies do
not divide government in line with the Fiorina model but rather would like to “protect themselves”
by contemporaneously voting for challengers in one race and incumbents in another. This is to
lessen the risks associated with voting for inexperienced and unknown challengers. The theory of
divided government is one that directly connects with split outcomes irrespective of the voter
intentions or reasons assigned it. This relates to the concept of two-office split-result (Burnham
1965; Cummings 1966; Feigert 1979) where one party wins the executive and the other has
legislative majority at the national level. Divided government is expected to have a direct
relationship with split outcome (Burden and Kimball 1998; Gschwend, Johnston, and Pattie 2003).
At the individual level too, divided voting (ticket splitting) could be linked directly to divided
outcomes (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009).
4.2.2 High Party Volatility
The concept of electoral volatility explains how voters are willing to switch between parties
from election to election. It shows that voters do not have strong party attachment with stable and
consistent voting behavior from election to election (Evans 2002; Pedersen 1979; Rose & Urwin
1970; Taagepera & Grofman 2003). Electoral volatility also shows that voters are free to choose
who to vote for in an election based on the issues of the day or candidates involved (Birch 2003;
Tavits 2008). Given that voters do not have strong party attachment with stable and consistent
voting behavior from election to election and the fact that voters are free to choose who to vote for
in an election based on the issues of the day or candidates involved, we can have a link between
volatility and ticket splitting. Volatility refers to the net change in the party system due to changes
of voter preferences over time. To measure volatility, I will sum up the change in each party’s vote
share in the current and previous election, then add up the absolute values of the changes in vote
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shares (for all parties) and then divide the sum of the absolute values by two. Conventionally, when
volatility or turbulence in the party system is mentioned in established democracies, it is assumed
that party supply (party entry and exit) is largely in a state of equilibrium and that all changes are
mainly due to voter activities such as switches in partisan affiliations, abstentions, among others.
As a result, Pedersen (1979) defines volatility as “the net change within the electoral party system
resulting from individual vote transfers” (Pedersen 1979, 3). It is worth stressing that most of the
studies on volatility which are largely based on the established democracies did not distinguish
between the role of electorates and elites when considering party-system changes.
Meanwhile, studies from emerging democracies have found that volatility in new
democracies is largely elite-driven (Gunther 1989; Mair 1997; Van Biezen 2003). These scholars
assert that elite strategizing is substantively responsible for the erratic electoral outcomes from
election to election and therefore better explains volatility in nascent party systems (Gunther 1989;
Mair 1997; Toole 2000). Like their counterparts whose work is focused on advanced democracies,
these scholars are also at the other extreme by explaining volatility solely from an elite perspective
and ignoring the role of the voters. To borrow the terms of Roscoe (2003), voters are like diners at
a restaurant whose choices are limited by the available menu. Thus, scholars who have studied the
subject in advanced and emerging democracies are similar in opposite ways as they view the
phenomenon exclusively from voter and elite perspective respectively.
Finally, there are other scholars who view party system stabilization as the combined effect
of elite and voter actions (Cox 1997; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rose & Munro 2003). These studies are
based on electoral politics where strategic coordination of elites and the electorates are critical.
Voters who want to avoid wasting their votes on nonviable contestants prefer to coordinate on the
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few viable ones for their votes to count. Likewise, when elites are planning their withdrawal, entry
and alliance strategies, they consider both voter expectations and the electoral rules in place.
These considerations aside, two scholars who have made significant contributions to
research on volatility are Birch (2003) and Tavits (2008). To Birch, the overall volatility between
successive elections is determined by the interactive effects of three factors. The first factor is the
change in party support of individual voters who vote at both past and current elections. The second
factor is the change in the configuration of the electorates due to exits, entries, and variations in
abstention. Third, factors such as non-contestation, changes in the range of parties on offer due to
party entries, exits, and alterations in the composition of coalitions affect volatility in many ways.
These are voter and elite level factors responsible for volatility. Birch, thus, distinguishes between
volatility, which is largely voter action, and party replacement which is purely the acts of elites as
responsible for party system stabilization. Birch further argues that the former works best in
advanced democracies while the latter is suitable for new democracies.
Building on that concept, Tavits (2008) distinguishes the roles of elites and voters in the
determination of party system stabilization in new democracies. She found that electoral volatility
(party system – changes and stability) is highly elite driven and shaped by factors such as high
candidate and party attrition rate and high rate of alliance fluidity in Central and Eastern Europe.
Voters’ role is largely influenced by the available choice set especially parties and candidates
running. Such elite acts are motivated by certain incentives that encourage or discourage system
stability. This finding is supported by work on Africa where the main challengers in these
democracies often change between elections (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Lindberg 2007;
Wahman 2014). It is further supported by some scholars who found instances where strong
candidates either switched parties or ran as independent candidates when they fail to secure party
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nomination they contested (Lindberg 2007; Randall and Svasand 2002; Wahman 2014). Based on
these findings, this dissertation adopts Pedersen’s (1979) conceptualization of volatility to measure
voter-level effects (voter coordination) of party system change since there are several elite-level
factors (elite coordination) such as disputed primaries in parliamentary elections and deals between
parties and candidates. I expect high party volatility to produce split outcome if the net change in
voter preferences over time in the different races lead to the election of candidates from different
parties in the same constituency. Thus, the first hypothesis is that:
H1: the higher the level of volatility in a constituency, the higher the likelihood of split outcome.
It is expected that high volatility will directly correlate with split outcome and thus, have a
positive relationship with split outcome. This means that as the level of volatility increases, split
outcome increases and as volatility level declines, split outcome is expected to fall.
4.2.3 Effective Number of Parties (ENP)
Duverger (1954) posits that “The simple-majority single ballot system favors the two-party
system” (Duverger 1954, 217) while the “simple majority system with second ballot and
proportional representation favors multipartism” (Duverger 1954, 239). Simplifying these
propositions, Cox (1997, 1999) argues that every electoral system prescribes a “ceiling” for the
effective number of candidates that can contest the elections. This is given by the M+1 rule; where
M represents the district magnitude (number of seats in a given district). Since parties and
candidates can field contestants to exceed the M+1 rule, and given that parties differ in relative
strength, Laakso & Taagepera (1979) have developed effective number of parties (ENP) index to
measure how votes are distributed among the competitors. The ENP calculates the relative strength
of parties based on their vote or seat share4. Though the ENP is not interested in the count of
parties, it relies on the number of parties and their vote/seat share to generate their relative strength.
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The ENP should be close to 1 where there is one party dominance (where one party receives a
landslide victory), and close to the number of parties contesting the election when each party
receives an equal vote share. The more the ENP exceeds the M+1 rule, the higher the probability
of a split outcome where the candidates that voters prefer in the different races are not from the
same party.
As I noted in a previous chapter, Cox (1997, 1999) distinguishes two M+1 rules. In its first
usage, the M+1 rule relates to the entry rule that the district magnitude prescribes to political elites
and candidates. This rule suggests that the viable number of candidates in, for instance, a single
member district (SMD) is two (M+1 candidates). Thus, the first M+1 rule relates to strategic entry.
As there are fewer seats than potential candidates, and given the entry rule, party elites are required
to coordinate in order not to exceed the district magnitude in terms of the required number of
candidates.
In its second usage, the M+1 rule relates to strategic voting after parties and candidates
have entered the elections. It shows that the contest in SMD is likely to reduce to a two-candidate
affair. In some contexts, there could be more than two effective candidates in a single member
district, but over time in FPTP the M+1 rule has a reductive effect on candidate entry because of
the tendency for voters to focus on the more competitive candidates (voter coordination) by
defecting from the less competitive ones. Generally, there are only two effective or viable
candidates in SMDs with a plurality rule even where there are multiple candidates contesting in
that constituency, voters tend to concentrate on the top two candidates. Thus, the second M+1 rule
relates to strategic voting. As voters will like their votes to count, they will like to be strategic in
their voting if party elites and candidates fail to coordinate on M+1 candidates. The caveat is that
not all voters are strategic because there are party core voters who will vote sincerely for their
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parties irrespective of the chances of their parties’ candidates. Thus, the presence of sincere voters
and elite coordination problems explain how ticket splitting takes place where there is higher party
fragmentation. Hence, the second hypothesis is that,
H2: the higher the level of party fragmentation in a district, the higher the likelihood of split
outcome if candidates that voters prefer in the different races are not from the same party.
This implies that the further the district magnitude is exceeded by contestants in a
constituency (which is a sign of elite coordination failure), the higher the possibility of split
outcome if the candidates that voters prefer in the different races are not from the same party. My
focus here is to determine whether elite coordination is successful which is determined by the first
M+1 rule. It is only when elites fail in their coordination that the second M+1 (voter coordination)
becomes inevitable. Meaning where party elites and candidates have failed to coordinate on M+1
candidates, given the presence of at least some sincere voters, then I expect the result of sincere
and strategic voting to likely lead to ticket splitting and consequently to split outcome. That is,
where the candidates elected in the different races are not from the same party. Here, the expected
relationship between exceeding the district magnitude and split outcome is positive in respect of
magnitude and direction. It worth pointing out however, that as an exception, an SMD race with a
majority runoff rule, is not likely to have party competition to be reduced to a two-party affair
(Cox 1997; Duverger 1954). In such a system, the district magnitude could be one (M=1), but the
effective number of parties is not reduced to two in the first round (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954).
4.2.4 SF-Ratio in Single Member Plurality System
Flowing from the above, where the first M+1 rule is breached, the second M+1 is expected
to follow where voters will now do their coordination by defecting from the less viable candidates
or concentrating their votes on the two top contenders as in the above example of a single member
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district. To determine this, we are to find the vote difference between the second and third placed
contestants. Cox (1997) provides us with an appropriate measure, referred to as the SF-ratio, which
represents the vote ratio between the second and first losers (that is the ratio between the secondand third-placed contestants) in a single member plurality FTPT constituency. The SF-ratio
provides a useful guide of voter coordination indicating defection from non-competitive to more
competitive contestants (Moser and Scheiner 2009; Wahman 2014). Cox (1997) argues that where
voters have information on the viable candidates in single member plurality constituencies, the
SF-ratio will be close to zero, but where voters are uninformed or do not want to cast strategic
votes, the SF-ratio will be close to one. Thus, the SF-ratio is between zero and one whether voters
vote sincerely or strategically. Employing Cox’s SF-ratio to investigate ticket splitting in mixed
member systems in a ten-country case comprising 35 elections, Moser and Scheiner (2009) found
that in established democracies splitting was more of a strategic act whereas personal voting drives
splitting in new democracies. The most important finding of Moser and Scheiner (2009) is that in
both established and new democracies, the SF-ratio provides an indication of voter defection from
unviable competitors, and this could be computed from the district aggregate electoral dataset.
Though the SF-ratio has been used by many scholars to measure voter coordination by
assessing voter defection from unviable contestants, it has been criticized of its inability to account
for instances where a high number of parties other than the second and third placed ones receive
small share of votes that become substantial when added together (Singer & Stephenson 2009).
The SF-ratio has also been criticized by Gaines (1999) for wrongly indicating non-Duvergerian
equilibrium in instances where there is a tie between the second and third placed contestants. These
criticisms notwithstanding, the SF-ratio remains a useful measure of computing voter coordination
from aggregate data, especially when it comes to investigating voter defection from less
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competitive parties/candidates. In single member districts (SMDs), an SF-ratio of one or close to
it is an indication that elites did not coordinate on only two competitors prior to the election or the
presence of more sincere voting, while SF-ratio of zero is an indication of thorough elite
coordination on only two candidates and that there was no second loser. Where the SF-ratio is
close to zero, we have a Duvergerian equilibrium which asserts that SMD system leads to two
party system at the district/constituency (Duverger 1954). SF-ratio close to zero also means that
there is less sincere voting going on. Where there is less sincere voting going on, all things being
equal, the effect of sincere voting on the overall election will be infinitesimally small but enough
to keep third-rank parties contesting elections. This means that winning an election in either
legislative or presidential race is largely a function of strategic voters who are also more likely to
withdraw from trailing candidates. Thus, where elites fail to coordinate on viable candidates, there
will be higher likelihood of defection from less competitive candidates. This will cause split
outcome if the viable candidates in the different races are not from the same party. Hence, the third
hypothesis is that:
H3: the more elites fail to coordinate on viable candidates, the higher the likelihood of
voter defection from less competitive candidates and the higher the likelihood of a split outcome
if the viable candidates in the different races are from different parties and there is a presence of
sincere voters.
I will rely on the legislative race to generate my SF-ratio since in most cases, voters vote
sincerely at the presidential race and strategically at the legislative races. This is because, all parties
normally can have candidates of comparable quality at the presidential race than in the legislative
race. As such, the SF-ratio at the parliamentary race is more likely to measure voter defection from
less competitive candidates than in the presidential race. This also shows how voter coordination
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can explain ticket splitting especially where candidates that voters select are from same party
(decrease splitting) or different parties (increase splitting).
4.2.5 (Mis)coordination
The preceding discussion brings us to the issue of strategic coordination adopted by party
elites in their interactions. Cox’s main argument about strategic coordination is that, because there
are fewer seats than potential candidates, party elites are to coordinate their entries based on the
first M+1 rule discussed above under 4.2.3 District Magnitude. Cox specifically gave a classic
example of elite coordination where he stated that if there are about 15 viable competitors from,
say, Social Democratic Parties who are willing to enter the election, elites are required to
coordinate the actions of many people for that political party to make any significant impact in the
election (Cox 1999, 146). To Cox, elites are expected to do one important thing which is to limit
the number of viable candidates willing to enter the electoral fray from a given political party or
political ideology. A generally accepted method of limiting the number of contestants is the
nomination process. He was quick to caution that if the nomination process were not transparent
and democratic it would pose problems. Again, party elites are required to persuade disappointed
nomination seekers from contesting the election as independent candidates so that the party’s votes
are not divided. This means that elites may fail in their coordination when they do not limit
nomination but allow all viable candidates to enter the electoral fray or do not manage a transparent
and credible nomination. Where the nomination process ends up with aggrieved nomination
seekers defecting, then it is a clear evidence of elite failure.
Consequently, the coordination role expected of party elites regarding contestants’ entry is
two-pronged. First, they (party elites) are to harmonize the entry of all the viable nomination
seekers with the view of limiting the number of contestants. Where elites fail in this task, it is
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expected that there will be unrestricted entry (free-for-all entry) which is likely to adversely affect
the electoral fortunes of that party or ideological block. This is what Cox (1999), and Navia &
Saldaña (2015) found to cause the defeat of the Concertación Alliance (Concertación Party) of
Chile. That was also the plight of most Japanese parties that Cox studied. Second, in limiting the
number of contestants, elites are to ensure that the nomination process is democratic, transparent,
generally accepted, and not viewed as done to favor a particular contestant. Anything short of this
is likely to trigger dissent especially from contestants who experience unfavorable terms. Thus, it
is likely to expect high rates of disagreements (disputes) from aggrieved nominees where the
nomination process is seen to be undemocratic. Undemocratic nomination is what has bedeviled
many emerging democracies including Africa leading to high rates of disputed primaries in these
settings (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Lindberg, 2007; Wahman, 2014).
These scholars have found that, disputed/unfair nomination in African democracies has
produced two effects. The first is a high rate of candidate replacement by parties. The second is
high rate of independents. That is, instances where strong candidates fail to secure the party
nomination they contest, such contestants either switch parties or run as independent candidates
(Pettai and Kreuzer 2001; Resnick, 2013; Wahman, 2014). In Ghana for instance, it has been found
that lack of internal democracy in some of the political parties, (especially the dominant ones),
account for disputed primaries in parliamentary elections leading to aggrieved primary contestants
at the constituencies contesting the elections as independent candidates causing ticket splitting
(Bob-Milliar 2012; Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar 2010; Debrah 2014; Smith 2002a). In a similar
vein, some scholars attribute Brazilian ticket splitting and for that matter its split outcome as a sign
of “extreme party underdevelopment” (Ames et al 2009; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Power
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2000). Therefore, I expect elite failure in the nomination process especially with regards to
disputed primaries in parliamentary elections to cause ticket splitting, consequently:
H4: the higher the level of disputed primaries in parliamentary elections due to unfair nomination
procedure, the higher the likelihood of ticket splitting and hence split outcome.
Disputed primaries in parliamentary elections are expected to be positively related to ticket
splitting and split outcome, all things being equal. This means that, as elite miscoordination in the
form of disputed primaries in parliamentary elections increases, ticket splitting and for that matter,
split outcome is expected to increase all things being equal. It is significant to note that even in the
midst of elite coordination problems some voters will still vote (sincerely) for their nonviable
candidates/parties.
Party elites do not only experience coordination failures (disputed primaries), they also
experience significant coordination successes, and these keep their parties alive. In fact, many
comparative scholars such as Benoit (2001), Birch (2003), Golder (2006), and Tavits (2008) have
found party elites to engage in alliances and changes in the configurations of alliances that have
shaped voter choices in certain directions during elections. Birch (2003) for instance, observed
that in countries where the president is directly elected, the presidency is more valued than the
legislature, and that politicians negotiate all sorts of deals for electoral purposes. Such different
configurations of deals made by politicians affect the available choice set and therefore, impact
the way voters cast their ballots. In Ghana for instance, when one of the two major parties enter
alliance with the smaller parties, often, the smaller parties defer the presidential slot to the bigger
party in exchange for support in the parliamentary race (Agyeman-Duah 2005; Boafo-Arthur 2006;
Darkwa 2019; Frempong 2017). In this vein, the bigger party also defers the legislative races in
some constituencies to the smaller party. It was by such deals that some of the minor parties such
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as the NCP, PCP, CPP and EGLE have had seats in parliament between 1993 and 2016 (Darkwa
2019; Frempong 2017). Hence, this study expects a positive link between electoral deals and ticket
splitting. Thus,
H5: the more elites negotiate deals in which one party trades its presidential contest and supports
the other for a corresponding assistance in the parliamentary race, the higher the likelihood of
ticket splitting and hence split outcome.
Thus, the negotiated deals among elites involving trading off parliamentary race by one
party for support in presidential contest from the other party are likely to produce ticket splitting
with a likely split outcome. In emerging democracies, because political institutions are less
developed and personal votes count a lot (Birch 2003; Moser & Scheiner 2009; Tavits 2008),
political elites are very flexible in entering new deals and altering existing ones all with the view
of improving their electoral objectives. Thus, alliances are very fluid in emerging democracies and
these in turn affect their electoral outcomes in a way different from their developed counterparts.
It worth stressing that often the varying configuration of alliances in new democracies produce
ticket splitting and to some extent, split outcomes.
4.3 DATA AND MEASUREMENT
The data for this chapter comes from multiple sources. The first and the main dataset is
taken from the Election Passport5 which provides constituency-level electoral data for six
Ghanaian general elections (1996 to 2016). This dataset is reliable and has been used by many
scholars and research organizations in electoral studies. However, as it is the case of many datasets,
the Electoral Passport dataset has missing data for 2008 and 2012 presidential races at the
constituency level. The missing dataset is supplemented with data from the Electoral Commission
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of Ghana, the institution responsible for elections. Thus, the aggregate electoral data for this project
is complete and reliable. The second dataset is the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS)
compiled by the Ghana Statistical Service. Four of these reports published between 1995 and 2014
are used to determine the ethnic profile for each constituency for the period under review. These
reports are the GLSS3 published in March 1995, GLSS4 published in October 2000, GLSS5
published in September 2008 and the GLSS6 published in August 2014. Third, the dissertation
uses published works and media reports that have recorded constituencies with disputed party
primaries where disappointed primary seekers have entered the election as independents because
disagreements relating to these primaries were not resolved. The reports also published deals
entered by political parties for electoral purposes. These materials played very critical role in
identifying constituencies with disputed primaries in parliamentary elections and deals among
elites6.
4.3.1 Dependent variable
The main dependent variable is skirt and blouse outcome (split constituency outcome) that
is whether a constituency had a split outcome or not. I generated a variable for skirt and blouse
outcomes for the period 1996 to 2016 by comparing the parliamentary and presidential results of
each constituency. Skirt and blouse constituencies are coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”. As
the dependent variable is dichotomous (a constituency split or not), the dissertation uses binary
logistic regression, and the level of analysis is the constituency. Details of the coding for both
dependent and independent variables are provided in Appendix 4.2 below.
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4.3.2 Independent Variables
To evaluate the five hypotheses presented above, the dissertation provides five main
independent variables which are disputed primaries in parliamentary elections, deals, district
magnitude (effective number of parties), volatility, and second to first loser ratio (SF-ratio) for
parliamentary elections where elite and voter coordination are prevalent.
Disputed Primaries in Parliamentary Elections: In Ghana, disputed primaries in
parliamentary elections (a major elite coordination problem) occur mainly due to lack of internal
party democracy in the nomination process. There are published works and media reports that have
recorded constituencies with disputed party primaries6. Since disputed primaries in parliamentary
elections are likely to cause split outcomes, every constituency with at least one disputed primary
is coded as “1” otherwise coded as “0”. It would have been preferable to distinguish constituencies
based on where just one party had a disputed primary and where more than one party had disputed
primaries in parliamentary elections so that I could use the percentage of disputed primaries in
parliamentary elections in each constituency instead of the dichotomous variable. However, given
that there are 275 constituencies in Ghana and I could not follow the parties’ primaries in person,
I only depended on available data from published works and newspaper publications; those I could
lay hands on do not provide this nuanced information. As a result, there could be false negatives,
especially instances where I may incorrectly indicate the absence of disputed primary in some
constituencies. Table 4.1 below provides a summary of disputed primaries for each electoral period
between 1996 and 2016. The column for prior period records instances where a constituency that
had had a disputed primary in the immediate past election has a recurrent experience in the current
election period. The column for previous experience, on the other hand, considers instances where
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a constituency witnessing disputed primary now, had had a similar experience in any of the past
elections except the immediate past one.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Parliamentary Disputed Primaries (1996–2016)
Year
Observation
Disputed
Undisputed Prior Period
Previous
Primaries
Primaries
Experience
1996
200
20
180
N/A
N/A
2000
200
12
188
2
2
2004
230
19
211
0
3
2008
230
19
211
6
3
2012
275
26
249
3
6
2016
275
37
238
3
12
6
Author’s compilation from published books and media reports
Effective number of parties (ENP): I generated the ENP from legislative elections results
by first computing the vote share of the competing parties/candidates in a given constituency.
Second, I squared each contestant’s vote share and summed up the values. Finally, I computed the
reciprocal of sum of squares. This is summarized by the formula, ENP = 1/sum[pi˄2] where pi is
the share of votes/seats of the ith party (Cox 1997; Laakso and Taagepera 1979)7
Volatility: I computed electoral volatility from legislative electoral results for each
constituency using the Pedersen index which measures the aggregate change in vote share in that
constituency. I modified the Pedersen Index to have my values ranging from “0”–1” rather than
from “0”– “100”. To do this, I first computed the change in each party’s vote share at time t and
time t-1 (current and previous election). Second, I summed up the absolute values of the changes in
vote shares. Finally, I divided the sum of the absolute values by two. This index ranges between 0
and 1. In general, values close to one indicate high party volatility, while values close to zero
indicate low levels of volatility.
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SF-Ratio: I generated the SF-ratio using the vote ratio between the third-place and secondplace candidates from the legislative results in a given constituency. Where there is no third-place
candidate, the SF-ratio is zero and where the vote difference between the third-place and secondplace candidates is small, the SF-ratio approaches one. Generally, higher SF-ratio (close to one) is
a signal of less voter coordination, while low SF-ratio implies effective party elite coordination.
Deal: Deal is a coordination tool employed by Ghanaian political actors. It happens where
a party enters formal or informal electoral coalition (electoral arrangement) with either another
party or with a candidate of another party. Deal is measured as a dichotomous variable where
constituencies with deals are coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”. In such deals, the minor party
often defers its presidential slot and supports the major party’s presidential candidate in exchange
for support from the latter in the legislative race in selected constituencies that the latter defers to
the minor party.
4.3.3 Control Variables
To address alternative explanation at the constituency level of analysis, this dissertation
controls for regional effects, distance and Ethnic fractionalization.
Regional Effect: I control for regional effect, as contiguous constituencies are more likely
to vote in identical ways. The regional effect assigns each constituency in a region the same value,
based on the percentage of constituencies in that region in relation to the skirt and blouse outcome
in that region in the previous election. To measure this, I computed the proportion of skirt and
blouse outcome at time t-1 for each constituency within each region. The justification is that some
regions (geographical areas) of Ghana are considered swing regions in the sense that they often
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change their voting pattern. These regions are notorious for skirt and blouse voting (Frempong
2017; Lindberg 2013; Weghorst & Lindberg 2013).
Distance: To control for how legislators’ closeness to their constituents from the national
capital where they converge to make laws may affect skirt and blouse, I use the distance from the
constituency capital (or the most prominent city in each constituency) to the national legislative
house as a measure. The assumption is that legislators closer to the national capital may be able
to interact more with constituents and thus affect skirt and blouse more than those far away.
Ethnic fractionalization: I computed ethnic fractionalization using the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) by squaring each ethnic group’s population share in that constituency and
then found the sum of those numbers. To obtain the proportion of each ethnic group’s population
share, I used the ethnic profile of each constituency as per the appropriate GLSS report. For
instance, I used the GLSS 3 published in March 1995 when computing the 1996 ethnic
fractionalization and the GLSS 4 published in October 2000 for the 2000 ethnic fractionalization
figures. The GLSS report is given at the regional level. To generate the constituency equivalence,
I used the proportion between the presidential valid votes cast at the regional and constituency
levels.
4.4 Estimation Strategy for Skirt and Blouse Outcome under Coordination Theory
This chapter of the dissertation is interested in how coordination successes and/or failures
impact ticket splitting, and hence, split outcomes. Elite coordination success is expected to lessen
skirt and blouse voting and therefore reduce skirt and blouse outcomes. Where elites fail to
coordinate, or their coordination ends in failure, voters are likely to coordinate on the most viable
candidates. Where any of these or their combination occur, I expect skirt and blouse voting to

129

Samuel K. Darkwa
increase, resulting in skirt and blouse outcomes if there are no mutual crossovers. Thus, elite
coordination success is expected to diminish skirt and blouse outcomes. Since the interest of this
chapter is skirt and blouse outcomes, it employs logit regression because the dependent variable is
binary. Three models were assessed for each of the six elections considered here using the same
aggregate electoral datasets. The first model regressed the dependent variable on only the control
variables. The second regressed the dependent variable on only the independent variables. Finally,
the dependent variable was regressed on all the independent and control variables. These were
done to determine how the different models affect split outcome.
4.4.1 Results
The results for the three models are shown in Tables 4.2 to 4.5 below. Consistent with the
theoretical expectations of the dissertation, most of the elite level coordination coefficients were
significant and were in the expected direction as per the regression models in Table 4.5 and the
changes in probabilities in Table 4.6. Generally, the independent variables were meaningfully
significant, and the results confirmed most of the research hypotheses. As indicated by Table 4.2
below, where the dependent variable was regressed on only the control variables the results present
interesting findings. The results found no support for regional effect which suggests that
contiguous constituencies are influenced by the voting behavior of the adjoining ones. Distance,
which purports that skirt and blouse is likely in instances where a legislator’s constituency is far
from the National Assembly, was supported by the model.

130

Samuel K. Darkwa
Table 4.2: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Outcome Using Aggregate Electoral Data (Control
Variables Only)
VARIABLES
Estimate/SE
Regional Effect
Distance
Ethnic fractionalization
Constant
Observations
Log likelihood
McFadden's R2
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1.1024
(0.6725)
0.0022***
(0.0004)
-0.0002***
(0.0001)
-2.4203***
(0.2729)
1,410
-413.78
0.036

Finally, ethnic fractionalization was significant with a negative coefficient, meaning ethnic
fractionalization and split outcome (skirt and blouse outcome) are negatively related. That is, as
ethnic fractionalization increases, skirt and blouse outcome reduce, and vice-versa. When the
dependent variable was regressed on only the independent variables as shown in Table 4.3, the
dissertation found support for hypotheses two, four, and five which are all elite level coordinationbased hypotheses. The second hypothesis which predicted that when the district magnitude is
exceeded because elites did not coordinate their entry or failed in their coordination, there will
likely be a split-ticket voting leading to a possible split outcome was supported by the dissertation.
Again, hypothesis four predicted that ticket splitting and consequently, split outcome will surge as
parliamentary disputed primaries increase and vice versa was also supported by the model. The
fifth hypothesis; electoral deals entered into by elites was also supported by the model. Thus, H5
which predicted that deals between political actors that require trading off one race for a support
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in another race to produce split outcome was confirmed by the model. However, hypotheses one
(volatility) and three (SF-ratio) were not supported by the model as shown in Table 4.3 below.
Table 4.3: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Outcome Using Aggregate Data (Independent
Variables Only)
VARIABLES
Estimate/SE
Disputed Primaries in Parliamentary Elections
Volatility
Effective number of parties
SF-Ratio
Deals
Constant
Observations
Log likelihood
McFadden's R2
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2.3874***
(0.2404)
-0.0964
(0.3770)
3.1381***
(0.3786)
-0.3837
(0.5797)
1.5969***
(0.3389)
-9.0956***
(0.7884)
1,410
-326.97
0.238

To ensure that the results were consistent, I regressed the dependent variable on all the
variables; both independent and control variables. The results given in Table 4.4 below are not
much different from those in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 above. Again, hypotheses two (effective number
of parties), four (disputed primaries at the parliamentary elections), and five (deals) were
confirmed by the model with the signs in the expected direction as before. Again, hypotheses one
(volatility) and three (SF-ratio) were still not supported by the model in Table 4.4 as in Table 4.3
when only the independent variables were used in the regression. It worth pointing out, however,
that when all the variables were combined in a single model, it was only ethnic fractionalization
hypothesis which was significant among the control variables.
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Table 4.4: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Outcome Using Aggregate Electoral Data (All
Variables)
VARIABLES
Estimate/SE
Disputed Primaries in Parliamentary Elections
Volatility
Effective number of parties
SF-Ratio
Deals
Regional Effect
Distance
Ethnic fractionalization
Constant
Observations
Log likelihood
McFadden's R2
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2.4028***
(0.2437)
-0.2081
(0.4530)
3.1758***
(0.4238)
-0.2234
(0.5914)
1.5563***
(0.3472)
1.2274
(0.9533)
0.0005
(0.0005)
-0.0002**
(0.0001)
-8.7825***
(0.8615)
1,410
-323.71
0.246

Table 4.5 presents a model that includes year dummies with all the variables used in Table 4.4
above and the results were consistent with those discussed above. Hypotheses two (effective
number of parties), four (disputed primaries in presidential primaries), and five (electoral deals)
were all significant as before. Again, among the control variables, it was only ethnic
fractionalization hypothesis that was significant. In terms of the measure of fit for the models, it is
significant to note that the model in Table 4.6 with McFadden’s R2 of 0.252 which is the model
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Table 4.5: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Outcome Using Aggregate Electoral Data 1996-2016
(With Year Dummies)
VARIABLES
Estimate/SE
Disputed Primaries in Parliamentary Elections
Volatility
Effective number of parties
SF-Ratio
Deals
Regional Effect
Distance
Ethnicity
1996 Election
2000 Election
2004 Election
2008 Election
2016 Election
Constant
Observations
Log likelihood
McFadden's R2
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2.3913***
(0.2468)
-0.0918
(0.7439)
3.4483***
(0.4577)
-0.1112
(0.6089)
1.5293***
(0.3593)
1.2066
(1.0032)
0.0003
(0.0006)
-0.0002*
(0.0001)
-0.4698
(0.6952)
-0.8891**
(0.4037)
-0.3790
(0.3718)
-0.4548
(0.3558)
-0.3023
(0.3296)
-9.0095***
(0.9057)
1,410
-321.10
0.252

that includes year dummies is comparatively better than that of Table 4.3 with McFadden’s R2 of
0.036 which was ran with only the control variables. Again, since all the models with the exception
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of that which was ran with only the control variables, lie within the conservative 0.2 and 0.4 range
of McFadden’s R2, it can be said that the model does well in modeling the relationship between
the independent variables and split outcome (McFadden 1974, 1977).
Table 4.6: Effect of Changing Variables from Their Minimum to Maximum Values on Probability
of Ticket Splitting
Variables
Change in Probability of
Splitting
Disputed Primaries in Parliamentary Elections
0.300
Volatility
-0.008
Effective number of parties
0.721
SF-Ratio
-0.025
Deals
0.139
Regional Effect
0.062
Distance
0.021
Ethnic fractionalization
-0.045
Note: Estimates are derived from Table 4.5 holding all other variables constant at their medians

A quick glance at the changes in probabilities in Table 4.7 below shows that consistently,
a change of the independent variables (disputed primaries, effective number of parties, and deals)
from their minimum to their maximum values is associated with an increased change in the
probability to have split outcomes. The change in probability to split, however, is not uniform for
each variable and this is explained by the level of significance and the values assigned to the
variable from the regression (compare Tables 4.5 and 4.6). For instance, a change of effective
number of parties from its minimum to its maximum is associated with about 0.72 change in the
chance of split outcome while disputed primaries and deals are associated with about 0.3 and 0.14
chances of split where they were changed from their minimum to maximum values. The rest are
associated with lesser values. It is also significant to note that volatility, second to first loser ratio
(SF-ratio), and ethnic fractionalization have negative signs. This means that when any of them is

135

Samuel K. Darkwa
changed from its minimum to maximum, we should expect a fall in the probability to realize a split
outcome.
Table 4.7: Percentage of Split Constituencies vs. Parliamentary Disputed Primaries 1996 - 2016
Year
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
2016

Constituencies
200
200
230
230
275
275

Disputed Primaries (%)
10.00
6.00
8.30
8.30
9.50
13.50

Split Outcomes (%)
7.50
8.00
8.78
9.60
9.50
10.50

Source: Created by author using data from Election Passport and Ghana Electoral Commission
As a prelude into the discussion section, it pays taking a quick glance at couple of
illustrations both tabular and pictorial that substantiate the results from the logistic regression.
First, Table 4.8 below created from extracts pulled out of the aggregate electoral data used to run
the regression provide visual evidence showing that split outcomes have come to remain an
enduring feature of the Ghanaian electoral “system.” Brunell & Grofman (2009) found that
Table 4.8: Presidential and Parliamentary Winners and Runners-Up 1992 – 2016
Presidential
Winner
Parliamentary
Winner
Presidential
Runner-up
Parliamentary
Runner-up
Presidential Runoff winner
Presidential Runoff second placed

1992
NDC
58.4%
NDC
94.5%
NPP
30.3%
NCP
4.0%

1996
NDC
57.4%
NDC
66.5%
NPP
39.6%
NPP
30.8%

2000
NPP
48.2%
NPP
50.0%
NDC
44.5%
NDC
46.0%
NPP
56.9%
NDC
43.1%

2004
NPP
52.5%
NPP
55.7%
NDC
44.6%
NDC
40.9%

2008
NPP
49.32%
NDC
50.4%
NDC
47.8%
NPP
46.5%
NDC
50.5%
NPP
49.5%

2012
NDC
50.6%
NDC
53.8%
NPP
47.8%
NPP
44.7%

2016
NPP
53.7%
NPP
61.5%
NDC
44.5%
NDC
38.5%

Source: Created by author using data from Election Passport and Ghana Electoral Commission

between 1900 and 2004, a number of districts exhibited split outcomes for President and for
representatives in U.S. House. The number of split districts during this period was between five
percent and forty percent of all districts. The pictorials provided here, in the case of Ghana, also
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show that between 1996 and 2016, the country recorded between 7.5% and 10.5% split outcomes.
It is interesting to see the connection between disputed primaries in parliamentary elections and
split outcomes in the case of Ghana where increase in disputed primaries is associated with an
increase in split outcome.
Figure 4.1: Percentage of Vote Share and Seat Share for Winning Party 1996 - 2016

Source: Created by author using data from Election Passport and Ghana Electoral Commission
It is significant to note that unlike other jurisdictions, such as the United States and Brazil
where split outcomes occur with regular frequency and often create divided government, in Ghana,
the phenomenon has not created divided government, at least for the period under review. As
shown by Table 4.8 and Figure 4.1 above, between 1996 and 2016, the party that wins the
presidential race also wins parliamentary majority. If we were to add the 1992 elections, the split
outcome would have been bigger because in that year, the presidential election was held on
November 3, 1992 and the parliamentary elections scheduled for December 8, 1992. When the
presidential results were declared, all the major opposition parties raised allegations of vote rigging
by the ruling military government that had ruled the country from January 1982 to 1992.
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The military leader (Flt Lt. Jerry Rawlings) was contesting and at the same time
“supervising the elections” (Ayee 1997, 1998; Boafo-Arthur 2006; Commonwealth Secretariat
1992; Debrah 2011; Drah 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 2009; Oquaye 1998). As a result, all the opposition
parties boycotted the parliamentary election. It was only parties allied to the ruling military
government who contested the parliamentary election. In the Ashanti Region for instance, the
opposition NPP had won 26 out of the 33 constituencies during the presidential race and had won
a number of constituencies in other regions. However, because the opposition boycotted the
parliamentary race, all the 33 seats of Ashanti were won by the NDC. Thus, in 1992 elections,
there were so many split outcomes because the opposition boycotted parliamentary election and it
is for this reason that many scholars do not add the 1992 elections when they consider Ghana. Of
course, election passport does not have the 1992 result in its dataset. The major takeaway from
this point is that, in Ghana, since the 1996 elections, though there is consistent split outcome, the
party that wins the presidential race always wins the parliamentary majority.
4.4.2 Discussion
From the logistic regression output and the accompanying figures and tables, the
coordination driven split outcome appears to have reasonable merit. First, the fact that split
outcomes have become a recurrent phenomenon in Ghanaian electoral politics and always the party
that wins the presidency also wins parliamentary majority buttresses the case of coordinationoriented splitting. Table 4.8 shows that the party that commands parliamentary majority pulls not
less than 50 percent of the legislative seats while the constitution requires the winner of the
presidential race to have at least 50 percent plus one votes (Asamoah 2014; Ayee 1997, 1998,
2002; Boafo-Arthur 2006; Frempong 2017). In fact, Ghana is a two-party state where the two
major parties have consistently together pulled between 93 to 98 percent of the valid votes cast
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since 1992 when the country returned to democracy (Ayee 1997, 1998; Boafo-Arthur 2006;
Daddieh 2011; Frempong 2017). It was only in 1992 where the opposition parties boycotted the
parliamentary election that the NCP, one of the allies of the NDC, placed second and secured four
percent of the parliamentary seats after the NDC had ceded some constituencies unopposed to the
NCP to contest (Asamoah 2014; Frempong 2017). Otherwise, it has been straight contest between
the NDC and the NPP. In the 2000 elections when there was presidential runoff between the Vice
President of the ruling NDC and the candidate from the opposition NPP, all the opposition parties
unanimously declared their support for the NPP candidate (Asamoah 2014; Frempong 2017; Smith
2002b). Their reason was twofold; first to jointly wrestle power from the (P)NDC which had
governed Ghana between 1982 and 1992 as military government and between 1993 and 2000 as a
democratic government (Frempong 2017; Smith 2002b). Second, they rationalized that the NPP
had won 50% of the parliamentary seats and leading the presidential contest by 48.2% while the
NDC had only 46.0% of parliamentary seats and trailing behind the NPP in the presidential race
by 44.5%. Therefore, supporting the NDC to win the presidential race will produce divided
government that will make governance difficult in Ghana’s young democracy (Ayee 2002; Darkwa
2019; Frempong 2017). Given the precedent of the 2000 presidential runoff, in 2008 when there
was another presidential runoff between the NPP and the NDC, the other opposition parties went
by similar argument that because the NDC had won parliamentary majority of 50.4% against the
NPP’s 46.5%, the NDC should be supported in the presidential runoff though the NPP candidate
was leading by 49.34% to 47.8%. At the end of the 2008 runoff, the NDC eventually wrestled
power from the ruling NPP candidate by a close margin of 50.5% to 49.5%. Thus, elite
coordination and or miscoordination can explain the phenomenon of split outcome.
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Second, other narratives to support the statistical basis for the coordination driven split
ticket and hence, split outcome are numerous, at least for Ghana. Going by the argument in support
of the proponents of (mis)coordination ticket splitting, many instances of ticket splitting, and split
outcomes can be traced to coordination problems. For instance, Smith (2002b) observed that in the
2000 elections, the ruling NDC lost some safe seats in its strongholds either because of unfair
competition, the decision not to hold primaries, or endorsing sitting MPs as consensus candidates
(Asamoah 2014; Debrah 2014). In such circumstances, the NDC lost four of its seats to party
members who were disappointed nomination seekers that contested the elections as independents
(Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar 2010; Daddieh & Bob-Milliar 2014; Debrah 2014; Frempong 2017;
Smith 2002a). There were other instances where some of the independent contestants had failed to
win but they facilitated the victory of the opposition party because they divided the party’s votes
(Daddieh & Bob-Milliar 2014; Debrah 2014; Frempong 2017). In respect of hypothesis two which
touches on exceeding the district magnitude, most of the smaller parties such as the CPP, PNC,
GCPP, PPP, DFP are all socialist that trace their origin to the Nkrumah’s CPP. They all contest as
separate parties and receive an insignificant vote share. The coordination problem is not unique to
the smaller parties but to the dominant NDC and NPP who have witnessed splinter groups and
independent contestants facilitating the political pendulum that has enabled the three turnovers the
country has witnessed between 2000 and 2016.
Volatility has been a major source of party system change and stability (something that
causes vote share of parties) in many jurisdictions. In established democracies, researchers have
found voters to be responsible for that (Evans 2002; Pedersen 1979; Rose & Urwin 1970;
Taagepera & Grofman 2003). In new democracies, however, scholars have found elites to be
responsible (Birch 2003; Moser & Scheiner 2009; Tavits 2008) while scholars whose work center
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on strategic coordination found both elites and voters to be responsible (Cox 1997; Kitschelt et al.
1999; Rose & Munro 2003). This chapter, which is based on strategic coordination, has found both
elite level variables (disputed primaries, ENP, and deals) to be significant as per the fitted logistic
results and the changes in probability tables above. The chapter, however did not find support for
voter level variables (volatility and SF-ratio). It could, therefore, be concluded that elite-level
variables are largely responsible in producing split outcomes which has in most cases altered party
vote share. In Ghana, deals have produced split results any time both or either of the contracting
parties in electoral alliance involving deal win(s). This is because the nature of the deal often
requires one party trading off its parliamentary race for support in the presidential race. Therefore,
where one of the contracting parties wins or both win the constituency, in which such deal was
arranged, there is split outcome. It was through such deals that minor parties like the NCP, PCP,
CPP and EGLE have had parliamentary representation between 1993 and 2016 (Darkwa 2019;
Frempong 2017). We know that where split outcomes occur, there is at least some split-ticket
voting in that constituency. That is skirt and blouse outcome is a sign of skirt and blouse voting
(Burden and Kimball 2009).
4.5 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, split outcomes as per the extant literature is the basis for divided government
in many countries (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Ames et al 2009; Burden and Kimball 2009;
Fiorina 1992, 1996). However, in Ghana, there is evidence of split outcomes but the reason why
till now the country has not yet experienced divided government is due to elite coordination as
explained above. This has made Ghana unique in the sense that in two instances (2000 and 2008)
where there were opportunities for divided government, the political elite had argued against it and
have coordinated to prevent its occurrence. Again, as shown by Table 4.8 and Figure 4.1 above, in
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all instances, the party that won the presidential contest also won at least a 50% seat share in
parliament. Thus, it could be argued that Ghanaian political elites do not advocate ticket splitting
with the intent of causing divided government8 at least within the Fourth Republic between 1992
- 2016. The results from the regression output to test the hypotheses in this chapter found
statistically significant support for the coordination-induced split outcomes that confirms the
theoretical expectations of this research. Certainly, differences in elite coordination within and
across constituencies account for variations in ticket splitting and for that matter split outcome. In
fact, the entire credit or blame could not be attributable to candidates and elites but to voters as
well because, as we have seen both elite level hypotheses and voter level hypotheses are all
confirmed by this study. As discussed above, the coordination rule which is the M+1 rule governs
both strategic entry (for candidates and elites) and strategic voting (for voters). Thus, the nuances
and complexity in split outcome is due to variations in elite and voter coordination within and
between constituencies.
An important clarification on why Ghana’s skirt and blouse voting has not produced
divided government needs to be pointed out here. As extensively shown in this chapter and
reiterated in the preceding paragraph, Ghanaian political elites, though often advocating skirt and
blouse, have both in word and deed moved against divided government7. A segment of the media
and civil society on the other hand, have supported divided government because they are of the
view that divided government would act as checks and balances between the executive and
legislative arms of government and lead to good governance. These contrasting views held by the
political elites and a cross section of the media and civil society will be discussed in the next
chapter that utilizes my fieldwork to examine elite level coordination of ticket splitting.
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In fact, as proponents of divided government have a number of justifications for the
concept, such as, it leads to policy moderation, checks and balances each arm of government and
places each party in its ideal office – institutional matching (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989, 1995;
Fiorina 1992, 1996; Jacobson 1990; Petrocik 1991), split outcomes have their strengths. First, it
has been argued that ticket splitting and for that matter, split outcomes, promotes performancebased voting such as economic voting (Debrah 2016; Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Helmke 2009).
Thus, ticket splitters will cast their votes for politicians who have performed well as well as for
competence instead of for partisanship. In Ghana for instance, it has been found that constituencies
with split outcomes put political actors especially parliamentarians on their toes to offer responsive
and accountable representation to their constituents while areas where voters vote straight ticket
receive subpar representation (Asunka 2016, 2017; Fridy 2006; Lindberg & Morrison 2008;
Weghorst & Lindberg 2013).
Finally, elite coordination especially, and to some extent, voter coordination have helped
nurture Ghana’s young democracy such that both coordination successes and failures have together
shepherded the country to navigate the contours of democratization to the point of realizing three
successive transfer of power from one party to the other. In critical instances where the country
had to have presidential runoffs between a ruling government and the main opposition party, elites
have coordinated to ensure that in both instances, the ruling party loses and hands over power
peacefully. Thus, the concept of coordination is such a powerful phenomenon that requires the
attention of political actors, electorates, policy makers and watchers of democracy.
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4.7 Notes
1. Ecological inference fallacy is the mistake associated with inferring individual level behavior
from aggregate data. For instance, relying on aggregate electoral result to deduce individual-level
attributes such as ticket splitting
2. The mediating factors are institutional and social contexts that influence elite coordination. For
instance, elite coordination in single member districts (SMDs) may differ from elite coordination
in multimember districts (MMDs) (Guinjoan 2016; Herron and Nishikawa 2001, 2005; Ferrara
2004). In Ghana for example, elite coordination in SMDs are such that, often, one party defers the
parliamentary race for its ally for a corresponding support in the presidential race in that
constituency.
3. Part of this dissertation is expected to be published in London by Rowman and Littlefield
International Limited.
4. Given that most of the examples given about divided government relate to the United States due
to its unique Constitution that provides separate roles for the various arms of government, I will
discuss the theory of divided government as it pertains to the US. I will also discuss how it is in
Brazil and Mexico.
5. http://www.electionpassport.com/
6. To compute ENP, the first step is to find each party’s vote or seat share (that is the percentage
of votes or seats received). Second, square each party’s vote or seat share and add up the squares.
Finally, find the reciprocal of the sum of squares.
7. I got most of my data from Frempong’s (2017) Frempong, Alexander Kaakyire Duku. 2017.
Elections in Ghana: 1951 – 2016. Digibooks Ghana Ltd. and just a few from Osei, Anja. 2012.
Party-Voter Linkage in Africa: Ghana and Senegal in Comparative Perspective. Springer Science
& Business Media.
The data from Frempong’s (2017) Osei (2012) were supplemented with journal publications and
by media reports. Among them are:
Bob-Milliar, George M. 2012. “Political party activism in Ghana: factors influencing the decision
of the politically active to join a political party.” Democratization 19.4: 668-689.
Bob-Milliar, George M., and Gloria K. Bob-Milliar. 2010. “The Economy and Intra-Party
Competition: Presidential Primaries in the New Patriotic Party of Ghana." African Review of
Economics and Finance 1.2: 51-71.
Daddieh, Cyril K., and George M. Bob-Milliar. 2014. “Ghana: The African Exemplar of an
Institutionalized Two-Party System?” Party systems and democracy in Africa. Palgrave
Macmillan, London. 107-128.
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Debrah, Emmanuel. 2014. “Intra-Party Democracy in Ghana’s Fourth Republic: The Case of the
New Patriotic Party and National Democratic Congress.” Journal of Power, Politics & Governance
2.3: 57-75.
In respect to media reports I try as much as possible to confirm a single story with about two media
houses. A media source for party members going independent for instance, that I worked with in
respect to members going independent was carried by at least four media houses as “NDC sacks
23 members for going independent”. The links to these are given below.
http://citifmonline.com/2016/11/01/ndc-sacks-23-members-for-going-independent/
http://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/politics/politics/201611/296840.php?page=1
HYPERLINK
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NDC-sacks-23-for-goingindependent-482650
https://www.pulse.com.gh/ece-frontpage/independent-candidates-ndc-sacks-23-parliamentaryaspirants/hbb7z08
8. Though Ghanaian political elites engage in acts that promote skirt and blouse voting, they have
done their best to avoid divided government because Flt Lt. Jerry Rawlings’ second military coup
in December 1981 came shortly after the Third Republican Parliament voted against the
president’s budget).

Appendix 4.1: Parliamentary Representation in Ghana’s Fourth Republic
Party/Independent
Date of investiture
NDC
NPP
NCP

First
Parliament
Jan 7, 1993
189 (94.5)
8 (4.0)

PNC

-

CPP

-

EGLE
PCP

1 (0.5)
-

Independent

2 (1.0)

TOTAL

200 (100)

Second
Parliament
Jan 7, 1997
133 (66.5)

Third
Parliament
Jan 7, 2001
92 (46.0)

Fourth
Parliament
Jan 7, 2005
94 (46.5)

Fifth
Parliament
Jan 7, 2009
116 (50.4)

Sixth
Parliament
Jan 7, 2013
148 (53.8)

Seventh
Parliament
Jan 7, 2017
106 (38.5)

61 (30.5)

100 (50.0)

128 (55.7)

107 (46.5)

123 (44.7)

169 (61.5)

-

-

-

-

-

1 (0.5)
5 (2.5)
200 (100)

3 (1.3)

4 (1.7)

2 (0.9)

1 (0.5)

3 (1.3)

1 (0.4)

1 (0.4)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

4 (2.0)

1 (0.4)

4 (1.7)

3 (1.1)

230 (100)

230 (100)

230 (100)

275 (100)

275 (100)

Source: Compilations from the Election Passport and Electoral Commission of Ghana Databases.
Notes: Percentages in parentheses. The seat allocations are as per the general elections conducted
prior to the inauguration of Parliament on January 7, and do not consider reallocations due to
byelections.
Appendix 4.2: Coding at the Aggregate Level of Analysis
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Variable
Split outcome
(DV)
Parliamentary
Disputed
Primaries
Volatility

Effective
number of
parties (ENP)
S-F Ratio

Deals
Regional Effect

Distance

Ethnic
fractionalization

Measurement
The main DV is split outcome as such, constituencies with split outcomes were coded as
“1”, otherwise coded as “0”.
Since disputed primaries in parliamentary elections are likely to cause split outcome,
every constituency with disputed primaries in parliamentary elections is coded as “1”
otherwise coded as “0”
I compute electoral volatility for each constituency from the legislative election results
using a modified Pedersen Index which ranges between 0 and 1. I first totaled the change
in each party’s vote share in the current and previous election. Second, I added up the
absolute values of the changes in vote shares. Finally, I divided the sum of the absolute
values by two.
The ENP is computed from the legislative election results using the vote share of
competing parties in a given constituency. First, I computed the vote share of all the
contestants in a given constituency. Second, I squared each contestant’s vote share and
summed up the values. Finally, I computed the reciprocal of sum of squares.
I generate the SF-Ratio from the legislative election results using the vote ratio between
the second and third placed candidates in a given constituency. In other words, the SFRatio measures the proportion of vote share between the second and first loser in a
constituency.
I measured deal as a dichotomous variable: constituencies with deals are coded as “1”,
otherwise coded as “0”.
I control for regional effect, as contiguous constituencies are more likely to vote in
identical way. To measure this, I computed the proportion of split outcome at time t-1 for
each constituency. In this way each constituency in a region is given the same value.
To control for how legislators’ closeness to their constituents may affect split, I use the
distance from the constituency capital in each constituency to the national legislative
house as a measure.
I computed ethnic fractionalization using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) by
squaring each ethnic group’s population share in that constituency and then found the
sum of those numbers. To obtain the proportion of each ethnic group’s population share,
I used the ethnic profile of each constituency as per the appropriate GLSS report.
The GLSS report is given at the regional level. To generate the constituency equivalence,
I used the proportion between the presidential valid votes cast at the regional and
constituency levels.
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CHAPTER 5. ELITE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
5.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
“Ghana stands to gain, and parliament will produce results for the people through give and take negotiations and
proper debates devoid of insults… if we vote wisely and vote skirt and blouse1 (Festus Lartey-Adjei, December 7,
2012).
As you go out to vote on Sunday, I am urging my friends and anyone who really cares about the growth of democracy
in Ghana to vote “skirt and blouse”. I’d like to have a situation where the president is from ‘Party A’ but parliament
is controlled by ‘Party B’ or ‘Party C’2 (Ato Kwamena Dadzie, December 5, 2008)

Political parties usually have a strong incentive to encourage straight ticket voting so that
voters support all their candidates on the ballot. In Ghana, split-ticket voting is so common that it
has a special name, “skirt and blouse voting,” denoting a two-piece dress instead of one straight
dress (Daddieh 2011). Not only do we see evidence of split-ticket voting in some constituencies,
but we also see some evidence that parties strategically encourage split-ticket voting under certain
conditions. Further, civil society and media may encourage split-ticket voting to achieve certain
goals. The above two quotes are mere crumbs of what political party elites and other Ghanaians
feed the electorates on in public and in private to shape their voting pattern. In fact, the first
statement was attributed to Dr. Abu Sakara, the 2012 Presidential Candidate of the Convention
People’s Party (CPP). In Chapter 4, the dissertation made a claim backed by data that elite support
for skirt and blouse voting aims to achieve certain electoral outcome other than divided
government. It is significant to note that both quotes at the beginning of the chapter support how
the phenomenon is encouraged. The second quote does something more than merely encouraging
skirt and blouse voting. It is actually asking for divided government: that is the presidency and
parliament are controlled by different political parties. The quote is actually from someone from
the media and civil society who thinks that divided government will create the necessary checks
and balances for the executive and legislative arms of government to play a watchdog role which
will strengthen Ghana’s democracy. Political elites, on the other hand, think otherwise. Though
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they engage in acts that promote skirt and blouse voting, they do not support divided government
because Flt Lt. Jerry Rawlings’ military coup in December 1981 came shortly after the Third
Republican Parliament voted against the president’s budget.
This chapter will explore the reasons Ghanaian political elites will generally support skirt
and blouse voting or skirt and blouse outcome and thus, contribute to our understanding of splitticket voting, elite behavior, and Ghanaian electoral politics within Ghana’s Fourth Republic. It
worth stressing that this chapter differs from Chapter 3 in the sense that whereas Chapter 3 focuses
on individual voter, this chapter focuses on party elites by trying to address why a party elite or a
party card bearing member will vote skirt and blouse. Why would party elites and supporters of a
political party want either the party’s presidential or parliamentary candidate lose the election in a
particular constituency? Why would a presidential and or parliamentary candidate of a political
party advocate either overtly or covertly for split-ticket voting? Again, why would a supporter, a
member or an official of a political party indeed vote to split the ballot, roll-off the ballot, or
abstain? Finally, how has this problem shaped the current distribution of votes and seats share of
parties in Ghana? Using fieldwork conducted in Ghana that sampled 303 party elites and few
media, civil society leaders and academics in 2017, the chapter argues that political party
officials/political actors tend to do what they feel will serves their best interests. In some cases,
their “best interests” may involve a split-ticket outcome.
Further, politicians will advocate for split-ticket voting in situations where coordination
breaks down or will deliberately frustrate coordination where they find it to be the most expedient
means of facilitating their political goal at a given time. This observation suggests that we can
observe conventional coordination which is a harmonious interaction or relationship within a
group or among groups of people working together and the reverse of that. I refer to both as
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(mis)coordination to cater for coordination failure and coordination success (Cox 1999; Navia and
Saldaña 2015). Thus, political actors are strategic in their choices; they make their choices in
response to (in anticipation of) what other actors (competitors and voters) are doing (will do).
Employing Cox’s (1997, 1999) coordination theory, the chapter further asserts that strategic
coordination is a mechanism that political actors employ to communicate their intentions about
the direction they expect the elections to go. The electorates are able to decode such cues where
political actors employ strategic coordination as communication mechanism because they come
with certain observable indicators3. It is instructive to note that strategic coordination is carried out
within party (intraparty) and between party (interparty)4. This chapter will identify the observable
indicators of intraparty and interparty coordination cues that party elites create as they engage in
strategic coordination and generate testable hypotheses, test them and draw conclusion about how
these promote ticket splitting.
The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section, section 5.2, presents findings from the
fieldwork conducted in 2017 exclusively for this dissertation. Section 5.3 discusses the strategic
coordination theory which is the dissertation’s contribution to the ticket splitting literature. The
strategic coordination theory is a two-pronged theoretical model used to analyze the phenomenon
of ticket splitting especially from elites’ perspectives as it relates to intraparty and interparty
coordination problems they face in prosecuting their political agenda. Each of these sections will
introduce and discuss the appropriate testable hypotheses that capture the observable indicators of
intraparty and interparty coordination problems faced by party elites. Section 5.4 discusses
alternative explanations with their associated hypotheses: Partisanship, the educational level of the
respondents, and whether or not the parties/candidates that respondents identify with contest in a
given constituency. Section 5.5 touches on the data and how it was collected, how relevant it is to
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the questions and the theory, as well as how the variables are measured. The section discusses the
dependent and independent variables as well as the control variables. The penultimate unit, section
5.6 models the interparty and intraparty coordination theory and presents the results from the
logistic regression. This will connect to the discussion segment of the chapter by buttressing the
results with stories of coordination problems in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. Section 5.7, the final
section, summarizes the discussions, points out the importance of the chapter and proposes
suggestions and recommendations for future research in the subfield.
5.2 DISCOVERIES FROM THE FIELDWORK
The post-election fieldwork conducted in Ghana in 2017 just after the 2016 Ghanaian
election offered my research team and I a unique opportunity to uncover several insightful
experiences and thoughts from party elites, media persons, civil society and scholars on why skirt
and blouse is pervasive in Ghana. These could be classified into: nomination problems, sabotage,
local vs national issues, results of government policy, and the effects of interparty coordination on
smaller parties vote share. These are briefly discussed under subsections 5.2.1 to 5.2.5 below.
5.2.1 Nomination Problems
Our interactions with our research subjects, especially with party elites who were either
victims or advocates of skirt and blouse voting/outcome, gave us an opportunity to unearth how
party nomination process becomes mechanism for promoting skirt and blouse outcome for several
reasons. It came to light that the two major political parties, the NPP and the NDC, have rolled out
what they referred to as “affirmative action”5 aimed at encouraging more female and disabled
politicians to enter parliament. The “affirmative action” has two strands: reduction in the filing
fees for beneficiaries and the designation of some constituencies as affirmative constituencies. The
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way these measures create skirt and blouse outcome is that instances where female politicians and
those with disability pay reduced filing fees, the level of intraparty competition in those
constituencies is compromised at the parliamentary race. That is, because as female politicians and
those with disability are made to pay reduced filing fees, their competitors see the action as
skewing the system in favor of their opponents and not on the basis of merit. Often, the candidate
selected is not able to match the competition from the opponents who may not have the same
policy in that constituency. From my respondent’s perspective, the most detrimental kind of this
policy is designation of a constituency as affirmative constituency. This kind of affirmative action
is seen as another kind of imposition of a candidate where women are to be given consideration in
a party’s stronghold, and it mostly creates problems for the party such that the party often ends up
losing a safe seat to opponents.
Other kinds of nomination problems unraveled by the team include instances where party
heavy weights, especially those in national, regional, and constituency executive levels, use their
positions to support a particular candidate. Similar to this is corruption on the part of party officials
who organize the primaries by favoring certain candidates either because those candidates bribe
them or because they have special relationship with the candidates. These acts create uneven
electoral playing ground among contestants, and those who feel they are unfairly treated often
advocate skirt and blouse voting. Often, aggrieved unsuccessful parliamentary nomination seekers
who are victims of unfair treatment enter the elections as independent and thus create opportunity
for skirt and blouse voting. Respondents 1 and 7 revealed in an interview that, victims of unfair
nomination become easy targets to opponents who are prepared to use financial inducement to
create skirt and blouse in their opponent’s strongholds with the view of making it possible for the
financier’s party’s candidate to win those constituencies6. The financial inducement used by
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opponents to create skirt and blouse voting in the recipient’s party referred to here as “financing
of opposition election campaigns” is of two kinds. The first is where the financier targets some
members or plant certain persons in opponent’s party for a period of time for those persons to
become eligible for that party’s parliamentary nomination. As expected, such persons’ aim is to
do whatever possible to mar the party’s nomination process and thus, break the bond of unity that
holds the party together. The second type uncovered by this research is where the financier woos
aggrieved nomination seekers of opponent parties and support them to contest the election as
independents. When this happens, it increases the likelihood of skirt and blouse voting in the
recipient’s party and a possible win for the financier’s legislative candidate because in most
instance, party supporters will support their presidential candidate but divide their vote at the
legislative race.
5.2.2 Deliberate Sabotage
Emanating from the above is the issue of calculated or deliberate sabotage often carried
out by aggrieved nomination seekers or persons with presidential or parliamentary ambitions. It
was found out that, aggrieved nomination seekers who feel unfairly treated by parties hold that the
best way to hurt their party or receive attention is to advocate skirt and blouse voting. Again,
persons with parliamentary or presidential ambitions also work against the current occupant of that
seat. Such acts often break the party’s front, create disaffection among party members and fester
intraparty conflicts which produce skirt and blouse voting when left unresolved. Key among
persons who harbor parliamentary ambitions are political appointees, such as district or municipal
chief executives (DCEs/MCEs), who represent the president and perform ceremonial and
executive functions and are often custodians of development projects in those areas. The research
found that there are two reasons why DCEs/MCEs would promote skirt and blouse to sabotage the
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member of parliament (MP) in that constituency. First, the position of DCEs/MCEs and that of a
minister do not have their tenure backed by the Constitution. Their continuous stay in office is at
the discretion of the president who can hire and fire at any time. The MP’s tenure, on the other
hand, is guaranteed by the Constitution and that is what most politicians prefer. Second, the MPs
are often detached from the people by result of the location of their working place which is miles
away at the national capital. In terms of presence and visibility, DCEs/MCEs are within the
community and their work is often conspicuous to the electorates. Thus, DCEs/MCEs are often
seen to “belong” to the constituent while an MP is seen to be too distant from the people. This
perception worsens where the MP does not frequent the constituency. The result is that because
DCEs/MCEs preferred to be MPs and given their visibility and presence, coupled with their role
as the representatives of the president promoting development in the constituency against the MP
who is seen to be distant, the DCEs/MCEs are easily able to sabotage the MPs. Again, because
there is no term limit for MPs, an MP can be in parliament as long as the constituents are willing
to renew the MP’s mandate. Consequently, MPs who have had three or more parliamentary terms
become targets of sabotage. The result of this is skirt and blouse voting or outcome because the
MPs also have some supporters in the constituencies who are likely to vote for the party’s
presidential candidate and the MP. These calculated sabotages often do not involve the presidential
candidates because they are limited to certain constituencies and involve the MP and in-party
member(s) who want the MP’s seat.
It also came to light that party foot-soldiers who do the leg work for the party at the
grassroots to win elections are often promised jobs and positions. However, because most of them
do not have the needed skills and qualifications, their parties often fail to honor promises made to
them. These party foot-soldiers often register their protest by mobilizing against their parties as
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they also register their dissatisfaction through skirt and blouse often against the candidates who
failed to honor their promises. Party foot soldiers often well organize their protest in the
constituencies with banners and placards communicating their intentions to their party leadership.
5.2.3 Local Vs National Issues
Related to the above is how the phenomenon of skirt and blouse voting relates to party
problems classified as local vs national. An interesting observation from the fieldwork is that in
Ghana, skirt and blouse voting, in most cases, is directed towards parliamentary candidates and
not the presidential candidates. That is, most of the time, it is the parliamentary candidate who
suffers from skirt and blouse voting. The reasons here are multifaceted. First, some of the MPs,
either before or after their parliamentary quest, might have involved themselves in local problems
such as chieftaincy conflicts. This is a local problem and, as such, it is the local politician (MP),
not the national politician (president), who suffers for it. It must be pointed out, however, that the
local politician can also benefit from skirt and blouse voting; especially where the local politician
promotes development projects in that constituency. Furthermore, candidates who do not connect
well with their constituents as well as those who do not conduct themselves well attract skirt and
blouse voting. Thus, the issue of responsiveness is at the heart of skirt and blouse voting. For
instance, a person who promotes development in an area can benefit from skirt and blouse voting.
Second, the nomination problems discussed above in section 5.3.1, and its associated sabotage
discussed in the preceding section, are largely local problems and thus make voters split from the
local politician. These aside, it was found that when there are conflicts in the party at the national
level and disciplinary measures are carried out at that level, it unites the party at the grassroots.
However, where there are conflicts at the local level and national leadership prescribes disciplinary
measures at the local level, it creates confusion and breaks the ranks of the party. These
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observations are context dependent, but they tell us that parties differentiate local and national
issues and when they are conflated, create skirt and blouse voting. One of my respondents said this
in support of local vs national issues:
“In the 2016, NPP was more divided at the top where their national executives such as Paul
Afoko (the National Chairman), Kwabena Agyei Agyepong (General Secretary) and
Sammy Crabbe (the Second Vice Chairman) were all suspended. Ironically, this united the
party’s grassroots especially given that the party has been in opposition for eight years and
wanted to come back into power. Again, given that the governing NDC was also having
internal division at the grassroots but the president (NDC candidate) and his executives
were using NPP’s internal division as a campaign issue galvanized the opposition to unite
at the grassroots and delivered a sound victory to their party”7.
Thus, the takeaway from these points is that local problems often create skirt and blouse that the
local politician suffers for.
It is also interesting to note that the local vs national divide can take a twist where the
presidential candidate rather than the parliamentary candidate suffers for it. It was found that where
there is a disconnect between the party structures and the presidential candidate’s campaign team,
it incurs the displeasure of the locals who vote against their presidential candidate but for the
party’s parliamentary candidate. For instance, some of my respondents said the NDC presidential
candidate, who was also the incumbent, created a lot of disaffection at the grassroots for using
celebrities (movie and music stars) instead of the local executives8. Most of these people do not
understand the local language, the customs and traditions of the people. These aside, they do not
even know the boundaries of constituencies in the country and this angered the locals (regional
and national executives) to vote against the president, making him the first to lose his reelection
bid. It was also found that most of the logistics of the incumbent president, such as T-shirt
distribution, mounting of billboards, were done by the president’s team from the national capital.
These acts covertly communicated to the local executives that they were not needed and as such
most of the campaigns led by celebrities were mere fanfare that did not attract any serious votes.
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5.2.4 Results of Government Policy
My interactions with respondents showed how a government policy can cause skirt and
blouse voting. The central government had withdrawn allowances from teacher training and
nursing training colleges9. This and other government policies placed financial burden on all
citizens. However, some smart MPs in the president’s party clandestinely distanced themselves
and rolled out some scholarship funds for their constituents. This reflected in the votes received
by these MPs against those of the incumbent president. Thus, the pursuit of certain policies by a
government can make its own supporters decide to vote against the party, but if an MP or
prospective MP of that party strategically distances himself/herself from that policy, there will be
likely ticket splitting. Conversely, skirt and blouse can also be used to reward the president for
pursuing certain policies that the electorates approve. On the other hand, they punish the MP for
not being responsive to the needs of the constituency.
5.2.5 The Effects of Interparty Coordination on Smaller Parties’ Vote Share
Analysis of fieldwork showed that though interparty alliance (coordination) between the
smaller and the major parties had helped the former to have parliamentary representation between
1992 and 2012, it has weakened the former and the effect is that they have ceded their strongholds
to the latter through that coordination. For instance, in the 1992 presidential election, the People’s
National Convention garnered (PNC) 6.70%, the National Independence Party (NIP) got 2.86%
and the People’s Heritage Party received 1.76% of the total valid votes cast. However, now, all the
smaller parties put together are not able to pull 2% of the votes because the bigger parties have
taken over their support base. One of my respondents had this to say:
“The bigger parties when entering alliance with smaller parties do not do favors to the
smaller parties because they do not negotiate on areas they know they will win. Rather, they
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negotiate on areas they will lose. For instance, a bigger party will expect you to concede your
presidential slot in your stronghold so that it does not contest the parliamentary seat in that
constituency. That aside, you both must endorse each other’s candidate and get your supporters to
campaign and vote. With that, both of you will help each other to win the presidential seat for the
bigger party and the parliamentary seat for the smaller party”10.
Respondents 5 and 6 said that, the bigger parties often poach the most qualified candidates
of the smaller parties they form alliance with by giving them ministerial appointments11. This, to
them, has resulted in the abysmal performance of the smaller parties. It could be argued, however,
that contrary to this, the adoption of a pure SMD system without a majority runoff rule coupled
with elite coordination largely account for the displacement of the minor parties in Ghana (Cox
1997; Duverger 1954). Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below show the vote share and seat share of contesting
parties in the presidential and legislative elections between 1996 and 2016. A quick glance at them
shows a trend of decline in the support for the smaller parties and sustained growth of the two main
parties; the NPP and the NDC.
5.1 Presidential Election Results 1996 – 2016
Year
Party
1996
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
New Patriotic Party (NPP)
People’s National Convention (PNC)
2000 (1st Round)

New Patriotic Party (NPP)
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
People’s National Convention (PNC)
Convention People’s Party (CPP)
National Reform Party (NRP)
Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP)
United Ghana Movement (UGM)

Votes
Percentage (%)
4,101,674
57.40
2,829,726
39.60
214,373
3.00
3,131,739
2,895,575
189,659
115,641
78,629
67,504
22,123

48.17
44.54
2.92
1.78
1.21
1.04
0.34

2000 (2nd Round) New Patriotic Party (NPP)
National Democratic Congress (NDC)

3,631,263
2,750,124

56.90
43.10

2004

4,524,074
3,850,368
165,375
85,968

52.45
44.64
1.92
1.00

New Patriotic Party (NPP)
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
People’s National Convention (PNC)
Convention People’s Party (CPP)
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2008 (1st Round)

New Patriotic Party (NPP)
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
Convention People’s Party (CPP)
People’s National Convention (PNC)
Democratic Freedom Party (DFP)
Independent Candidate
Democratic People's Party (DPP)
Reformed Patriotic Democrats (RPD)

4,204,073
4,070,889
112,673
73,618
28,471
19,178
8,367
6,443

49.32
47.76
1.32
0.86
0.33
0.22
0.10
0.08

2008 (2nd Round) National Democratic Congress (NDC)
New Patriotic Party (NPP)

4,527,909
4,443,654

50.47
49.53

2012

New Patriotic Party (NPP)
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
Progressive People's Party (PPP)
Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP)
People’s National Convention (PNC)
Convention People’s Party (CPP)
Independent Candidate
United Front Party (UFP)

5,573,572
5,263,286
64,267
38,250
24,621
20,109
15,156
8,909

50.63
47.81
0.58
0.35
0.22
0.18
0.14
0.08

2016

New Patriotic Party (NPP)
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
Progressive People's Party (PPP)
Convention People’s Party (CPP)
People’s National Convention (PNC)
National Democratic Party (NDP)
Independent Candidate

5,755,758
4,771,188
106,092
25,552
22,298
16,935
15,911

53.72
44.53
0.99
0.24
0.21
0.16
0.15

5.2 Parliamentary Election Results 1996 – 2016
Year
Party
1996
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
New Patriotic Party (NPP)
People’s Convention Party (PCP)
People’s National Convention (PNC)

Seats Won Percentage (%)
133
66.5
61
30.5
5
2.5
1
0.5

2000

New Patriotic Party (NPP)
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
Independent Candidates
People’s National Convention (PNC)
Convention People’s Party (CPP)

100
92
4
3
1

50.00
46.00
2.00
1.50
0.50

2004

New Patriotic Party (NPP)

128

55.65
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National Democratic Congress (NDC)
People’s National Convention (PNC)
Convention People’s Party (CPP)
Independent Candidates

94
4
3
1

40.87
1.74
1.30
0.43

2008

National Democratic Congress (NDC)
New Patriotic Party (NPP)
Independent Candidates
People’s National Convention (PNC)
People’s Convention Party (PCP)

116
107
4
2
1

50.43
46.52
1.74
0.87
0.43

2012

National Democratic Congress (NDC)
New Patriotic Party (NPP)
Independent Candidates
People’s National Convention (PNC)

148
123
3
1

53.82
44.73
1.09
0.36

2016

New Patriotic Party (NPP)
National Democratic Congress (NDC)

169
106

61.45
38.55

5.3 STRATEGIC COORDINATION THEORY
To address the questions raised above, I explore Cox’s (1997, 1999) coordination theory
to analyze splitting in the Ghanaian general elections between 1996 and 2016. Cox (1997, 1999)
developed a general theory of electoral coordination (especially elite-level coordination) which
aimed at ensuring coordination within a single party (intraparty coordination) and coordination
between and among parties (interparty coordination). Cox observed that electoral systems of any
kind determine how votes are translated into seats and are replete with coordination problems for
electoral competitors. Such problems emerge because there are more potential competitors than
the available seats. Thus, within a single political party, there may be several contestants and within
an ideological bloc, such as social democratic parties, there could be several capable candidates
prepared and determined to enter the election fray in pursuit of fewer seats. This situation poses a
coordination problem especially to the political parties involved in the sense that they will need to
limit the number of competitors. Cox contends that this could be done by “either limiting the
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number of actual competitors (e.g. via joint lists or fusion candidacies), limiting the number of
competitors for whom voters actually vote (strategic voting), or both. The process of limiting either
entry or vote dispersion entails coordinating the actions of more than one person” (Cox 1999, 145146). The central thrust of Cox’s general theory of electoral coordination goes as:
Electoral systems affect the coordination of political forces at two main levels: (a) within
individual electoral districts when candidates and lists enter the electoral fray and voters
distribute their votes among them; and (b) across these districts (within the nation as a
whole) as potentially autonomous candidates and lists from different districts ally with one
another to form regional or national parties. A third and final stage of coordination is less
directly affected by electoral rules, namely the forming and sustaining of governments…
district-level electoral coordination problems for the simplest electoral systems…two
different M+1 rules apply. First, the number of candidates or lists entering a given race
tends to be no more than M+1; second, when more than M+1 candidates or lists do enter a
race, votes tend to concentrate on at most M +1 of them (Cox 1999, 160).
From the long quote above, Cox is making three important points. First, he meant that an
electoral system puts a ceiling on the viable number of competitors in an electoral district given
by the M+1 rule. The M denotes the district magnitude which tells us that if a constituency elects
only one MP/candidate, then there is a tendency to have only two viable competitors in that
constituency (M+1) especially when a plurality formula is used to determine the outcome. If more
than two candidates are contesting in such a constituency, then voters who want their votes to
count, will concentrate their votes on the two most viable ones (vote strategically). How strategic
voting may translate into ticket splitting is where a voter’s choices in the different races are not for
candidates from the same political party. Cox therefore, advices politicians to do their homework
by way of coordinating on only M+1 candidates, so that voters will not have to vote strategically.
The second form of elite coordination; political interaction across districts (constituencies), is what
Cox refers to as linkage decisions among political actors (candidates and political parties
contesting the election in different constituencies). It deals with the interaction between a
presidential and a parliamentary candidates’ joint efforts in executing an electoral campaign with
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the view that their supporters vote equally to both. The third phase of elite coordination has to do
with political interaction for setting up and maintaining governments. Thus, it focuses on the
distribution of offices (legislative and executive) to public officials. In sum, the first two phases
are associated with elections and are directly affected by electoral rules whilst the third deals with
formation and maintenance of governments.
In applying how the coordination problems identified by Cox can explain split-ticket
voting, I will restrict the theory to the first two levels of coordination (but especially to the second
level which deals with elite interactions) and use the third as a bargaining chip that top political
actors can use to facilitate how they overcome the coordination problems they face. As political
actors are interested in votes, policy, and office (Golder 2006, Kadima and Uteem 2006) it is easier
for them to employ Cox’s third-level of coordination (office and government formation) as a
negotiation chip to address/overcome their coordination problems.
It worth pointing out that coordination problems faced by party elites and candidates are at
times problems they deliberately create as they interact with other players in the pursuit of their
political agenda. These problems are associated with certain identifiable indicators which are
observed by Cox (1999), Benoit (2001), and Golder (2006). For the sake of clarity, I classify them
into intraparty and interparty coordination successes and failures as doing so will give a clear gauge
to assess how party elites (candidates and parties) behave in respect to the coordination problem
they face. Coordination is necessary for party elites who are goal oriented and working together as
a team in meeting those goals. Since they depend on one another to pursue a common goal, they
will need to do things in a way that a single person pursuing similar goals will not normally do.
Malone aptly captured this when he defined coordination as, “the additional information
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processing performed when multiple, connected actors pursue goals that a single actor pursuing
the same goals would not perform” (Malone 1988, 5).
5.3.1 Intraparty Coordination
Intraparty coordination deals with how party elites negotiate their interdependent relations
within a given political party. According to scholars such as Cox (1999), Benoit (2001), and Golder
(2006), intraparty coordination has its associated observable indicators as shown in Table 5.3
below. When successful, the first observable indication is that political parties limit nomination or
they coordinate on a single candidate (nominee). This is what Cox (1999) refers to as nomination
control. He argues that nomination control could be done through primary elections or any internal
party procedures that are transparent and democratic. Second, the consequence of nomination
control is that the party runs fewer candidates. Where there is nomination control or fewer
candidates are presented on a party’s ticket, it is highly probable that some aspirants might
withdraw their decision to contest or might lose to an in-party competitor.
Therefore, the third observable indication of a successful intraparty coordination is the
ability of party elites to prevent losing or disappointed nomination seekers from entering the
general election as independent candidates. This could be done by negotiating policy concessions
and/or office positions with disappointed nomination seekers in exchange for their support prior
to the elections. The promise of government position to losing in-party contestants may be enough
to secure their support for the election. This is where Cox’s third-level of coordination
(government formation) becomes relevant in this chapter. The view is that government formation
predates electoral victory and that it acts as a catalyst for inducing internal party cohesion for
electoral success. The fourth observable indication of a successful intraparty coordination deals

169

Samuel K. Darkwa
with linkage decisions among political actors from different districts within the same political
party. This involves the creation of common or joint electoral platform between the presidential
and legislative candidates of a given party. This may include the use of marketing strategies such
as billboards and sponsoring joint adverts meant to make electoral impact. The presence of these
in a party points to intraparty coordination success. Where there are intraparty coordination
successes all things being equal, there will be straight-ticket voting, so we do not expect splitting.
Table 5.3: Observable Indicators of Intraparty Coordination Success and Failure
Intraparty Coordination Success
Intraparty Coordination Failure
Limiting nomination
Over nomination
Running fewer candidates
Contentious primaries (independent contestants)
Ability to prevent independents
Existence of splinter groups
Creation of a joint platform
No policy linkage between candidates
Sources: Authors’ own compilation from Benoit (2001), Cox (1999), and Golder (2006)
Contrary to the above are the indications of intraparty coordination failures as shown at the
right quadrant of Table 5.3 above. The first signal of intraparty coordination failure is over
nomination which happens where there exist factions, especially competitive and degenerative
types (Boucek 2009, 479). Cox (1999) observed that Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) often
had over nomination due to the existence of factions. In Ghana, the tendency of having about five
independent parties from the Nkrumahist tradition contesting the election is a perfect example of
intraparty coordination failure since their main ideological difference is a show of who is a true
Nkrumahist (Jonah 1998, Osei 2012).
The second sign of unsuccessful intraparty coordination is undemocratic ways of
conducting party’s nomination process. Third, emanating from this is the inability of party elites
to persuade disappointed nomination seekers from contesting the election as independent
candidates. Normally, internal party competition is required for the bigger contest – the national
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or constituency contests (Crutzen et al.2009; Cox 1999) but when it leads to degenerative type
referred to as race to the bottom (Boucek 2009; Crutzen et al.2009; Volden 2002), then mobilizing
support for the bigger elections is bound to suffer. The fourth sign of intraparty coordination failure
flows directly from the third, and it is the existence of splinter groups and defections from the party
either to join another party or to create a new one. Analogous to this is fighting for supremacy
among leading members of the party. The fifth failure is where there is a disconnect between the
presidential and legislative candidates of a given party. Thus, the existence of parallel structures
within a political party that produce duplication of campaigning of candidates, or the existence of
animosity between the presidential and legislative candidates, are indications of intraparty
coordination failures. Intraparty coordination failures are likely to produce ticket splitting, all
things being equal. Based on these observations, I expect the following hypotheses as markers of
intraparty coordination failures.
Where a party’s nomination process is democratic, all things being equal, I expect both
losers and winners to be gracious to each other and see the result as a victory to democracy and to
the party. This is expected to unite the party towards the general elections and therefore, likely to
reduce splitting. However, where a party’s nomination process is tinted with accusations and
counter accusations because the process is undemocratic, or someone chose to make it so, then I
expect the aggrieved contestants to express their displeasure. If their concerns are not satisfactorily
resolved, then ticket splitting is highly probable. These observations lead to the first hypothesis:
H1A: the more successful a party’s nomination process is, the lower the likelihood of ticket
splitting especially from party supporters.
Thus, higher incidence of successful party primaries is likely to be associated with lower levels of
ticket splitting and vice versa. Consequently, all things being equal, I expect successful primaries
and ticket splitting to be negatively related. When the party primaries become contentious, but
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party elites are able to resolve the issues, all things being equal, I expect the aggrieved nomination
seekers to remain in the party and at best offer their support to the success of the party. However,
where party elites are not able to resolve the concerns of aggrieved persons, such persons are more
likely to threaten to leave the party or actually leave the party. Where aggrieved persons threaten
to leave the party, all things being equal, it will affect party cohesion and if not properly handled,
it is likely to produce ticket splitting. Thus,
H1B: the more unsuccessful party nomination seekers threaten to leave the party, the higher the
chances of split-ticket voting.
Where aggrieved primary candidates’ threats to leave the party are likely to induce ticket splitting
if not handled well. The outcome may also depend on whether the threat to leave the party is
credible or not. The status of such persons in the party will also affect how party elites respond to
such threats. Hence, unresolved credible threats to leave the party which are not handled well are
likely to produce splitting with the direction being positive while those that are handled well are
expected to be negative all things being equal. Suffice it to say here that a threat to leave the party
could be considered credible, if the person has the capacity to leave and draw others along or where
the person actually leaves to contest as independent.
In fact, unresolved in-party conflicts from acrimonious parliamentary primaries are likely
to produce skirt and blouse voting, especially where the aggrieved person(s) leave to contest as
independent. Thus, where the party becomes fragmented because some aggrieved members are
defecting to contest the elections as independent candidates, all things being equal, there will be
high likelihood of ticket splitting. This leads to:
H1C: ticket splitting is likely to increase where unsuccessful nomination seekers in a party contest
the elections as independent candidates.
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This often happens where in a particular constituency the aggrieved unsuccessful primary
seekers decide to contest the parliamentary race as independent candidates. In such instances,
persons who defect or contest the election as independents will advocate for ticket splitting and
will like the party’s candidate to lose even if that will mean another party’s candidate winning the
elections. Thus, the direction and the magnitude of a party member contesting the parliamentary
election as independent candidate will be positively related to ticket splitting.
Finally, where there exist proper party linkages such that there is cordial rapport between
the presidential and parliamentary candidates’ campaign at the constituency level, especially
where they rely on the party structures, ticket splitting is likely to be low. However, in instances
where the presidential and parliamentary candidates’ campaigns are disconnected, or they abandon
the party structures in their campaigns, I expect to see more split-ticket voting. Hence,
H1D: the more harmonious the interaction between a presidential and legislative candidate of a
party is, the lower the likelihood of ticket splitting.
Thus, where the candidates adopt common pool and conduct their campaigns in a harmonious
manner, split-ticket voting is likely to reduce. I expect negative relationship between split-ticket
voting and harmonious party relations such as the adoption of a joint platform between candidates.
5.3.2 Interparty Coordination
Interparty coordination (pre-electoral coalitions or electoral alliances) is any attempt by
two or more political parties to harmonize their efforts jointly at the polls to maximize their mutual
electoral benefits (Golder 2006). Interparty coordination is easier where two different parties with
similar political ideologies forge electoral alliance (Golder 2006). However, unlike intraparty
coordination that must be forged by political parties with same/similar ideology, interparty
coordination could be forged by parties with different ideologies with the view of eliminating or
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defeating an “undesirable” party. Just like intraparty coordination success, interparty coordination
success is marked by observable signals. Benoit (2001) observed that party elites through their
coordination sent cues to voters who rightly responded to such signals. The first observable signal
of a successful interparty coordination is that the parties involved do not contest the elections
independently. This is done using joint nomination, running of joint lists, or fusing of candidates.
The goal is to present fewer candidates and they do this by way of coordination. Second, related
to the above, is strategic withdrawal of candidates. In some instances, parties that enter alliance
negotiate on which candidates should step back. Benoit (20001) saw this as the strength of the
Hungarian politicians in electoral coalition. Thus, the ability of parties to negotiate on step back
arrangements points to signals of successful interparty coordination.
Third, parties in interparty alliances can negotiate and overcome the commitment problems
faced by coalitions. Golder (2006) observed that due to the repeated interactions among preelectoral partners, the commitment problem in practice is very easy to resolve. In South Korea for
instance, due to term limits, presidential pre-electoral alliances are easy to form. Fourth, partners
in interparty alliances coordinate on their campaigns and ensure that they do run joint campaigns
and coordinate all their marketing strategies. Fifth, the ability of coalition partners to secure the
support of their members is key to successful interparty coordination (Benoit 2001; Cox 1999).
Interparty coordination failures are first characterized by over nomination. Cox (1999)
argues that there will be coordination failure if an ideological bloc enters the electoral fray with all
possible competent candidates contesting. Second, related to the preceding point is what Golder
(2006) refers to as fight for supremacy. She observed that in France, members of the leadership
group in the rightist party were fighting for leadership supremacy instead of fighting to defeat the
leftist party. Third, conflict over policy, ideological differences and distributional problems are
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clear signs of interparty coordination failure. Golder (2006) found that distributional problems
such as indivisibility of office impede pre-electoral coalitions in presidential systems especially in
France. Although parties fail to form alliances due to policy and ideological divergence, Golder
(2006) found that in France following the end of the Cold War, the center-left and center right
parties do no longer have radical ideological differences as such they do not care much who wins.
Thus, center-left parties for instance, run many candidates and do not make compromises such that
in the 2002 presidential elections there were nine candidates representing the Left. The fourth sign
of interparty coordination failure is the inability of coalition parties to secure the support of their
members or support base (Benoit 20001; Golder 2006). Securing the support of coalition partners
is crucial to the success of the coalition and this requires efficient and effective coordination. In
fact, it is not enough to sign documents to enter electoral agreement to ensure the success of
coalitions but rather the support of those whose votes are needed.
Table 5.4: Observable Indicators of Interparty Coordination Success and Failure
Interparty Coordination Success
Interparty Coordination Failure
Joint nomination/campaigns

Fight for supremacy

Strategic withdrawal

Over nomination

Effective negotiations

Conflict over policy/ideology

Ability to secure members’ support

Inability to secure members’ support

Sources: Authors’ own compilation from Benoit (2001), Cox (1997, 1999), and Golder (2006)
Flowing from the above discussions on interparty coordination, the chapter tests two
hypotheses to falsify the credibility and reliability of the interparty coordination among coalition
partners as far as Ghana is concerned. First, I expect that coalition partners will do their best to
limit nomination by whatever best means they can which are anchored on transparent and
democratic principles to ensure they put their best foot forward. That is, they coordinate on the
most viable candidate(s) that can secure them the needed electoral victory or lead them in making
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electoral impact for future victory. Where the parties are able to coordinate on a single or required
number of candidates, they need to endorse the coalition candidates and secure the support of their
members. Thus, for a successful interparty coordination, party elites in alliance are expected to
endorse coalition partners even those from another party who have been accepted as coalition
candidates. Hence
H2A: the more party elites endorse candidates of other parties, the higher the likelihood of ticket
splitting.
Thus, ticket splitting is expected to increase in such circumstances where parties do not necessarily
contest the election as a coalition but agree to support other parties in areas and in races they do
not contest. The direction of endorsement splitting is expected to be positive all things being equal.
That is, the more party elites endorse other party’s candidates, the higher the likelihood of splitting.
Emanating from the preceding paragraph is the issue of strategic withdrawal of candidates
to facilitate the performance of another candidate or party’s performance. As stated earlier, Cox
(1999) argues that electoral coordination is necessary because there are more potential contestants
than the available number of seats. Parties that do well are those that are able to coordinate on the
most viable candidates. To be efficient in that requires some form of modality of agreeing on a
viable or suitable candidate as discussed above. However, in the event that parties had already
agreed on their candidates before the coalition or electoral arrangement, there will be the need for
some parties to withdraw their candidates in certain constituencies or voting districts where their
chances of winning are comparatively weak for those with better chances of winning to have even
more promising chances. In fact, Benoit (2001) observed that in Hungary coordination also took
the form of strategic withdrawal of candidates known as “stepping back” ostensibly to facilitate
the chances of the contesting candidate. Consequently, the more such arrangements are done, the
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higher the likelihood of split-ticket voting given that party elites are able to secure the backing of
their supporters. Therefore,
H2B: the more the widespread of strategic withdrawal of candidates, the higher the likelihood of
ticket splitting.
Thus, I expect strategic withdrawal and ticket splitting to be positively related; that is the higher
the instances of strategic withdrawal, the higher the likelihood of split-ticket voting and vice versa.
5.4 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Aside from the theory of strategic coordination and the accompanying hypotheses
introduced above that evaluate my main argument about coordination induced ticket splitting, the
chapter considers several alternate explanations used in the literature as they pertain to split-ticket
voting. These include candidate quality, partisanship, restricted menu of choice, and education to
ensure that alternative explanation to ticket splitting is not overlooked. Among these alternative
explanatory variables, I expect candidate quality to be more connected to coordination because the
essence of coordination is to settle on the most viable candidate or harmonizing a party’s material
and human resources to make the most of the current or future election.
5.4.1 Candidate Quality
The literature on candidate-level factors of ticket splitting has identified variables such as
incumbency, campaign spending, and issue positioning as responsible for the phenomenon. In the
United States, incumbents are said to often face unmatched contestants (Box-Steffensmeier 1996).
As a result, party supporters whose preferred Congressional candidate is weak will vote for their
presidential candidate and either roll-off or vote for a more experienced candidate who is often the
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incumbent (Born 1994; Burden and Kimball 2009). This is the case because incumbency is
frequently associated with candidate quality (Benoit et al. 2006; Burden 2009; Scheiner, 2005).
Conversely, it has also been found that incumbency can also be a liability instead of being
an asset (Burden 2009; Roscoe 2003; Scheiner 2005). Incumbents at times lose their party’s
primaries to in-party challengers and others lose the main contest to “unpopular” competitors. It
has also been argued that the main cause of ticket splitting is campaign spending (Burden and
Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003). Thus, in the U.S. for instance, a candidate who is able to spend
beyond $200,000 has a greater chance of getting the attention of the electorate and therefore can
cause ticket splitting (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003). It is also a common
knowledge that some candidates often spend less than some incumbents and yet they win
(Frempong 2017; Roscoe 2003). Given that incumbents do not always win, and high spending
candidates lose to less spending competitors suggests that candidate quality works best with
coordination.
The final candidate-level variable identified to be responsible for ticket splitting is issue
positions. Proponents of issue positions argue that candidates can create ticket splitting by moving
closer to their opponent’s issue position or moving away from their party’s position (Frymer 1994;
Petrocik 1991; Petrocik and Doherty 1996). The line of this argument is elucidated by Key (1966)
who argues that when there is a clear difference between the parties or candidates contesting the
elections, voters can make distinct choices but where the contestants look alike on ideological
grounds and issue positions, voters do not have unique choice, therefore, they will split their votes.
Burden and Kimball (2009) found strong statistical association between candidate’s issue position
and ticket splitting. In a nutshell, the fundamental argument of proponents of candidate quality to
ticket splitting is that, variations of candidate quality among contesting parties and or candidates
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can cause ticket splitting. This is where high-quality candidates in the different races are not from
the same political party. Therefore, I expect higher variations in candidate quality among
contesting parties to be associated with ticket splitting, all things being equal. Consequently,
H3: where the most qualified (visible) candidates in the different races belong to different parties,
the greater the likelihood of ticket-splitting
It worth pointing out however that, a party’s ability to attract and field the most viable
candidate boils down to the issue of coordination because where coordination fails, a party may
fail to nominate the most qualified candidate or can have the most qualified candidate, but most
splitters will likely split away from that candidate. However, with effective coordination, candidate
quality is expected to be associated with positive splitting towards the most qualified candidate.
5.4.2 Partisanship
It has been found that, partisanship intensity is inversely related to split-ticket voting (Beck
et al. 1992; Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell and Miller 1957). The argument made in support of
partisanship and splitting is that persons who identify with parties will vote for their political
parties irrespective of the candidate quality of their parties. These are often the core support base
of a party. In contrast, Maddox and Nimmo (1981) found that all partisans split their ballots
however, weak partisan do split more than other partisans. Thus, the position of Maddox and
Nimmo (1981) gives clues that there are certain instances that even strong partisans may split their
ticket. This chapter believes that one such context is where coordination problems faced by
candidates and parties are not well handled. However, the conventional wisdom is that, weaker
partisans are more likely to split their tickets. Consequently, I expect weak partisanship to be
positively correlated with ticket splitting, all things being equal. Thus,
H4: the weaker the partisan leaning of the electorates (in this case, party elites/card bearing
members), the higher the chances of ticket splitting.
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It must be stressed however, that voter level factors for ticket splitting are different from
elite level factors since normally elites will support and vote for all their candidates but will split
their tickets when coordination breaks down.
5.4.3 Restricted Choice
Candidate availability has been identified as one of the candidate level factors of ticket
splitting. It has been argued that two voters with diametrically opposing characteristics may have
different choices. However, if for instance, no Republican (NPP or NDC in the case of Ghana) is
running they cannot be able to vote for or against a Republican (NPP or NDC) candidate (Roscoe
2002). Benoit, Giannetti, and Laver (2006) refer to this situation as restricted choice menu. In their
study of ticket-splitting in the Italian mixed member system, Benoit, Giannetti and Laver (2006)
observed that though in mixed-member electoral systems voters are required to cast ballots
simultaneously in single-member districts and multimember PR districts, yet because some parties
do not have candidates in both constituencies, their supporters have to vote for different parties.
They describe these voters as frustrated because they are forced to split their votes between their
most preferred parties and others. This similar situation confronts the members and supporters of
the smaller parties in Ghana who do not have candidates contesting all races in all constituencies.
In my field work in Ghana where I surveyed party officials and members, about 26% out of 303
respondents cited the inability of their parties to have candidates in all constituencies as the
motivation for voting skirt and blouse. If party officials who are supposed to think and act in party
terms give such reasons as their motivation for voting skirt and blouse, then the electorates would
not act differently when it comes to the effect of restricted choice menu on split ticket voting. Thus,
H5: as the proportion of constituency nominations covered by political parties decreases, the
higher the likelihood of ticket-splitting.
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I expect a positive relationship between restricted choice and split-ticket voting, especially
from the core supporters of smaller parties in instances where their parties contest in just one race
in a concurrent presidential-legislative race.
5.4.4 Education
As discussed above, research has found correlation between education and ticket splitting
(Beck et al., 1992; Dalton 2013; DeVries and Tarrance 1972). Some scholars have found positive
association between education and ticket splitting; meaning higher educated voters are more likely
to split their ticket than their lesser educated counterparts (De Vries & Tarrance 1972). On the
contrary, Campbell and Miller (1957) assert that lower level of education is associated with ticket
splitting. As latter scholars have confirmed the positive relationship between higher levels of
education and ticket splitting (Beck 1997; Beck et al., 1992; Dalton 2013), the chapter will expect
positive correlation between education and ticket splitting. Therefore,
H6: the higher the level of education of the electorate, the higher the likelihood of ticket splitting.
Thus, the higher educated the respondent/voter is, the higher the likelihood of ticket
splitting and vice versa. It worth stressing that often, where individual level factors are inferred
from aggregate data it has a potential for ecological inference problems (Burden 2009; Burden and
Kimball 2009; King 2013; King et al 2004; Roscoe 2003). However, such problems are not
expected here because the data employed here is elite-level data used for elite-level analysis, thus,
the chapter is not disaggregating elite voter behavior into individual voter behavior.
To sum up, based on the strategic coordination theory and the literature related to splitticket voting reviewed above, I expect the following: contentious primaries are most likely to be
positively related to ticket splitting while successful primaries will be negatively associated to
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splitting. Instances where disappointed nomination seekers do threaten to leave the party or contest
the election as independent candidates are likely to lead to ticket splitting. Therefore, situations
where aggrieved members leave the party to contest as independents are likely to trigger ticket
splitting. I also expect strategic withdrawals and endorsements to be positively related to splitting,
especially in instances where parties and candidates who do the endorsement or the strategic
withdrawal do not contest the election on the same party label/ticket but do so to facilitate the
performance of one another. Additionally, weak partisanship and higher level of education are
expected to be positively related to splitting. On the contrary, where there is harmony between the
presidential and parliamentary candidates, I expect a negative relationship with ticket splitting.
5.5 DATA AND MEASUREMENT
The data for this chapter was based on fieldwork carried out in Ghana in 2017. The
fieldwork sampled seven constituencies. In selecting the cases, the chapter considered how
electoral scholars and analysts have divided the country based on the parties’ strengths and the
volatility of voter behavior in Ghana. The Ghanaian political terrain is dominated by the NPP and
the NDC whose electoral performance together account for over 90% of the votes since 1992
(Agyeman-Duah 2005, Frempong 2012, 2017, Lindberg 2013 Osei 2012). In the 2016 elections,
for instance, there were six political parties and one independent candidate contesting the
presidential slot. The outcome indicated that the NPP and NDC polled 98.3% against 1.7% for the
rest of the contestants. Also, the 275 parliamentary seats were all won by the two major political
parties (EC Ghana 2016; Frempong 2017).
Administratively, Ghana is divided into ten regions (six new regions were created in 2019
bringing the total number regions in the country to sixteen). These regions are further classified
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into Southern Ghana, Northern Ghana and the Middle Belt. Since the two major parties dominate
the electoral landscape, electoral students and analysts have divided the ten administrative regions
into how they relate to the two major parties. Four regions, Brong Ahafo, Central, Greater Accra,
and the Western region are referred to as swing regions (Agyeman-Duah 2005; Frempong 2012,
2017, Lindberg 2013). The Ashanti in the middle belt and Eastern Region are the stronghold of
the NPP while the three Northern Regions (Northern, Upper East and Upper West) as well as Volta
Region are the stronghold of the NDC (Agyeman-Duah 2005; Frempong 2012, 2017).
With this background, to avoid the problem of selecting on the dependent variable, the
selection of cases was based on the following criteria: 1) Constituencies that have and those that
have not witnessed skirt and blouse outcomes; 2) Constituencies that experienced interparty
electoral alliances; 3) Constituencies that are cosmopolitan; 4) Swing constituencies10; 5) Party
strongholds; 6) Large population size (having more than 60,000 registered voters6); and 7)
Constituencies won by a formerly party affiliated candidate who protested by going independent.
These criteria were used to ensure that consideration is given to swing regions, party strongholds,
north-south-middle belt concerns, as well as demographic and other peculiarities. Thus, the seven
selected constituencies were identified based on how they fit into the criteria above. Listed in
alphabetical order, they are Ablekuma South, Bantama, Ellembelle, Evalue Ajomoro Gwira, Ketu
South, Klottey Korle7, and Wulensi. Out of the seven constituencies selected, four were from the
Greater Accra and the Western Regions (that is two constituencies were selected from each of
these two regions). In each case, the two constituencies selected from the Greater Accra and the
Western Regions were contiguous. The selection was deliberately done to facilitate data collection
and to save cost given that the selected constituencies satisfy all the criteria listed above.
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Alphabetically, the first constituency, Ablekuma South is in the Greater Accra Region (one
of the swing regions). This constituency fits the criteria in many ways: first, it is a swing
constituency, urban and cosmopolitan, and has large population density as shown by Table 5.5
below. Again, as shown by Table 5.6 below, in 1996 and 2008 the constituency witnessed skirt
and blouse outcomes. In the 1996 general elections, the NDC won the presidential vote while the
NPP won the parliamentary seat. Again, in 2008, the constituency witnessed skirt and blouse
outcomes, but the two parties switched places in the sense that the NPP won the presidential race
while the NDC took the parliamentary seat. The second constituency is Bantama in the Ashanti
Region which is the stronghold of the NPP. Bantama is significant for its population density,
unique voting pattern (voting about 80% straight-ticket), and ethnic dominance. It has never
experienced a skirt and blouse outcome. Also, in the 2016 general elections, the incumbent
parliamentary candidate of the NPP who had lost the party’s primary filed to contest as
independent candidate, but the party was able to dissuade him, and he withdrew from contesting
as independent candidate. The third constituency is Ellembelle in the Western Region which has
experienced three skirt and blouse outcomes (1996, 2000, and 2004). It is a constituency where
the NPP never contested the parliamentary elections between 1996 and 2008 but supported the
Table 5.5: Cases (constituencies) and their Fitness to the Selection Criteria

Constituency
Ablekuma
South
Bantama
Ellembelle
Evalue A.
Gwira
Ketu South
Klottey Korle
Wulensi
Others

Skirt &
blouse
outcome

Experienced
Interparty
alliance

Cosmopolitan

Swing
constituency

Party
stronghold

Won by
Independent
Protester

No

Huge
population
size
+60,000
votes
Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
Yes

No
No
No

No
Yes
No

No

37

No
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
No

No
No
No

51
39
39

No
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
No

No
No
Yes

46
38
46
7
303
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CPP candidate to win the election for the three consecutive times. Interestingly, the CPP member
for Ellembelle, Mr. Freddie Blay has left his party to join the NPP and is now the National
Chairman of the NPP. Thus, Ellembelle constituency satisfies four out of the seven criteria as
illustrated by Table 5.5 above.
The fourth constituency is Evalue Ajomoro Gwira also from the Western Region that
adjoins the Ellembelle constituency. This constituency has witnessed a total of four skirt and
blouse outcomes out of the six elections considered under this project. In general, Evalue Ajomoro
Gwira has witnessed the highest number of skirt and blouse outcomes between 1996 and 2016. It
fits the selection criteria in many ways. Though, with a smaller population size, the constituency
has produced skirt and blouse outcomes between the two major parties (NPP-NDC) and has also
produced a CPP/PCP (a smaller party) member of parliament through alliance with the NPP. The
fifth constituency, Ketu South in the Volta Region, is a stronghold of the NDC often referred to as
the NDC “world bank” (Agyeman-Duah 2005; Ayee 2014; Frempong 2012, 2017). Like Bantama,
Ketu South is significant for its huge population density, unique voting pattern (voting about 90%
for the NDC) and ethnic dominance. It has also never observed a skirt and blouse outcome. Albert
Kwasi Zigah who was the NDC legislator for two terms between 2005 and 2012 lost his third term
bid and contested the 2012 and 2016 elections as independent but lost in both attempts. Aside from
Albert Kwasi Zigah, another NDC member and parliamentary aspirant, Mr. Jim Yao Morti, who
was disqualified in the party’s legislative primary in the constituency contested the election as
independent in the 2016 election. Thus, two members of the NDC who were not nominated by the
party ran as independents against NDC nominee in the 2016 election, but they both lost to the
party’s nominee. This shows how strong the party is at the constituency. The sixth constituency is
Klottey Korle Constituency in the Greater Accra Region. This constituency has witnessed only
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one skirt and blouse outcome which occurred in the 2016 elections due to a protest from an NPP
candidate who lost the party’s primaries and decided to go independent. Per Table 5.5 above, the
Klottey Korle Constituency satisfies four out of the seven criteria; it is a swing constituency
(alternating between NPP and NDC. Also, the winner of this constituency wins the presidential
slot), and a cosmopolitan with large population density.
Finally, Wulensi, the seventh constituency in the Northern Region is a swing constituency
that has also witnessed three split outcomes (1996, 2004, and 2008). This constituency has voted
for the ruling government, the opposition and independent candidates to get to parliament. It has
also produced outcomes where the winning presidential candidates were from different parties at
different times. Finally, it also marked an instance where a candidate who could not get the party’s
nomination in 2008 went independent and won the parliamentary seat.
Table 5.6: Selected Constituencies: Winning Candidates and Parties between 1996 and 2016
2016
Pres Parl

2012
Pres Parl

2008
Pres Parl

2004
Pres Parl

2000
Pres Parl

1996
Pres Parl

Constituencies

Region

Ablekuma
South

Greater
Accra

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NPP

NDC

NPP

NPP

NPP

NPP

NDC

NPP

2

Bantama

Ashanti

NPP

NPP

NPP

NPP

NPP

NPP

NPP

NPP

NPP

NPP

NPP

NPP

0

Ellembelle

Western

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NPP

CPP

NPP

CPP

NDC

CPP

3

Evalue A.
Gwira

Western

NDC

NPP

NDC

NDC

NPP

NPP

NPP

CPP

NPP

NDC

NPP

CPP

4

Ketu South

Volta

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

0

Klottey Korle

Greater
Accra

NPP

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NDC

NPP

NPP

NPP

NPP

NDC

NDC

1

Northern

NPP

NPP

NDC

NDC

NPP

IND

NDC

NPP

NDC

NDC

NDC

NPP

3

Wulensi

Freq

Source: Author’s compilation from Electoral Commission 1996-2016 (Skirt & blouse outcomes
colored; green represents two different parties while yellow represents a party and independent)
In respect of administering the surveys, I did part of the field work by myself and others
were done by trained persons (professionals) whom I briefed on the goals of the research as well
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as the sampling frame. The research targeted the following: party chairs (either national, regional,
district, or zonal), secretaries, women’s organizers, youth leadership, campaign coordinators,
treasurers, directors of elections, grassroots/cadres, research team members, results analysts,
polling agents, and communication team members. Also sampled were eight MPs whose
constituencies experienced split outcomes or were threatened with skirt and blouse voting. Further,
15 candidates defeated in their parties’ primaries (of whom eight did not defect, one defector who
was later dissuaded by his party to come back and six who contested the election as independent
candidates) were interviewed. Also interviewed were five leaders of civil society organizations,
one Deputy Chairman (Operations) of the National Commission for Civic Education, three faculty
members at the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana8 and nine media
practitioners. In all, 303 respondents were surveyed through administered questionnaires (230
participants) and face-to-face interviews (73 participants) in March 2017. This was done to ensure
that respondents fit the research questions. Details of the survey respondents and all the survey
questions are in Chapter 3 Appendix 3.1. The coding of the variables is in Appendix 5.1,
5.5.1 Dependent variable
What this research sought to address is why a party elite or a card bearing member of a
political party will vote skirt and blouse (split ticket). To establish this, respondents were asked in
the survey question 26, “Have you ever voted skirt and blouse (that is to vote for presidential and
parliamentary candidates in the same election from different political parties) before?” Thus, the
dependent variable is skirt and blouse voting which is a dichotomous variable (a respondent voted
skirt and blouse or not). I generated the dependent variable by coding respondents who answered
“Yes” as “1” and “No” responses were coded as “0”.
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5.5.2 Independent Variables
The focus of this chapter is to empirically ascertain why Ghanaian party elites and party
card bearing members will vote skirt and blouse or advocate for skirt and blouse voting (splitticket voting) a phenomenon which is uncommon in political science discourse/literature. This
seems to show that Ghanaian voters behave in a manner inconsistent with ticket splitters in other
parts of the world. I estimated logit model and discuss my coding rules below with summary
provided at Appendix 5.1 below.
Successful Primaries: I compute successful primaries using Q5, “Please select the
statement that most closely matches your view. In general, the recent parliamentary primaries of
your political party were successful. “Strongly agree” and “moderately agree” were coded as “1”
“Strongly disagree” and “moderately disagree” coded as “0”. “Neutral/don’t know” responses
were treated as missing. I expect successful primaries to be negatively related to splitting.
Threaten to Leave Party: I measured the variable “Threaten to Leave Party” using Q6, “Did
any defeated candidate of your party threaten to leave the political party?” “Yes” were coded as
“1”, “No” coded as “0” and “don’t know” treated as missing. There were no “neutral” responses.
Go Independent: I generated the variable, “Go Independent” using Q9, “Did some losing
parliamentary contestants go independent?” Respondents who answered “Yes” were coded as “1”,
“No” coded as “0” and “Don't Know” treated as missing. There were no “neutral” responses.
Common Pool: The variable “Common Pool” was measured using Q17, “Leading to the
elections did your party maintain a common pool of resources for both presidential and
parliamentary campaigns?” Those who selected “Yes” were coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0”.
There were no “don’t know/neutral” responses.
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Endorsement: The variable “Endorsement” was generated using Q21, “Did your party
endorse another candidate for either the presidential or parliamentary slot?” Respondents who
answered “Yes” were coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0” and “Don’t Know” treated as missing.
There were no “neutral” responses.
Candidate Quality: The variable “Candidate Quality” was generated using Q27 in respect
of reasons given by respondents’ decision for voting skirt and blouse. Respondents who chose
candidate quality (which was the most popular response) were coded as “1” otherwise, coded as
“0”. There were no “don’t know/neutral” responses.
5.5.3 Control Variables
Restricted Choice: I control for “Restricted Choice” using Q24 “Did your party contest in
both presidential and parliamentary seats in all constituencies?” Respondents who selected “Yes”
were coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0” and “Don't Know” treated as missing. There were no
“neutral” responses.
Party ID: The control variable, “Party Identification” variable (Party ID) was generated
using Q3 “If you answered Yes, on Question 2, which political party is that?” Respondent’s party
affiliation was coded as per their responses; CPP 41, NDC 87, NPP 86, PNC 38, and PPP 44.
Education: I generated the education variable using the educational qualifications of
respondents. In both models, education is on a seven rater-scale from “0” to “6” ranging from
“Some Primary Schooling” to “University completed and beyond”. Respondents who selected “I
don’t know” were treated as missing.
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5.6 MODELING INTRAPARTY/INTERPARTY COORDINATION THEORY
To understand the behavior of Ghanaian politicians and party elites in respect of their role
in the facilitation of skirt and blouse voting, two factors need to be taken in to account. The first is
the instances where the parties’ nomination process is characterized by irregularities, especially,
within the two dominant ones, NDC and NPP. The political parties in Ghana have ensured that as
much as possible, they promote free, fair, and transparent internal competition. Against this
backdrop, the NDC and the NPP have allowed the nations’ Electoral Commission (EC) to
supervise the elections of officials and candidates of their parties at all levels (Daddieh and BobMilliar 2012; Debrah 2014). Additionally, the parties have done their best to come out with single
winners to contest the election on their respective party’s ticket. They have also ensured that there
is proper linkage between the presidential and the parliamentary candidates by resorting to the use
of the party structures to conduct their campaigns (Debrah 2014; Osei 2012). The NDC and the
NPP have always ensured that as much as possible, they prevent disappointed nomination seekers
from contesting the elections as independent candidates even after acrimonious party primaries
(Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2012; Osei 2012). In most cases, these acts of intraparty coordination
successes often ensure that the party wins both seats in a constituency. This notwithstanding, the
parties have experienced serious setbacks in their intraparty coordination which is characterized
by defections and inability of party elites to persuade some disappointed nomination seekers from
entering the elections as independent candidates (Boafo-Arthur 2006, 2008; Daddieh and BobMilliar 2012; Debrah 2014; Frempong 2017; Osei 2012). Good examples of how disappointed
nomination seekers going independent can cause split-ticket voting and consequently split
outcome is the 2000 elections. In the 2000 general elections, there were four independent winners
all of which unseated incumbent MPs who were seeking third term in the NDC. Each of the

190

Samuel K. Darkwa
independent winners (Boniface Abubakar Saddique of Salaga constituency, Joseph Akudibillah of
Garu -Tempane constituency, Rashid Bawa of Akan constituency, and James Victor Gbeho of
Anlo, constituency) contested the election as independent candidates after unsuccessful primaries
(Ayee 2002; Frempong 2017). Aside from the four independent winners, other candidates who
went independent indeed caused the defeat of the NDC in six constituencies (Abetifi, Akropong,
Akwatia, Ashaiman, Asutifi North, and Techiman South) (Ayee 2002; Frempong 2017).
The second factor is what I will refer to as the acts of “revisionist politicians” who will like
to alter the political status quo in their parties by rocking the political boat or stirring controversy
within the party or take advantage of a controversy and amidst the controversy leave the party to
contest as independents (Ichino and Nathan 2013, 2017). The revisionist politicians are those who
harbor presidential and parliamentary ambitions but know that if they were to play by the rules as
prescribed by the status quo, they may not achieve their goals and therefore, must adopt
unconventional strategies. Unlike a president who has a two-term limit, there is no term limit for
a parliamentary candidate. So, an in-party competitor who wants to get to parliament but has a
senior colleague in the same constituency who has been in parliament for more than two terms will
begin to work against that member of parliament by either disputing the parliamentary primaries
(Ichino and Nathan 2013, 2017) as undemocratic or advocate for skirt and blouse voting. The
reason is that if the MP from his party loses, it will create an opportunity for him to achieve his
goal (field interview March 2017)9. Again, those who harbor presidential ambitions also often use
the party’s structures to sabotage their presidential candidate (field interview March 2017). Though
the president has a two-term limit, apart from former Presidents Rawlings and Mahama, all the
other Presidents in Ghana’s Fourth Republic made three attempts before winning. When they win
they can seek reelection giving an individual about 20 years (three attempts at the presidency plus
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two possible terms making five multiplied by four years), in such cases, in-party competitors who
cannot wait will advocate skirt and blouse voting and at times openly campaign against their party
members which their out-party opponents will use against them (their party).
Between 1992 and 2008, it was not very likely for Ghanaian political parties to win the
elections by counting on their individual strengths. For instance, in the 1992 elections, the NDC
and other two political parties formed an alliance and made Mr. Rawlings, the NDC candidate
their presidential candidate. Mr. K.N. Arkaah of NCP, a junior partner, was made the running mate
while the alliance supported the parliamentary candidates of the other parties. In 1996, again, the
NDC and two other parties formed the Progressive Alliance and helped the parliamentary slots of
its junior partners. The NPP and PCP also formed the Great Alliance and made the PCP candidate
its running mate and deferred some of the parliamentary seats for its alliance partner. In all
instances, the junior parties deferred their presidential race to their senior partners, got the running
mate and had their senior partners defer some of the parliamentary contests to them. Thus, the
relationship between and among Ghanaian parties in alliance is such that the junior parties defer
the presidential race to their senior partners and endorse their senior partners’ presidential
candidates and in return, their senior partners defer some of the parliamentary races, endorse and
support their junior partners. Therefore, the interparty relations between and among Ghanaian
parties in alliance is shaped to produce certain type of voting behavior among their supporters. It
worth pointing out, however, that not all the party supporters were in favor of the kind of
arrangements that their parties entered into with their alliance partners (Frempong 2017) because
such arrangements required strategic withdrawals that denied their members the opportunity to
contest in certain constituencies. Such persons in opposition to their party’s arrangement with
another at times call on their supporters to boycott the elections or vote against their parties.
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Therefore, understanding the nuances and intricacies of Ghanaian ticket splitting requires
unraveling the contextual peculiarities and hurdles that the Ghanaian political elites and candidates
faced within their parties and in negotiating with other parties for electoral purposes. Internally,
the politician is faced with an in-party competitor whose presidential career requires a prospective
presidential candidate a wait time of about twenty years while a parliamentary hopeful must wait
in “perpetuity.” The best possible means to overcome such hurdles is for the prospective candidate
to adopt a revisionist approach by disputing the nomination process or calling on his supporters to
vote skirt and blouse. When it comes to relations between and among parties in alliance, some
candidates will have to withdraw and endorse their candidature of their alliance partners. In such
instances some people must abandon their political dreams of winning elections at least for a
period. In all these instances, aggrieved members who are unable to control their emotions or do
not receive an assurance as an appropriate payoff for what they will have to forgo, will trigger
certain indications of intraparty and interparty coordination failures which are likely to facilitate
ticket splitting and eventual defeat of their in-party competitors. The intuition behind voter choice
of party elites and aggrieved members under the strategic coordination theory operates on the
assumption that they (the aggrieved members) will themselves vote against their parties and
persuade their supporters to vote against at least one office of their party in a given constituency if
the party fails to negotiate acceptable payoff. This payoff is often a promise of position in the new
government if the party wins power.
5.6.1 Results
The chapter used the fieldwork datasets to run logit regression to examine the relationship
between skirt and blouse voting and elite coordination. To confirm that the results are not
compromised by missing data, multiple imputation techniques were employed to deal with missing
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data (StataCorp 2017). It appears most of the coefficients were not that significant as per Table 5.7
below. The results however, provide some empirical evidence in support of the strategic
coordination induced ticket splitting especially in respect to conducting a successful primaries and
elite endorsement. For instance, interparty coordination variable endorsement, (H2A) was
significant and in the expected direction. The other interparty coordination variable, strategic
withdrawal (H2B), however, was not significant. Among the intraparty coordination variables,
successful primaries (H1A) and candidate quality (H3) were significant with the signs in the
expected direction. Interestingly, the other intraparty coordination variables; threaten to leave party
(H1B) and common pool (H1D) were not significant. Interestingly, the control variables party ID,
restricted, and education were not that significant as per Model 1 in Table 5.7 below.
To ensure that missing data were not responsible for the results, multiple imputation
techniques were employed to replace missing data, and the same binary logit regression used
initially for Model 1 was used to run Model 2. The missing data per the coding above and in
Appendix 5.1 below are made up of respondents who did not answer the questions used for the
variables, as well as neutral, and “don’t know” responses. The regression results from multiple
imputation techniques displayed in Model 2 are essentially not different from those from Model 1
shown side by side in Table 5.7. In fact, endorsement (H2A) was equally significant as before and
the sign in the expected direction. Successful primaries (H1A) too maintained its level of
significance and in the expected direction. Candidate quality (H3) was also significant in both
models. Interestingly party ID (H4) became the only significant control variable in the model after
missing values were replaced through multiple imputation techniques. Finally, the McFadden’s R2
of 0.608 computed from the model using fistat, lies above the conservative 0.2 and 0.4 range of
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McFadden’s R2, it can be said with certainty that the model does well (McFadden 1974, 1977).
That is, about 61 percent of the variance is explained by the model.
Table 5.7: Logit Analysis of ‘Ticket-Splitting’ using Survey Data
With Missing Data
VARIABLES
(Model 1)
Successful Primaries (H1A)
-1.1983**
(0.5447)
Threaten to Leave Party (H1B)
0.5336
(0.5767)
Go Independent (H1C)
-0.3447
(0.5696)
Common Pool (H1D)
0.0699
(0.5884)
Endorsement (H2A)
1.9797***
(0.6796)
Strategic Withdrawal (H2B)
0.4999
(0.6910)
Restricted Choice (H5)
0.1105
(0.5628)
Party ID (H4)
0.2902
(0.2038)
Candidate Quality (H3)
-4.3758***
(0.5769)
Education (H6)
-0.1561
(0.1061)
Constant
-2.7129
(1.8338)
Observations
249
2
McFadden’s R
0.608
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

With Imputation
(Model 2)
-1.5818***
(0.3820)
0.0536
(0.4360)
0.0144
(0.4733)
0.3393
(0.4326)
0.1439***
(0.4313)
0.3674
(0.5970)
-0.0127
(0.4430)
0.2587**
(0.3726)
-3.2781***
(0.5769)
-0.1105
(0.0750)
-2.1422**
(1.1217)
303
Note 18

I then computed changes in the probabilities of splitting by changing variables from their
minimum to their maximum values and displayed the results in Table 5.8 below. The results show
that when candidate quality was changed from its minimum to its maximum, the probability of
splitting reduced by (0.446). This shows that ticket splitting can be induced by party elites when
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elite coordination results in situation where the most visible candidates are from different political
parties. That is, the higher the disparities in candidate quality among the contesting parties, the
higher the likelihood of splitting. It also shows that when party elites are able to field high quality
candidates, they can reduce the chances of splitting by (.0446). When the variable endorsement
was changed from its minimum to its maximum, the probability to split increased by (.070)
meaning party elites can influence ticket splitting when they endorse candidates of other parties
which is a common practice among parties that enter into electoral deals. In chapter 4, the variable
was significant in four out of the six years under review. Finally, when the variable, successful
primaries, was changed from its minimum to its maximum value, the probability of splitting
reduced by (.023) meaning parties can reduce the likelihood of splitting when they conduct
successful primaries.
Table 5.8: Effect of Changing Variables from Their Minimum to Maximum Values on
Probability of Ticket Splitting
Variables
Probability
of Splitting
Successful Primaries (H1A)
-0.023
Threaten to Leave Party (H1B)
0.007
Go Independent (H1C)
-0.003
Common Pool (H1D)
0.001
Endorsement (H2A)
0.070
Strategic Withdrawal (H2B)
0.007
Restricted Choice (H5)
0.001
Party ID (H4)
0.013
Candidate Quality (H3)
-0.446
Education (H6)
-0.017
Note: Estimates are derived from Model 1 holding all other variables constant at their medians
5.6.2 Discussion
Per the results from the fitted logit regression above, coordination variables such as
conducting successful primaries, endorsing candidates from another party and fielding candidates
of high quality affect the chances of splitting in many significant ways. These are consistent with
196

Samuel K. Darkwa
the theoretical expectation of the chapter. A couple of the variables, however, differed from
expectations. In fact, research on coordination and voter behavior has found that coordination can
be elite-driven through strategic entry (Arriola & Arriola 2013; Benoit 2001; Cox 1999) or voterdriven through strategic voting (Conroy-Krutz 2013; Cox 1999). Therefore, coordination variables
that were significant, such as conducting successful primaries and endorsement which were elite
driven are not surprising. For instance, as of 1999, Cox had found that the decline in vote share
suffered by Japan LDP’s was the result of its inability to overcome coordination problems
confronted it in the 1960s (Cox 1999). Similarly, Golder (2006) found that the French center-left
parties were having as much as nine candidates contesting the 2002 presidential elections due to
coordination problems. The fate of the Japan LDP and the French center-left parties are not
different from those of the many smaller parties in Ghana that align with the first President of
Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah who are not able to overcome their coordination problems that have
led their parties reduced to a pale shadow of the original CPP which had won all the elections in
Ghana between 1950s up to the mid-1960s. Sure, apart from parties that belong to the CPP who
have been swept with the currents of coordination, in Ghana, the low and high tides of coordination
can be seen when one considers the performance of the three main party traditions in the country
today; the Nkrumahists (represented by the many fragmented parties that trace their origin to
Nkrumah’s principles) Danquah-Busia-Domo tradition (represented by the NPP) and the
Akatamansonia (represented by the NDC) (Amponsah 2006; Apter 1966; Jonah 1998; Osei 2012).
The significance level of the endorsement variable is supported by both published work on
Ghana and my fieldwork. Together, they explain how elite endorsement has influenced skirt and
blouse voting and hence, skirt and blouse outcome in Ghana. In the early 1990s, though Mr.
Rawlings was very popular, the NDC’s alliance with its coalition members helped secure the two
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successive electoral victories for the party and facilitated the winning of several parliamentary
seats of its alliance members. Due to how the alliance was shaped, it led to ticket splitting because
of how the NDC endorsed and supported the parliamentary candidates of its junior partners (in the
same constituency, an NDC member was likely to vote NDC at the presidential race and for its
alliance partner at the parliamentary race). The same was the case with the NPP and its alliance
members. In fact, in the 1996 elections, the NPP and People’s Convention Party (PCP) entered
alliance and the PCP deferred its presidential slot to the NPP, endorsed and supported the NPP
presidential candidate and in return, the NPP deferred some of the parliamentary races to the PCP.
In the end, all the five seats the PCP won were in constituencies that the NPP deferred to, endorsed
and supported the PCP (Agyeman-Duah 2005, Frempong 2017, Osei 2012). The NPP also could
not have gotten the same presidential vote share without the PCP’s support. In these instances, the
results were all skirt and blouse outcome (split outcome) which is a strong indication that there
were significant skirt and blouse voting. Again, in these instances, party elites and candidates
openly encouraged skirt and blouse voting.
In fact, elites do it overtly and covertly but if you ask them, they will rather tell you their
expected outcome of the election. It means that the focus is not on the means (skirt and blouse),
but on the end (expected electoral outcome) and therefore, “the end justifies the means”. One of
my respondents said this about their alliance with the NPP,
“The Great Alliance (GA) was formed as an alliance between the NPP and the CPP/PCP
to defeat the NDC. We had to forfeit our presidential race by making our flagbearer the
running mate of the GA and endorse the NPP presidential candidate for the NPP to cede
some parliamentary constituencies for the CPP/PCP. We further endorsed the NPP
parliamentary candidates in constituencies we did not have candidates. The result of that
alliance might be construed as skirt and blouse, but it was rather a mark of the success of
the Great Alliance”10.
Endorsement, which is an interparty coordination mechanism, often takes place when there is an
alliance and obviously, there will be compromises for the alliance to be successful. However, in
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Ghana, how the alliances have often been made normally produces split outcome because in the
parliamentary race, the parties retain their original name and party labels (Ayee 1998; Frempong
2017; Ninsin 1998). Even in the presidential race, when the alliance adopts a different name, the
government that is formed is considered the government of the major party that produced the
presidential candidate (Ayee 1998; Frempong 2017; Ninsin 1998). For instance, in the 1992
election the NDC and two other parties formed alliance to win the election and the government
was called the NDC government. Again, in 1996, the NDC and two other parties formed the
Progressive alliance and that government was called the NDC government as well (Ayee 1998;
Frempong 2017; Ninsin 1998). Thus, irrespective of the name of the alliance, official reports from
the Electoral Commission and Parliamentary Hansard had always showed the registered names of
the political parties (Electoral Commission 1992-2016; Ephson 2008, 2009, 2012, 2016). This also
shows that the parties do not register the alliance names, neither do they contest with those names.
They are instruments elites use to achieve their electoral objectives.
Though the interparty coordination has been successful as discussed in the preceding
paragraph, it has been a sort of quagmire that has adversely affected parties in alliance and this
could explain why the strategic withdrawal variable was not significant. There are published works
to show this and it is supported by my fieldwork. One of my respondents revealed that alliance
formation takes time, especially when you just come out from one that you got your fingers burnt.
So, negotiations did not end before parliamentary candidates were elected and deciding on who
should give up their nomination created conflict within the party and between members of the
alliance. Below is the quote of respondent 5 on the subject:
“In 1992, we had just seven months to prepare for the election between the time the ban on
political parties was lifted and the elections. Therefore, we rushed into an alliance with the
NDC but before the next election, we had to leave that alliance and enter another. With the
hindsight of the NDC experience, in 1996 we couldn’t just rush into another one. It took
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time and we couldn’t agree on the terms of the alliance before candidates were elected. Of
course, that can’t hold us from electing candidates. We operate by party constitution. So,
withdrawal of candidates after the alliance became problematic and created conflicts within
the individual parties and between the alliance parties”10.
Scholars such as Ayee (1997) and Frempong (2017) have substantiated how the inability to
strategically withdraw candidates by the NPP-PCP alliance created problem for the parties. These
scholars observed that in 1996 the Great Alliance (GA) between NPP and the PCP witnessed
coordination problems where alliance candidates openly campaigned against each other. In some
constituencies, for instance, the parties could not negotiate to withdraw some candidates because
the NPP and PCP had already elected their candidates who had started campaigning. Consequently,
in constituencies such as Ablekuma South, Awutu-Senya, Ayawaso Central, Okaikoi North, and
Okaikoi South, candidates of the GA campaigned against each other (Ayee 1997, 425, Frempong
2017). These could explain why the strategic withdrawal variable was not significant in both
models.
At the intraparty sphere, coordination problems, such as nomination problems discussed in
section 5.2.1 above under discoveries from the fieldwork, could explain why the successful
primaries variable was significant. From the fieldwork, it came to light among other things that
some financiers support certain members of their rival parties to divide the votes in the recipient’s
party for the candidate of the financier’s party to win. Furthermore, party elites who have
presidential and parliamentary ambitions can sabotage the present holder of that position even if
that person is from the ambitious contender’s party. In certain instances, it could be a person in a
position higher than the legislator who would undercut the legislator to lose the election for the
superior authority to introduce his/her favorite. The result often creates skirt and blouse voting or
skirt and blouse outcome. Respondent 4 said this about sabotage:
“…At times, if those at the top do not like you they will deliberately sabotage you. If for
instance, they should give you materials they will give you lesser quantity or different type
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of materials which they know you cannot work with. This will go on till you lose the
elections.17
Certainly, legislators do not work with “materials”, but the message is obvious. That is, sabotage
aims at undercutting the target person to fail at the end. Thus, the use of the word material in the
analogy above should be read in context to mean the mechanism of sabotaging a target person.
Finally, unsuccessful primaries have robbed the two major parties, the NDC and the NPP,
to lose the election in even their strongholds. The conflictual relationship that creates successful
primaries often ensues between an incumbent MP and the challenger. In most cases either of them
anticipates foul play from officials either due to sabotage or favoritism shown to either the
incumbent or the challenger. When it happens, it is difficult to resolve because often the aggrieved
person(s) does not trust the party officials. What follows is the aggrieved person contends the
election as independent. Below is a quote from respondent:
“In 2012, the former NDC MP, Dr. Ato Quarshie, who had held the seat for three terms
(1992, 1996 and 2000) staged a comeback to contest the parliamentary primaries of the
NDC but lost the primaries by just 12 votes to the incumbent, Dr. Joseph Samuel Annan.
Dr. Ato Quarshie was not happy with the results from the primaries but the party could not
mediate the conflict between Dr. Joseph Samuel Annan and Dr. Ato Quarshie. At the end,
Dr. Ato Quarshie contested as an independent and by so doing, divided the party’s votes
for the NPP’s candidate, Stephen Nana Ato Arthur to win the seat with merely 38.17% of
the votes whereas at the presidential slot, the NDC had won with 55.57%.7”
These evidence from the fieldwork aside, there are published documents that have shown how
unresolved successful primaries have influenced aggrieved nomination seekers to contest the
election as independents and either win or cause the defeat of their parties. In the 2000 election
alone, the NDC lost four of its safe seats to aggrieved nomination seekers who contested as
independents and defeated the incumbents seeking third term. Aside these four, others who went
independents caused the defeat of six NDC incumbents (Boafo-Arthur 2008; Daddieh and Bob-
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Milliar 2012; Debrah 2014; Frempong 2017; Osei 2012). In all these instances, the results were
skirt and blouse outcome pointing to significant skirt and blouse voting.
The above are some instances that Ghanaian political elites and candidates will openly
advocate ticket splitting. Political elites’ penchant of advocating ticket splitting is not unique to
Ghana. In the U.S. for instance, during the 1996 elections, it was said that some Republican
congressional candidates campaigned to be elected alongside President Clinton so that they could
check him (Burden and Kimball 2009). Again, Senator Joseph Anthony Manchin (Joe Manchin)
who has represented West Virginia since 2010 as Democrat is known for his liberal views and
voting with Republicans on many policy issues. In fact, most people here on West Virginia
University campus and within the United States that I discuss my research with had mentioned
Senator Joe Manchin as a good example for skirt and blouse voting in the United States. During
my fieldwork in Ghana, some of my respondents jokingly wanted to know if I received funding
from Senator Joe Manchin when they found out I am schooling in West Virginia. Thus, political
elites advocating for ticket splitting/skirt and blouse voting is something not entirely peculiar to
Ghanaian elites and, therefore, research into such a phenomenon is in place.
5.7 CONCLUSION
In sum, this chapter attempts to address an unusual question in split-ticket voting by trying
to find out why party elites’ coordination/interaction will influence ticket splitting or which
candidates will split their ballot instead of the conventional question, “why some voters would
split the ballot and others would not”? Again, it has also tried to make us understand how this elite
behavior has affected the current distribution of votes and seats share of parties in Ghana. In
addressing these questions, I carried out elite survey in Ghana in 2017 sampling 303 respondents
comprising party elites and card bearing members of five Ghanaian political parties, members
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drawn from academia, the media and civil society. Though the sample was not randomly selected,
it was selected to have a true representative of party officials from constituencies that have
experienced skirt and blouse outcome and those that have not. It also sampled persons at the center
of skirt and blouse voting (party officials advocating ticket splitting or threatened with it) and those
who were not. I also needed to be circumspect in my interpretation because of the sample selection
strategy. However, it is worth stressing that the regression results, the insights from the fieldwork,
and published works by others on the subject support my interpretation and conclusions.
As evidenced by the results from the fitted binary logit regressions, the interparty
coordination variable endorsement was significant in the models. Also significant was the core
intraparty coordination variable, successful primaries which was significant in both models and
having the signs in the expected direction. Candidate quality was also significant in both models.
The significance of successful primaries, for instance, makes us aware that party elites are likely
to split their ticket and advocate same where the party’s nomination process is undemocratic. That
is, in normal times, as long as the party’s nomination process is transparent and democratic, we do
not expect Ghanaian politicians and party elite to engage in ticket splitting or advocate that.
However, in non-normal times where a politician calculates and finds that adhering to the status
quo would mean that they wait in “perpetuity”, they would like to accuse others of irregularities
in the nomination process (Ichino and Nathan 2013, 2017) and use that excuse to get party officials
to take decisions in their favor or leave with other supporters to contest as independent. Others
who have parliamentary and presidential ambitions can sabotage their party candidates to lose the
elections so that they can in future win a candidate that had lost on the party’s ticket (Frempong
2017). In all these instances, these persons advocate skirt and blouse voting. In fact, leaving one’s
party and contesting as independent is not peculiar to Ghana10. In 2000 U.S. elections, former
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Republican Senator, James Jeffords of Vermont defected and contested as independent (Burden
and Kimball 2009). It is likely that his defection will cause ticket splitting. It will be interesting to
find out how he and his family and friends voted especially where after his defection he started
fraternizing with Democrats.
At the interparty level, opinions are divided about the effects of coordination between
bigger and smaller parties in Ghana which invariably have contributed to ticket splitting as in most
instances, the smaller parties support the bigger parties in the presidential race and the bigger ones
defer some parliamentary seats to the smaller parties. In fact, some respondents are of the view
that it was largely because of interparty coordination that the smaller parties could pick the few
seats in parliament in the past. However, in situations where the members of big parties have
refused to coordinate with the smaller parties has led to what Mr. Kwesi Jonah refers to as “the
withering away of the smaller parties” (field Interview March 13, 2017). To him, the country has
lost the voice of the smaller parties. In a sharp contrast to this view, Dr. Ofori Mensah is of the
view that the smaller parties have not articulated their own view since the inception of the 4th
Republican Parliament. To him, the smaller parties have always supported the bigger parties who
supported them and as such have not presented their own platform (field Interview March 24,
2017). Thus, others think that though skirt and blouse voting and subsequently, skirt and blouse
outcomes have helped the smaller parties to have representation in parliament because in few
occasions that the smaller parties have gone into parliament it was due to interparty coordination,
the relationship worked against the smaller parties. The reality is that in many instances, the bigger
parties poach the viable candidates of the smaller parties and independent candidates by giving
them ministerial appointments and other governmental appointments. These candidates have
supported the policies of the government of the day and have not had their own voice. The
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observation by Yobo and Gyampo (2015) that the electoral performance of the minor parties within
the Fourth Republic has dwindled and have been reduced to supporting the victory of the major
ones is a worrying one. These parties need to augment their coordination game by coming together
far ahead of time to give Ghana a viable alternative between the NDC and the NPP.
In sum, it is critical to carry out empirical research on how coordination problems affect
parties, elites, and candidates. Such research will help party elites to identify and guard against
intraparty coordination problems such as linkage problems which happen where there is no
harmony between the parliamentary and presidential candidates’ campaigns. Again, such research
will help political parties to take steps to improve internal democracy if they know that imposition
of a candidate on a constituency for instance, will cause skirt and blouse voting. We will also know
that young politicians who have legislative ambition but are not able to realize such goal because
their seniors already on the legislature have no term limit will make them adopt strategic
coordination that may hurt their own parties. My field research shows that though politicians do
not often overtly advocate ticket splitting, many do so when they see it to be in their interest and
do so more at the grassroots. In fact, the nomination problems and deliberate sabotage discussed
in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 respectively show how politicians like DCEs/MCEs, party elites with
presidential and parliamentary ambitions will undercut their own party members through skirt and
blouse voting. Such conducts take place largely due to coordination problems that parties are
unable to identify in the first place and address. Such a revelation will help politicians and crafters
of constitutions to have a second look at ways of reviewing existing laws and policies to limit
internal conflicts.
Ghana currently does not have a viable, major third party. The Nkrumahists who won
independence for Ghana and formed the governments under the First and Third Republican
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Constitutions have now run out of steam due to the existence of several splinter groups which
together attract less than two percent vote share. In fact, the 2016 elections results show that the
two leading political parties pulled about 98 percent of the presidential votes cast and 100 percent
of the legislative seats as per Table 5.1 and 5.2 (also see EC-Ghana 2016, Frempong 2017). This
is due to coordination problems faced by the Nkrumahists elites. By such research, they can
identify their coordination problems and craft proactive solutions for their coordination problems
and workout pre-election coalition ahead of the 2020 elections. They can also figure out how to
position themselves given that the Akatamansonia and the Danquah-Busia-Domo traditions
occupy center-left and center-right respectively, the Nkrumahist who are the original leftist party
can draw some votes from the left when they come together. Their coordination problem is not
affecting that tradition alone, but Ghana’s democracy given that there is policy vacuum at the far
left and far right.
This chapter will suggest that further research into ticket splitting should also consider
instances where party elites will strategically encourage split-ticket voting. Thus, questions such
as why would parties, elites, and candidates encourage ticket splitting can advance our knowledge
of the phenomenon. Another thing I chanced upon during my fieldwork, discussed under section
5.2.1, was how the financing of opposition election campaigns contributes to skirt and blouse
voting. It was alleged that some politicians finance the campaigns of their opponents with the view
that the recipients of such funds will find faults with their party’s nomination process create
confusion that will trigger observable indicators intraparty coordination failures discussed above.
Such acts often divide the votes of the opponent’s party and consequently, enhances the chances
of the financier or his/her candidate to win the election. This invariably promotes ticket splitting
in the recipient’s part. It would therefore, be great to research into such acts in future.
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5.9 NOTES
1. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Be-Bold-vote-skirt-and-blouseSakara-258747
2. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Let-s-vote-skirt-and-blouse-154036
3. Largely, political actors send cues to guide voter choice. In most cases, they want them to
behave as we would often expect (coordination/straight tickets). However, voters do not always
behave as politicians expect them to.
4. I use the term ‘interparty coordination’ to characterize any form of pre-electoral interactions
and/or arrangement between parties, candidates and individual deals between them capable of
affecting their electoral performance. It also encompasses their negotiations for policy and office
prior to the elections.
5. Interview with a Policy Analyst of the main opposition NDC and with the Achimota Zonal
Chairperson of the ruling NPP on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 by author.
6. Interview with NDC parliamentary candidate who was a victim of skirt and blouse advocacy at
the Parliament House on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 by author and with NPP Western Regional
Chairperson on Tuesday, March 14, 2017 by enumerator.
7. Interview with a faculty at the Political Science Department at the University of Ghana (Legon)
on Wednesday, March 15, 2017 by author.
8. Interview with the Deputy Director of Operations, National Commission for Civic Education
(NCCE) Ghana and with an NDC parliamentary candidate who was a victim of skirt and blouse
advocacy, at the Parliament House on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 by author.
9. Interview with the Deputy Director of Operations, National Commission for Civic Education
(NCCE) Ghana on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 and with the Director of Research to the main
opposition NDC on Wednesday, March 15, 2017 by author.
10. Interview with the Second National Chairperson of the Convention People’s Party on Friday,
March 10, 2017 by author.
11. Interview with the Second National Chairperson of the Convention People’s Party on Friday,
March 10, 2017 and with a National Civic Society leader on Monday, March 13, 2017 by author.
12. The swing constituencies are erratic in their voting patterns and any political party that wins
the swing regions wins the national elections since 1992.
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13. Constituency with more than 60,000 registered voters is considered large because it exceeds
the national average of about 56,000 registered voters and about 39,000 valid votes cast as per the
2016 electoral statistics.
14. Klottey Korle constituency is at times written Korle Klottey or Osu Klottey.
15. One of the faculty from the Department of Political Science in the University of Ghana
interviewed is the author of Elections in Ghana 1951 – 2016 whom I quoted copiously in this
chapter. The next has also written extensively on elections. He was a former head of the department
and has headed the governance centers of two think tanks. He is currently the head of the
governance center of The Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) in Ghana. The third wanted
to remain anonymous. I also received a great deal of support from the immediate past head of the
political science department who is now the Deputy Commissioner at the EC. He introduced me
to the president of the Political Science Students Association at the University of Ghana.
16. This situation is not unique to Ghana however, it has become an issue such that if an MP spends
more than two terms in parliament, that member becomes a target within his/her party. In fact, one
of the MPs I interviewed during my fieldwork (Hon. Alhassan Fuseini Inusah), who had been
threatened with skirt and blouse voting in the 2016 election on his fourth attempt hinted he was
not going to stand for reelection. I am not surprised he has confirmed that decision (retrieved on
January 8, 2019, from https://www.myjoyonline.com/politics/2018/July-3rd/inusah-fuseini-bowsout-of-2020-parliamentary-race.php)
17. Interview with a cadre of the opposition National Democratic Congress on Thursday, March
9, 2019 in Accra.
18. Standard measure of fit cannot be calculated for multiple imputation technique model. Per
Stata Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual Release 15, standard measure of fit does not work
with models estimated using multiple-Imputation technique.

Appendix 5.1: Coding at the Elite Level of Analysis
Variable
Split (DV)

Successful
Primaries

Threaten to
Leave Party

Description of the Variable (questions in 2017
field Survey)
To measure the DV, respondents were asked in Q26,
“Have you ever voted skirt and blouse (that is to vote
for presidential and parliamentary candidates in the
same election from different political parties)
before?”
I compute successful primaries using Q 5, “Please
select the statement that most closely matches your
view. In general, the recent parliamentary primaries
of your political party were successful”.
Threaten to Leave Party was measured using Q6,
“Did any defeated candidate of your party threaten to
leave the political party?”.
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Coding Rule
Respondents who answered “Yes”
were coded as “1” and “No” coded as
“0”
“Strongly agree” and “moderately
agree” coded as “1”, “strongly
disagree” and “moderately disagree”
coded as “0”, “neutral /don’t know”
treated as missing.
“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0”
and “don’t know” treated as missing.

Samuel K. Darkwa
Go
Independent

I generated the variable, ‘Go Independent’ using Q9,
“Did some losing parliamentary contestants go
independent?”

“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0”
and “don’t know” treated as missing.

Common
Pool

The variable “Common Pool” was measured using
Q17, “Leading to the elections did your party
maintain a common pool of resources for both
presidential and parliamentary campaigns?”
The variable “Endorsement” was generated using
Q21, “Did your party endorse another candidate for
either the presidential or parliamentary slot?”
I generate the variable, “Strategic Withdrawal” using
Q23, “Did your party decide to leave out any
constituency or withdraw a candidate from a
particular constituency to help another party win that
seat?”
The variable “Contest both Offices” was generated
using Q24 “Did your party contest in both
presidential and parliamentary seats in all
constituencies?”
It was generated using Q3 “If you answered Yes, on
Question 2, which political party is that?”

“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as
“0”.

Endorsement

Strategic
Withdrawal

Restricted
Choice

Party ID

Candidate
Quality

Education

The variable “Candidate Quality” was generated
using Q27 Why? which was a follow-up to Q26
“Have you ever voted skirt and blouse (that is to vote
for presidential and parliamentary candidates in the
same election from different political parties)
before?”
I control for education using the educational
qualification of respondents.
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“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0”
and “don’t know” treated as missing.
“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0”
and “don’t know” treated as missing.

“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0”
and “don’t know” treated as missing.
Respondent’s party affiliation was
coded as per their responses; CPP 41,
NDC 87, NPP 86, PNC 38, and PPP
44.
Respondents who chose candidate
quality (which was the most popular
response) were coded as “1” otherwise,
coded as “0”.

Education is on a seven rater-scale
from “0” to “6” (some primary
schooling to “university completed &
beyond). Respondents who selected “I
don’t know” were treated as missing
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
6.1 FINDINGS FROM THE RESEARCH
In this dissertation, I have attempted to examine how voter-level and elite-level factors can
enhance our knowledge of ticket splitting in an emerging democracy like Ghana. In doing so, the
dissertation employed Cox’s (1997, 1999) strategic coordination which posits that strategic voting
by the electorate is due to unresolved elite coordination problems. That is, voters in pure SMDs
for instance, will coordinate their votes on the top two candidates when elites fail to coordinate
their entry on only two viable candidates. This can translate into splitting when elite coordination
creates incentives for voters to vote strategically and the candidates a voter selects in different
races are not from the same party. The analysis carried out here has been approached at three
levels. These are: individual-level, constituency-level, and elite-level using different datasets
appropriate for each level to examine the phenomenon. This approach has helped to improve our
knowledge on ticket splitting, elite behavior, and Ghanaian electoral politics.
First, analysis at the individual level considered the characteristics of voters alongside
variables indicative of voter and elite coordination. I conducted this evaluation to determine which
variables best explain split-ticket voting. Interestingly, the individual level variables perform
poorly. In fact, the demographic and socioeconomic variables were weak and inconsistent as in
other findings (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Bybee et al. 1981; Campbell and Miller 1957;
Roscoe 2003). It was only income that was partly significant just in one out of the six models run
in chapter 3. By contrast, the political information variables: radio, television and newspaper
present interesting findings. First, radio exposure for instance, is negatively related to splitting,
indicating that voters might be listening to radio networks that match their political inclinations as
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found by scholars such as (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003). Newspaper and
television were partly significant. Put together, the effects of political information are largely
inconsistent as found by many scholars (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Beck et al. 1992; Burden and
Kimball 1998, 2009; Bybee et al. 1981; Campbell and Miller 1957; Roscoe 2003). Their
inconsistency with splitting is indicative of the fact that they can be tools for whipping voter
decision in certain direction during elections (Chandra 2007, 2009; Mclaughlin 2008).
Elite coordination variables such as party positioning and parliamentary split were highly
significant when used alongside the voter level variables discussed in the preceding paragraph. In
chapters three and five, I showed that when party elites distance themselves from their party’s
policy or position themselves closer to their opponent’s policies, they create ticket splitting. This
explains why perceived party similarities (candidate positioning) variable was significant. Again,
some party supporters and elites often withdraw from their PCs due to coordination problems and
that is a huge cause of skirt and blouse voting in Ghana. It was not surprising that the parliamentary
split variable was highly significant in all the models in Chapter 3 and the signs in the expected
direction. Certainly, comparing the performance of elite level factors against voter level factors
from the regression results demonstrates that differences in ticket splitting are better explained by
variation in the degree of elite coordination than by variation in characteristics of individual voters
such as political sophistication, demographic and socioeconomic variables. In fact, ticket splitting
has largely been influenced by changes in elite coordination. The relationship between elite
coordination and ticket splitting is depicted by Figure 6.1 below (constructed from Table 4.7 in
chapter 4), which shows the relation between disputed constituencies in parliamentary elections
and split outcomes in Ghana between 1996 and 2016. Disputed primaries in parliamentary
elections which is a major elite coordination pitfall discussed in chapter 4, to greater extent, seems
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to be an important contributor to split outcomes because almost every constituency that had
disputed primaries in parliamentary elections experienced split outcomes.
Figure 6.1: Percentage of Split Constituencies vs. Parliamentary Disputed Primaries 1996–
2016

Source: Created by author using data from Election Passport and Ghana Electoral Commission
Second, the aggregate level analysis examines how voter level factors such as volatility
and SF-ratio and elite level factors such as disputed primaries in parliamentary elections,
deals/alliances, and effective number of political parties affect split outcomes especially in the
parliamentary race. Using the constituency-level electoral dataset (1996-2016) alongside
published works that show constituencies with disputed primaries in parliamentary elections as
well as deals entered into by political parties, the dissertation demonstrates how coordination
influences split outcomes. The model controlled for three variables: regional effects, ethnicity, and
distance to accommodate alternative explanation. Interestingly, the control variables were not all
that significant. Each of the elite coordination variables: disputed primaries in parliamentary
elections, deals, and effective number of political parties were highly significant with the signs in
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the expected direction. The voter level coordination factors: volatility and SF-ratio were not
supported by the model. Furthermore, the signs of the voter-level factors were not in the expected
direction indicating that voter-level factors by themselves are not very effective and will need some
sort of influence from the political environment to influence splitting. This sort of influence from
the political environment comes from elite coordination which is in tandem with the strategic
coordination model that this dissertation advocates (Cox 1997 2006; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rose &
Munro 2003).
The third level of analysis was at the elite level where the variables of interest were
intraparty coordination, interparty coordination, and candidate quality using fieldwork carried out
in 2017 sampling 303 respondents made up of party elites and card bearing members of five
Ghanaian political parties. Also sampled were members drawn from academia, the media and civil
society. Given the target group, the sample was not randomly selected but purposively selected to
cover all of these important groups, especially party officials from constituencies that have
experienced skirt and blouse outcome and those that have not. Again, persons at the center of skirt
and blouse voting (party officials advocating ticket splitting or threatened with it) and those who
were not were sampled. To accommodate alternative explanations, the model controlled for
education, party ID and restricted choice menu to make sure that alternative factors that influence
splitting are considered. Successful primaries which is intraparty coordination variable was
statistically significant in all the models with the signs in the expected direction. Again,
endorsement was highly significant in all the models. These findings are consistent with the
political realities in the Ghanaian political scene where elite coordination successes and failures
have shaped party support and have caused significant shifts in parties’ vote share since 1992
(Graham et al. 2017; Kumah-Abiwu 2017; Lindberg 2007, 2013; Weghorst & Lindberg 2013).
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6.2 CONTRIBUTION TO THE SPLIT-TICKET VOTING LITERATURE
The contribution of this dissertation to the existing literature can be classified into four.
First, the dissertation shows how in-party and cross-party elite coordination explain ticket splitting
and consequently split outcome and by extension the composition of the executive and the
legislature. It shows how cross-party interaction of party elites can create cohesion even among
disunited elites. This kind of elite cohesion has the potential of creating consensually united elites
who see politics as bargaining based on the principle of give to get which partly explains Ghana’s
democratic success. Many people have wondered why Ghana’s democracy is seeing progress with
repeated peaceful transfers of power even in the wake of closely contested elections (Frempong
2007; Obama 2009; Osei 2015; Whitfield 2009). This dissertation is of the view that this has been
possible because the Ghanaian political elites are moving towards the zone of consensually united
elites.
Second, ticket splitting affects democratic representation and accountability. In respect to
democratic representation, electorates who want their votes to count do not vote based on partisan
identification but based on candidate quality. In this way, elections give voters the opportunity to
select the most viable candidates in the different races which can potentially create ticket splitting
in situation where the most viable candidates in the different races are not from the same political
party. The study also shows that ticket splitting better ensures political accountability in the sense
that it sends a clear message to political actors that voters expect competence and that it (ticket
splitting) has a way of promoting individual accountability by punishing incompetence and
rewarding competence.
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Third, the dissertation has reclassified Ghana’s skirt and blouse voting which has two
different meanings and therefore creates conceptual ambiguity into skirt and blouse voting and
skirt and blouse outcome. This reclassification harmonizes Ghana’s skirt and blouse voting with
split-ticket voting on one hand and skirt and blouse outcome (split district outcome) on the other.
In this way, the dissertation has made it possible to compare Ghana’s ticket splitting with ticket
splitting in other settings.
Finally, it makes the case that, though ticket splitting is seen as voter level phenomenon, it
could be studied from elite perspective as well. This is because, politics is largely elite driven; “if
elites choose to practice liberal democratic politics, then liberal democratic politics will be
practiced” (Higley and Burton 2006, 3). Since political elites are critical in the determination of
democratic success and elite interaction affects the available choice set in elections, it is important
to study how elite coordination affects ticket splitting and democratic success.
6.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
In spite of the significant contribution made by this dissertation to the Ghanaian skirt and
blouse voting and hence the split-ticket voting literature, the dissertation is saddled with two major
limitations all related to the dataset used for the analysis. First, the Afrobarometer dataset
employed for the individual level analysis in chapter 3 presented three major challenges:
differences of objective of the Afrobarometer and my dissertation, timing of data collection, and
respondents’ decision not to answer some questions leading to significant number of missing data.
In fact, because ticket splitting was not the goal of the Afrobarometer in its data collection, the
survey questions did not directly assess behavior or voting intentions that will cause ticket splitting.
As a result, I resorted to the use of proxies to obtain my dependent variable – split-ticket voting.
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Again, the Afrobarometer survey was not carried out immediately before or after elections to
survey voter intentions and their actual voting decisions. It would have been great to explore how
voter coordination can even lead to reduction in ticket splitting but the data did not allow me to
analyze this fact. For instance, a voter’s preferred choice may be party ‘A’ for president and party
‘B’ for legislature, but this voter may end up choosing party ‘A’ for both president and legislature
because party ‘B’s legislative candidate is subpar. Due to the absence of this critical factor, my
assessments of likely voter behavior may understate or overstate skirt and blouse likelihood.
Furthermore, a significant number of respondents did not identify with a party when asked in the
interview, as well as failed to answer some of the questions. This increased the number of missing
data in almost every variable used by the dissertation. I had to resort to the use of multiple
imputation technique to handle missing data. Aside from these, the dataset did not allow me to
find out which parties and candidates failed to coordinate.
The second major limitation has to do with the measurement of disputed primaries in
parliamentary elections, a major elite level independent variable used in chapter 4. As shown in
that chapter, in Ghana, elites coordination problem like disputed primary involving nomination
mainly occurs due to lack of internal party democracy. Where this happens, and elites are unable
to resolve the dispute, in most instances, the aggrieved nomination seekers rally their supports to
contest the election as independent candidates. This often divides the party’s votes and if the
party’s main opponent commands similar vote share, then electorates who will like their votes to
count are likely to vote for their next preferred candidate. If the party that voter selects in the other
race is from a different party, that will cause ticket splitting. To measure disputed primaries in
parliamentary elections, the dissertation relied on published works and media reports that have
recorded constituencies with disputed party primaries. After compiling all constituencies with
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parliamentary disputed primaries from the reports, the dissertation was unable to distinguish
constituencies where just one party had a disputed primary and where more than one party had
disputed primaries in parliamentary elections to measure the variable (disputed primaries) in
percentages. Consequently, I had to measure disputed primaries in parliamentary elections as
dichotomous variable instead of in percentage which is a preferred measure. This measure could
cause false negatives, especially in instances where I may incorrectly indicate the absence of
disputed primary in some constituencies. It worth pointing out, however, that it is a better evil to
under report the presence of a disputed primary than to over report it.
The final limitation, though minor, is the choice of Ghana as the laboratory to examine the
relationship between elite coordination and split-ticket voting. This is because the findings from
Ghana may not be generalizable to the rest of Africa and emerging democracies. This nonetheless,
the choice of Ghana allows the dissertation to go more in depth into how elite coordination
influences ticket splitting. This could be replicated elsewhere in single country case and in multiple
case research. In fact, I hope to expand this research to cover other West African countries as well
as other democracies in Sub-Saharan and Northern Africa.
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH IN THE SUBFIELD
From the afore going discussions, it is clear that, examining ticket splitting from the prism
of strategic coordination has expanded our knowledge on how elite- and voter-level factors interact
to influence the phenomenon. Notwithstanding the contribution the dissertation has made to the
split-ticket voting literature, the chapter will suggest few things that future research into ticket
splitting should also consider. First, it will be great to ask questions aimed at investigating why
party elites will strategically encourage split-ticket voting. Also important are questions that will
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seek to explore how elite coordination successes and failures facilitate ticket splitting. Such
questions will help advance the work of scholars who have found individual level factors to be
inadequate in explaining why ticket splitting occurs (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Bybee et
al. 1981; Campbell and Miller 1957; Roscoe 2003).
A second area worth considering is how ticket splitting and for that matter, split outcomes
promotes performance-based voting such as economic voting (Debrah 2016; Downs 1957; Fiorina
1981; Helmke 2009). Performance voting has received much research attention from students and
scholars of electoral studies (Anderson 2007; Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Hellwig and Samuels
2008; Helmke 2009; Kayser and Wlezien 2011; Moehler and Lindberg 2009). However,
comparative study on how split and non-split constituencies may receive differentiated responsive
and accountable representation that may produce variations in socioeconomic and human
development is lacking (Asunka 2016, 2017; Fridy 2006; Lindberg & Morrison 2008; Weghorst
& Lindberg 2013). Future research examining such differences is likely to enhance our knowledge
on the instrumental role of ticket splitting (split outcomes).
Third, in my fieldwork in Ghana, I uncovered how the financing of opposition election
campaigns contributes to the phenomenon of skirt and blouse voting (skirt and blouse outcomes).
It was alleged that some politicians sponsor the campaign costs of their opponents with the view
that the recipients of such funds will find faults with their party’s nomination process. When this
happens, the party whose member plays the ‘traitor’ role rallies support and contests the election
as independent candidate. Such acts often divide the votes of the traitor’s party and consequently,
enhance the chances of the financier’s party to win the election. This invariably promotes ticket
splitting in the recipient’s party. Future research into how such acts facilitate splitting will help
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party elites, policy makers and watchers of democracy craft solutions designed to salvage
emerging democracies from certain vices that impede responsive and accountable representation.
Fourth, where individual level factors explaining ticket splitting were considered, political
information variables such as radio, newspaper and television presented inconsistent relationship
with ticket splitting. This shows that the political information variables could be tools to
disseminate public opinion in vogue at the time of an election to influence voter choice in certain
direction (Chandra 2007, 2009; Mclaughlin 2008). It will therefore, be interesting to investigate
how politicians employ political information variables to influence ticket splitting. At start, it will
be important to determine the relationship between split-ticket voting and political information in
respect to its direction. A negative direction will mean political information does not influence
ticket splitting while positive relationship will indicate that political information impacts splitting.
Finally, this dissertation holds that, though ticket splitting was definitely not one of the
objectives of the Afrobarometer in its data collection, collecting data on it will help advance the
comparative study of African politics because other barometers do that. Thus, data collection on
voter intentions that can help determine whether voters will split their ticket would be helpful. This
may not require much space nor costs because already there is a question line that requires voters
to indicate the party they will vote for in the presidential race if elections were held tomorrow.
Additional questions that will find out which party the voter will vote for in the parliamentary race
will help figure out split-ticket voters. The next question worth looking into is who the voter voted
for in the parliamentary and presidential races in the previous election. This question will help
determine voters’ consistency of ticket splitting.
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